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CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEM AND DEFINITION OF TERl^IS USED
"Public relations" is such a recent arrival in the field
of the social sciences that the Encyclopedia Brittanica and
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences make no reference to it.
Yet it is something which has existed ipso facto since man
first organized himself into groups
•
Averell Broughton, one of the leaders in the public rela*
tions field, makes this point clear by stating that it is true
that the roots of the intelligent practice of public relations
go back to the dawn of history. Out of the aptitudes and ap-
plied intelligence of the great men in history came results not
unlike those achieved by conscious modern methods
Individuals, corporations, political groups, the armed
forces, in fact, any organized group, are becoming increasing-
ly aware of the need for good public relations if they are to
survive and prosper in our present streamlined, high-pressure
Civilization*
I. THE PROBLEM
Statement of the problem. The purpose of this study is
to cuialyze Air Force public relations and to examine its evolu-*
tion as reflected in leading publications of the nation. The
study begins in 1908, when it became evident that the Army was
interested in aviation, and extends to December 7, 1941.

2Public relations has always been practiced to some degree
in the Air Force, However, it has been only recently that pub-
lic relations became identified as a distinct and important
factor in its overall development.
Due to the absence of a conscious effort and a clearly
defined public relations program prior to 19^4-5, it is necessary
to view the past in this field by indirect method. It is as if
one turned the corner on Public Relations Avenue in 19l4-5j in
0Pder to determine what had transpired prior to that date, a
reflecting device must be used to peer around that corner into
the past. The "reflectors" in this case will be the editorial
pages of The New York Times and major United States periodicals.
The authors have endeavored to detach themselves as much
as possible from their indoctrination and beliefs. In order to
completely objective and unbiased, they have envisaged them-
selves as bein£5 isolated on an island just about the year I9O8,
with The New York Times and the aforementioned periodicals as
their only contact with civilization. It is believed than an
individual under such circ^jmstances would develop definite im-
pressions, beliefs, and convictions concerning the issues of
the world. This would include Air Force public relations
policy, its growth and evolution into the concrete form it
taites today. If those impressions, beliefs and convictions are
favorable, it is prima facie evidence that the Air Force has
fo^lov/ed a sound public relations program. In those instances
where xinfavorable public opinion reactions developed* it would
!
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seem that something went amiss.
Importance of the study. It is accepted doctrine that
before one can effectively study and analyze any problem, he
must first be av/are of what has happened in that field so that
he can profit from the experiences of his predecessors. It is
considered valuable to the furtherance of the United States Air
Force public relations program to cast the spotlij-^ht of history
on obstacles and pitfalls of the past which may be avoided in
the future,
II, DEFINITIONS OF TEBMS USED
Public Fielations, In the evolution of public relations
no concrete definition of the term has been made. It is said
that there are as many definitions as there are practitioners
In the field. The definition adopted by the Public Relations
Society of America follows:
1, The activities of an industry, union, corporation,
profession, •;5overnment, or other organization in building
and maintaining sound and productive relations with special
publics such as customers, employees, or stocliholders , and
with the public at large, so as to adapt itself to its en-
vironment and interpret Itself to society.
2, The state of such activities, or the degree of their
success, in furthering public understanding of an organiza-
tion's economic and social adjustment; as, good or poor
public relations,
5, The art or profession of organizing and developing
these activities; as, university course in public relations;
public relations requires technical skill in various tech-
niques. Hence, public relations officer, director, counsel^
or consultant,^
j
Aviation Section of the Signal Corps, This term was used

4to designate the United States Air Porce during the period of
July 18, 1914 to May 19, 1910 when the Aviation Section was
severed from the Signal Corps* Two air departments were created
on May 20, 1918 and v/er© known as the Bureau of Military Aero-
nautics and the Bureau of Aircraft Production.
Army Air Service, On June 4, 1920, the Army Air Service
was created.
Army Air Corps. On July 2, 1926 the Army Air Service
was redesignated the Army Air Corps which remained in effect
until June 19, 1941.
Army Air Forces. The Air Corps v/as redesignated the Army
Air Forces on June 20, 1941,
United States Air Force. On July 26, 1947, the Armed
Services Unification Act established the Air Force as an auton-
omous unit, coequal with the Army and Navy,
Air rorce. The term, "Air iorce", has heen used in this
study to convey the general meaning of personnel and equipment
i
assigned to army aviation regardless of the official designation
|in force at the time.
Media. In this treatise the term "media** is confined to
newspapers and magazines.
III. METHOD OF PROCEDURE
The New York Times Index and Readers' Guide to Periodi-
cal Literature were surveyed by the authors for all articles
which might have some bearing on Air Force public relations.
I
I5
I]
jlhis examination disclosed such a vast amount of material avail-
able that it was considered impractical to cover the entire his-
tory of Air Force public relations in one treatise. Therefore,
with the concurrence of the faculty advisors, it was decided
that this thesis would deal with the period 1908-1941, with the
possibility of subsequent developments being treated in another
j
graduate study.
Index cards (3x5) were prepared on 452 New York Times
editorials and letters to the editor and on 606 magazine arti-
cles written during the period 1908-1941
All of the indexed material v/as reviewed and information
applicable to this study was extracted on 5 x 8 research cards
which totalled 576 for xShe New York Times and 436 for magazines
#
In preparation of this study, approximately fifty per
cent of the research material was incorporated into the body of
the thesis. However, the balance of the information gleaned
during research is considered valuable for background purposes*
Due to the specialized nature of each chapter in this study, it
jWas considered desirable to arrange the bibliography by chapter
jisubjects rather than to have a consolidated bibliography for
the entire thesis. This will enable the reader to refer more
easily to subject matter pertinent to the special phase of Air
Force public relations in which he is interested.
REFEREITCES
1 Averell Broughton, Careers In Public Relations—The

Hew Profession (New York: £• P. Dutton and Company, 1943),
p. 23
y^^fefter* 3 New International pictionar;r. Second Edi-
tion (Springfield, luass.j G» .1 C« Merriam Company, 1945}

CHAPTER II
PTJBLIC RELATIONS ASPECTS OP THE DEVELOPIffiOT
OP MILITARY AVIATION
In the Invention of the airplane, the Wright brothers
I
created a form of communication which was to affect values,
mental action, transportation, relations between governments,
and other kindred denominators of human living. In addition, it
changed the entire concept of warfare so that the aerial poten-
tlal became a coequal if not prime consideration in the offen-
sive and defensive strength of any nation Involved in conflict*
ij
II
The movement of airplanes through the sky carries many
benefits for mankind. On the other hand, it has been recognized
1
I
for a long time as an Implement, if so used, in the destruction
of man and his works, Orvllle Wright, in 1941, said:
In a sense, I guess we didn't know what we were doing
when we built our first plane. We never envisaged the
plane as a terrible engine of war,,,,-^
1
!
To conjecture on the point of what might have occurred
if the airplane had never been invented would serve no useful
purpose. It has changed methods of thinking to such a great
degree that concepts considered to be final twenty-five years
ago have no such prominence today. It must also be realized
that the high state of development in which it exists today is
|by no means conclusive either in regard to its communications
potential or in its role in warfare. The future holds unlimit-
•d and undlaoovgred storea of kDowleds«> The Importance of

8jbeing open-minded and not bound by tradition with reference to
further new developments cannot b© overemphasized. This was
ijpointed out in 1935 when it was stated about the airplane that:
I
It appears that here again we have run into the old story
I
of a su^^^reme weapon destined, in the opinion of its advo-
cates, to revolutionize war. For there liaa always been a
tendency among certain enthusiastic propagandists to hail
each successful innovation in the realm of tactics as a mil-
itary panacea rendering all other forms of armament obso-
lete.
2
Vi/'hile the airplane has revolutionized warfare, it must
I
jnever be considered as the sole means by which one nation can
t
pestroy another. The predominance of the airplane, the glory
^ttached to it and the significance of the part it plays in war*
iCare may easily lead the public to believe this, A superlative
Jpublicity campaign with little contradiction from other Inter-
1
Vsted organizations would aid in the effort. But to do so would
Ibe to support a delusion which has no existence in fact. During
the inclusive period of this thesis, the airplane has been uti-
lllzed in a supporting capacity for the other services. This was
i
Jpointed out by Hanson Baldwin prior to our entry into World War
...The old terms--seapower, landpower, airpower—have no
real and detached meaning. The three are now merged in what
might be termed global power, with each service dependent
upon the other and with airpower absolutely essential to
them all, , , ."^
Military leaders have had varied opinions concerning the
|j?ol© that the airplane was to play in warfare. Although General
Ipershing later realized the greater benefits of aerial power, he
I
.Stated In X924 that the value of the airplane was Ita use aa an
LI
I
!1
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luxlliary arm of combat for the Army and Navy. Marshal Ferdi-
nand Foch, commander of the Allied Forces in the first World War
Bnvisioned the airplane's future in a different lights
...The military mind always Imagines that the next war
will he on the same lines as the last. That has never been
the case and never will he. One of the great factors in the
next war will obviously be aircraft. The potentialities of
aircraft attack on a large scale are almost incalculable,
but it is clear that such attack, owing to its crushing mor-
al effect on a nation, may impress public opinion to the
point of disarming the governments and thus becoming decis-
ive.^
The foresight of Marshal Foch was borne out in the German
Invasion of France in World War II when German airplanes were a
Bontributory cause to the crushing of French morale and subse-
luent defeat.
Public opinion has been affected so greatly by the concept
of aerial might that to the multitude of people has come the re-
llization that it has brought total warfare in which all of the
populace, not the military alone, are involved:
...Airpower has revolutionized not the principle but the
technique of war and made every man a soldier. There are no
civilians an^ore,..The meaning of strategic frontiers has
been modified. . .Used in sufficient number from favorably
situated basgs, it can exercise at least tenuous control ovei
narrow seas.^
To a great extent the public opinion resulting from the
role of aircraft in warfare is constructed by the statements of
Billtary leaders, some of whom have been farsighted enough to
realize its implications, and also by others who have been bound
by tradition and schools of learning from which they have never
laparted. These statements, by their effect on the American
I
10
public, on Congress and on other nations can either build or
destroy the public relations effort of the Air Force, Tliere !•
a tendency ainong civilians to feel that all members of the mili-^
tary know the answers. While this is recognized to be falla-
•lous, it is nevertheless important that when statements are
made concerning the role of aircraft they must be carefully
scrutinized and judged for their public relations effect. And
this is true regardless of whether the remark is made by a gen-
'
•ral or a private.
The historical value of the role of aircraft in warfare
is also important, \¥hat were considered to be new methods of
warfare in World War II were in reality the developments of somci
Ideas which existed before World War I. Consider the statement
of Frederick Todd in I908 which was perhaps the first printed
concept of transportation of airborne troops and the dropping
of agents into enemy territory:
,.It is anticipated that there will be occasions for the
use of small balloons shaped like the motor-balloons, having
the long stiffening frame hanging underneath but no engines
or propellers. These may be strung together in trains and
towed along by the powerful airships to quickly transport
small bodies of "technical troops"--the soldiers of modern
armies that do not fight but perform with great heroism
special duties that the scientific organization of fight-
ing now train men for,'
Knowledge of the historical element can be utilized to
inform the public that what may be considered as an entirely new
project may be in actuality the development of an old idea. De-
pending upon the state of public opinion in existence at the
- time, which weuld^^^ive to--^be—
e
ayefully judged^^^e^eBitlon migb^ =
I
be eliminated or favoritism encouraged for any project, If the
historical factor were known.
Since the Innovation of the airplane. Its effect on the
I
concept of warfare has been discussed at great length v/ith vary
Ing opinions. These statements have no doubt Influenced publle
opinion throuii;h the years. The feats of airplanes and the a-
mount of publicity which they received naturally brought about
i
I
favorable opinion for sufficient American air power. But not
without a struggle as will be pointed out In subsequent chap-
ters.
REFERENCES
1 ''Bombers—They Are Heavy Hitters of the Air," Life
^
llj26, July 7, 1941.
2 ?/• F. Kernan, **Our Heceptlon for Bombers," American
Mercury , 35 $205, June, 1935.
3 Hanson Baldwin, "Airpower," Life, 11:103, December 1,
1941
.
4 Samuel Taylor Moore, "Hagle or Ostrich—Which?" The
'independent, 114 i 177, February 14, 1925.
5 Log. clt .
6 Baldwin, loc . clt .
7 Frederick Todd,»¥/hat War Will Be With Flying Machines,"
The World »
s
Work, 17:10913, November, 1908.

CHAPTER III
AIR PREPAREDNESS
' A narration of the public relations aspects of air pre-
paredness must necessarily become one which correlates the many
elements that enter into the picture of building a strong air
force* Of tlriese elements, public opinion is one of the strong-
est, ViTiile there is no question, for obvious reasons, that the
public would want a strong air force diiring a war, the issue of
sustaining that strength during periods of peace becomes one
Which the American people, through their representatives in Con-*
gress, decide,
i Another factor to consider, however, is that the Air
Force is likewise a molder of public opinion and may create a
dominant force by its performance in the air, testimony of its
representatives before Congress or various appeals it might
make to the public. One might also argue that there are -many
proponents of the Air Force, who, in their status, military or
civilian, also are deciding factors in this molding of the
,
pub-
lic opinion in order to create a state of air preparedness in
the nation. It should never be forgotten, however, that these
people, military or civilian, are tho people of the United
States who are represented by the President and Congress, and
who are interested in a strong defensive and, if need be, a
strong offensive air machine to protect themselves from attack.
I
Little waa knowg^_about the ramificatlone of the airplane

(1
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when the Vi/right brothers soared into the air for the first time
and the situation was similar to ttxat of the atomic bomh today#
W© know of what it can do but we do not know exactly what Its
future means. We have awakened quickly tlirough media to the
possibilities it presents. But such was not the case when the
alrplai'ie was invented. The lallitary role of the airplane was
Ignored for a time in the United States, The realization of
the part the airplane was to play In the Araerican way of life
was a hazy vision; the ja rt it was to play as tho vanguard of
our military forces was a distant dream except to a few. Such
was the situation when the flames of war erupted in liurope in
1914.
THE PRE-WORLD WAR I PERIOD
It was not until 1915 that full awareness of air power
came into being in the United ^tates. This occurred only after
the European belligerents had proven what the rudimentary air-
plane could do in a military situation. Richard Harding Davis,
In the November, 1915 issue of Metropolitan, bitterly condemn-
ed the policy of our t^overnment in neglecting military aviationi
In power of wing—wMch is to say, in the number of mil-
itary aeroplanes he posaesses—the Airierican eagle stands in
the same relation to European nations tliat the barn-yard
ctiicken does to the hawk,,,,
,,,The blame lies at the doors of Congress,^
If the conflict in Europe was not enough to prove that
America was ill-prepared, a situation closer to home served to

1:
bring into clearer focus our lack of direction in the air age,
r This was the Mexican Punitive Expedition. In tVie light of what
h was happening in Europe, editorial comment again pointed out
! that of all the many wa^yTS in which this country was unprepared
for conducting military operations of any considerable magni-
tude or importance, its lack of airplanes in adequate number
and proper quality was perhaps the most obvious. Congress was
again criticized for being **obstinately blind to the duty of
equipping our troops with this most efficient of scouting in-
struments" and for subjecting aviators to wiiolly needless dan-
gers every time they flew in antiquated machines,
|j
Wlien Congress allotted funds for the purclriaae of twenty-
four airplanes. Secretary of V*ar Newton D. Baker announced the
War Department would purchase eight of different kinds for ex-
perimental purposes. Although this evoked criticism in itself
because of the urgent and immediate need for aerial strength
in the Mexican Punitive Expedition, it was also stated:
II
,,,0no might have expected, too, that work so obviously
essential to providing the army with aeroplanes as good as
the market affords would have been done, if not before, at
least as soon as, the first hint of possible trouble for the
country was visible and audible to eyes and ears ordinarily
acute • • .
•
But the responsibility for this situation, at once so
humiliating and so irritating, should probably be placed on
our national temperament and inveterate habit rather than
on any particular Administration or individuals. Not only
do we scorn to cross bridges before we come to themj we do
not even see the use in assuring ourselves that there are
bridges to crnss when occasion arises, and as long as gos--
sible, we ignore the existence of rivers to be bridged,^
Conftraaa continued to show little Interest In airplanea

15
and It and th« government, including the War and Navy Depart-
Jtoents, were berated for their attitude toward the new weapon
Which, it was said, was radically wrong from the beginning,^
'j It was at this time that the Aero Club of America offered
!to the War Department two airplanes for the nominal price of
one dollar each. This offer was rejected and served as a mile-
stone in poor public relations, Notwithstanding the rejection
of its costly and valuable gift, both to itself and to the gov-
ernment, it was stated:
...That patriotic and enlightened organization, the Aero
Club of America, forgetful of past di scouragevents and re-
buffs, is doing what it can to remedy thej^consequences of
j
Congressional obstinacy and blindness. .-^
I
Coiflaienting on a Dutch aviator coining to the United State!
to buy airplanes and to report home on ovt airplane industry
and anuy aviation, the Boston News Biireau, suioning up news-
paper discussion of the situation, said:
! •••He will report that oiu? whole amy only equals the
number of men engaced in aeroplane-making and operating in '
France, He will report that our aviation corps is helpless,f
I
because our Congress will not vote the money it needs,...He
will report that our uexican punitive expedition took all
the available army planes with itj that these planes were of
s such wretched construction and design that they were a source
it of constant danger and trouble, . .And he will report that
!' these six aeroplanes no longer exist, the last of them hav-
ing been wrecked, and burned to prevent capture, weeks ago.
He will report that the United States, making every con-
ceivable kind of heavier-than-air craft for liurope, has not
a single swift, quick-climbing monoplane for aerial auelingf
, that it has not an aeroplane with a machine gun mounted
thereon; that it has not even a standard bombj that it has
! no heavy, armored machines capable of carrying passengers,
heavy armaraent, or great loads of bombs; that it has so few
aviator officers that the loss of a half-dozen would crip-
|
= pie JAa mLlAts^ &^.^s^'if^^^^==em^^s^a^^ iwgva.e^ id=
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in small repute.
He would report that the country of Langley, Gurtias and
the Vi/'rightfl is, in aviation, the last in the civilized
world,
^
1
This was the dark side of the picture. Yet, out of tiila
criticism there was to come some e^ood, For it was slowly
bringing ahout the awakening of Congress and public opinion
through media and men of recognized authority in the field,
THE WORLD V/AR I PERIOD
With America's entry into the war, public opinion and
the press became more insistent that some action be taken to
increase the number of airplanes and personnel in the Aviation
Section of the Signal Corps, Finally, Congress appropriated
1639,000,000 Iri July, 1917 for the building of airplanes and
the training of personnel. The announcement brought forth a
boom in optimism lAhich was somewhat tainted by the production
Incident described in the next chapter.
However, prior to its passage of the appropriation. Con-
gress was again berated for its slowness in building the air
service even though we were already a belligerent and were pre*
paring to send American troops to fight on foreign shores.
During the period of the war, there was little editorial
comment concerning the exploits of the Aviation Section, These
comments tended to explore, in an optimistic tone, the value of
what our accomplishments would be instead of wliat our accor?Q3-
lishments were.
1 ,

17
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THE POST WORLD WAR I PERIOD
At the conclusion of the war, public opinion again came
' forth to demand air preparedness and this reasoning was based
I
on the fact that the airplane had proved its military value.
Editorial corarnent stressed the point that there should be a de*
termined effort to advance the progress of aviation and to uti*»
lize its potentialities, which were as yet little known in this
7
country,
[
Although the period prior to United States entry into
World War I was one of air preparedness, it was such in name
only because it had been brought into life by the immediate ur*
genoy of the war and America's imminent embroilment in it,
|i The long-range air preparedness movement began in the
period after the conclusion of World War I. The New York Times
editorial writer indicated visionary powers when he wrote:
,,,The next war, if there should be a next war, may be
won in the air; it will certainly be v;on in the air If one
j
combatant is aerially prepared and the other is not, ..S
THE PERIOD OF THE TWENTIES
I Until this tim-e, air preparedness had been discussed in
the press and periodicals, in testimony before Congress, and
by prominent civilians interested in the furtherance of avia-
I
tlon. Yet, no military aviator had come to the fore for air
preparedness because there wore none before the war who had
gained sufficient stature to merit public attention. Therefore,

18
It fell to Billy Mitchell and others who had received acclaim in
World War I to call attention to our lack of air preparedness.
In his fight to establish a separate air force, Creneral Mitchell
brought about an awakeninr^ of the problem;
••.We have, at the present time, in all the air service
in this country, only a few models of what our airplanes
should bo. We have no regularly equipped organizations for
carrying out txiese functions. Congress set aside more than
^100,000,000 last year for aviation, which was split up be-
tween the Ariuy, ^iavy, Post Office Department and other places
to such an extent that a united effort could not be obtained^
with incident duplication of work, ma-^ified overnead, and
an absence of a consistent air doctrine and policy,...'^
General Williaris, Chief of Ordnance, exclaimed: "A bomb
was fired that will be heard around the v/orld," after the sink-
ing of the ex-German dreadnought Ostfriesland by army aviators.
And General Pershing said:
We should have a force that can take tne immediate defen-
sive, and that can, daring a reasonable period ox' operations,
expand to the strength required for an offensive .10
However, it v/as mainly General Mitchell who carried on
the struggle. In the Saturday Evening Post he wrote:
During the following year, 1922, all tiie world's flying
records were captured by the United ^tates--speed, altitude,
long distance and the hours of time that an airplane can
stay aloft. In 1923 and 1924 we sank more battleships, flew
across the American continent from daylight to dark, and
then our airplanes circled the eartii, iiaving established an
airway clear around it. Tlherever an airway can be estab-
lished, there aircraft can go....
In spite of these splendid performances of individuals,
which have led the way for the world in the development of
this moat important art and science, and benefit to commerce
and civilization, v/e
,
today, compared to our resources and
ability, are fallin^^ back constantly.il

I1
I
1
The New York Herald Tribune stated that the deficiency
in the air could "be regarded without fear because there was no
immediate prospect of attack. However, it also stated that the
nation »s real danger was in the lack of an air policy as much
12
as in the lack of armament.
THE PERIOD OP THE THIRTIES
Air preparedness, as an issue, became a dormant question
during the early 1930 *s but it was revived towards the end of
the decade. The lack of editorial comment and public opinion
concerning preparedness was due to the fact that the United
States was struggling to lift itself out of a period of depres-
sion and more pressing problems were on hand. On the eve of
World Vtfar II, the Thirtieth Anniversary of army aviation was
hailed as the rebirth of the Air Corps, its release from many
of the chains of conservatism, traditionalism, ignorance and
13its breaking point with the past,
THE PRE-WORLD WAR II PERIOD
Following the lull of the thirties, a storm of criticism
was again lashed at the Air Corps in the period prior to Amer-
icans entry into World War II, Ifowever, where in the past
criticism had been aimed at Congress for its lack of sufficient
appropriations for the Air Corps, censure was now directed at
the latter.
The lack of preparedness in the number of military air
4
20
bases In the country was apparent when it was pointed out that
there were about twenty In the United States in comparison to
approximately 650 which Germany had developed. But it was also
acknowledged that military authorities were making plans for
new airports, strategic locations, undergrotmd hajigars and re-
14
pair shops.
Finally, in 1941, just prior to our entry into Y/orld Vi/ar
II, editorial comment stated that America was neither the lead-
ing exponent of air force nor the possessor of the greatest air
power and blamed it on a weakness for getting tangled and wran-
gled into "schools of thought, Experimentation in various
types of aircraft was criticized once more, as had been the
1 6
ease during the Mexican Punitive Expedition,
FINDINGS
1, Until American entry into Yvorld War I, public opinion
and the press placed the blame for lack of air preparedness on
Congress with only incidental mention being made of the War De-
partment in this regard. Lack of air preparedness was the alleg*
ed result of a "lack of interest" in Congress and the War Depart-
ment. As a result, the Aviation Section proved to be negligible
in the Mexican Punitive Expedition,
2, The li&r Department showed a lack of awareness of pub-
lic relations when it refused to accept two airplanes from the
Aero Club of America for the nominal price of one dollar apiece.
The power of public opinion was dexaonstrated when it literally
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forced the responsible authorities to take necessary steps to-
ward air preparedness after our entry into World War I.
3« As a result of publicity which had been given to
aviation records established by American airmen, the public had
received a false conception of the state of air preparedness.
Consequently, most editorial comment during World War I was on
a futuristic level rather than on actual performance of Araerl- •
can. planes and aviators in combat.
4* The state of air preparedness at the time of America'i
entry into World War I was attributable to a lack of a definite
air policy and clear sense of direction in military aviation.
This brought about criticism of the Air Service which closely
resembled condemnation levelled at the Air Corps prior to World
War II.
I
CONCLUSIOKS
1. The "lack of interest" allegedly attributed to mem-
bers of Congress might have been alleviated had they been
advised concerning the progress of aviation and the role, though
minor, it was to play in the 1918-19 concept of warfare. This
serves to emphasize the responsibility incumbent upon the Air
Force to keep Congress and the President constantly and accu-
rately informed of the developments in military aviation. This
is essential for two reasons: to insure adequate appropriations]:
and to satisfy a continuing requirement of keeping the American
public eognisa.nt of the status of air preparedness through theii*
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representatives in Congress,
2, When compliance with a regulation might serve to an-
tagonize a segment of the American public, consideration should
be given to the possibility of waiving the directive if the pub-
lic relations factor becomes dominant. The Air Force and all
government agencies must foster and maintain the friendship of
Individuals and organizations because of the powerful influeno*
they possess as molders of public opinion. However, this is
not to be confused with the nefarious practices of lobbying,
bribery, etc,
3, Criticism from the various publics of the Air Force
should always be received open-mindedly and carefully weighed
because on many occasions it might ultimately provide the im-
petus for positive and corrective action which would, in turn,
establish good public relations,
4, In order to insure that the public and Congress do
not misinterpret the value of aerial feats and records, it is
important that stress be placed upon the fact that such accom-
plishments are only a means to the end of air preparedness and
do not constitute air preparedness itself,
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CHAPTER IV
AIRPLANE PRODUCTION
One of the major activities of tiie Aviation Section was
the control, allocation, and distribution of airplane produc-
tion in order that the principal facilities of the industry
could be energetically directed toward the achievement of stand-
ards of quality and quantity for a supreme and victorious
effort,
I Because of this close relationship and the fact that
what the Aviation Section did affected the industry and vice
versa, a poor public relations policy fostered by one could pos*
sibly iaipalr the other insofar as its relations with the public
were concerned*
I
Therefore, it must be assumed that their combined ef-
forts would have to be one of coordination and cooperation be-
cause of their interlinked responsibilities in production and
performance.
In dealing with the public relations aspects of airplane
production in connection with the Air Force, two other assump-
tions must be stated:
a. In time of v;ar, peoples of a fighting nation are
^iprone to accept Y/ith optimism public relations policies and
statements of their government because of a patriotic fervor
and innate desire to win the struggle,
b« Sine© there is a very fin© line dividing this aubjaot

and security and since the latter should be treated under the
heading of censorship, it will not be dealt with in this trea-
itise* Consideration of these factors will be concerned more
';with the public relations aspects of policies rather than with
jjwhether the press or public were or v/ere not entitled to facts
jconsidered to affect the security of the nation.
Of primary interest in this chapter is production during
World War I when millions of dollars were appropriated for the
building of airplanes although few fighting planes reached the,
European front. Research during the period covered in this
thesis indicates that the public is concerned with production
records and goals during war time as well as in peace time v/ith
I
igreater interest being shown in th© former period.
THE AIRPLAFii SCMDAL
In July, 1917, ;ii>640,000,000 was allocated by Congress
for the building of airplanes, including the necessary provi-
sion of material, tools and machinery and for the establisxunent
of training camps and instruction in flying. Subsequently
other large sums wore made available for these purposes.
I
V/ith the announcement came optimism which resulted in a
flood of editorial comment, all of it favorable to the govern-
mental agencies handling production facilities, until actual
facts were disclosed and swung the public opinion penduluui in
the opposite direction.
A chronological analysis of comments in the press during
ii
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the period involved indicates the upsurge and down swing in the
attitude of the press and public toward airplane production:
1, A statement of supreme optimism (September, 1917)
j
I
America has solved the motor problem for v/ar in the
airl..»l
ii
! 2, The optimism continues but an attitude of doubt is
injected (October, 1917):
\i ••Under the law appropriating $640,000,000 for avia-
tion, contracts have been let for the building of 20,000
war airplanes* Only 5,000 of these will be constructed in
foreign workshops.
•
Mr, Baker speaks most encouragingly* The results of the
work are not yet visible., ,2
3, A partial revelation of the facts is made, yet there
is still a hopeful attitude (January, 1918):
t •••We know nov/ that we are not to have 100,000 planes in
tne air this year, nor anywhere near that number,,..
But the shock to us of this enlightenment was probably
no shock at all to those who have looked, and still look,
to us for help in destroying, once and for all, Prussian
I militarism. .. ,3
^* More facts but doubt becomes more prevalent (Feb-
ruary, 1918)
:
...Secretary Baker issued a statement intended to be re-
assuring. "Battleplanes," he said, "are today en route to
the front in trance," Looking forward, the announcement
was reassuring in a measure, for while Mr, Baker never ad-
mitted that the shipment was not large, he said it marked
"the final overcoming of raany difficulties met in building
up this new and intricate industry," He promised quantity
production of Liberty motors immediately. The "peak"
would be reached "in a few weeks",.,.
4
5, Optimism and hope fade. Despair creeps into the
picture (April, 1918):
i
«7
• ••In the New York V/orld we read, "Whether the expecta-
tions of the Aircraft Board were too ^reat or whether there
j
have been serious delays in carrying out the program, the
fact seems to be that airplane production is far from the
ata^e at A^hich the public was led to believe that it would
I
be by this time,^,^'*^
I
6, The need for action to correct a wrong (April, 1918)
t
' It will profit nobody if the report of the Senate Coxa-
j
mlttee on Military Affairs about our failure to produce
I airplanes for war service is treated merely as a contribu-
tion to the files of the document room.,^^o
7» A hopeless failure (November, 1918):
..•The report now given out discloses conditions of hur-
ried and faulty organization, executive misdirection and
confusion, woeful Inefficiency, unconscionable delay in ex-
ecuting plans, lamentable waste of money, and practices of
agents in the employ of the Government that, in the opinion
of Judge Hughes, makes necessary a criminal prosecution of
three army officers and the court-martial of another army
officer. . •'?
The above indicates that what had appeared to be a suc-
cessful and determined effort on the surface v;as actually an un*
fruitful adventure into the production of airplanes vitally
needed in the war. The public was misled from the very begin-
ning with statements v/hich were gleaned out of thin air and
which had no basis in fact*
the passings of the appropriations act for the production of
airplanes
;
In the month of June, 1917, the press of the country was
appealed to to ur^e upon Congress the necessity for the
passage of the bill appropriating i;^ 640, 000, 000 for aircraft
production. The newspapers loyally took up the work* Con-
gross with equal loyalty responded. The appropriation bill
was passed. Neither the press nor Congress likes to be put
in the position of even unconscioualy and with the best in-
tent furthering the predatory designs of profiteering con-
Confidence and aid were sougl;ht from the press prior to
iI
2B
j
tractors, or of aidinr; in the procurement of such an enor-
' mous sum of monev to be squandered by ignorant and iracompe-
I tent persons. •••o
i
I
THE ORGAMIZATi^.. OF AIRPLAIE PRODUCTION
: Although editorial comment about airplane production be-
gan to appear in the Fall of 1917, it v/as not until the Spring
of 1918, when it became evident that claims could not be met,
that the organization of production was editorially questioned:
[
•••Exactly what the relations of the Signal Corps with
tne Aviation Production Board are it might be difficult to
define, but between them they are responsible for the spend**
ing of a vast sum of money, hundreds of millions of dollars,
without producing a single battleplane for the front in
j
France after eight months of effort,,..
i ,,,It is so notorious that the twin promotors of army
1 aviation, the Signal Corps and the Production Board, have
not met the public expectation that the wonder is why re-
organization has been so long delayed,^
And one day later, the editorial columns of The Mew York
Times provided the sounding board for the report of the Senate
Military AfiairtJ Committee on aircraft oroduction which stated,
among other things, "the unfitness of the Signal Corps as at
present organized to have technical cnarge of the aviation pro-
gram. "^^ The committee recommended "that aircraft production b*
turned over to one executive officer appointed by the President
and responsible to him."-^^
On the basis of this particular case, organization be-
I
came a matter for inquiry by the public only when it became evi*
dent that the governmental agencies Involved had arrived at an
impasse in their abilities to get the production of airplanes
Ii
rolling.
j
A CHAUVINISTIC PATTERN
! It is a reoogiiizod fact that the American people Drlde
i'
themselves in the advanced technology practiced in this country
jand the results of that technology in comparison to that of
other countries, even to the point of boasting about it. Yet,
in time of war, they realize that an exchange of armaments for
the mutual benefit and employment of allies is advantageous.
I An attitude of "chauvinism in reverse" was another of
the attributes credited to the War Department when it became
jclear to the public that production figures would not be met.
With reference to the Liberty motor. The Mew York Times com-
mented editorially!
If the y^&r Department had not been so set on possessing
an exclusively Aiaerican motor. . .deliveries of French and
British models could have been made months a^o.^^
That correction of this attitude to bring it into line
with the opinion of most American people was necessary became
evident when the Senate Military Affairs Committee on aircraft
production, in recommending that aircraft production be turned
over to one executive officer appointed by the President, fur-
ther stated that he "shall surround himself with the best air-
craft engineers, both European and American."
A further indictment was made when an editorial comment
stated:
I
Constant tinkering with it [the Liberty motor] by the
1i
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specialists of the Signal Corps in an endeavor to make it a \\
triumph of American design, when dispatch was the crying
|
need of the war emergency, has delayed manufacture at the
plants selected "by the Production Board.,..
• . .The Signal Corps could have supplied the array with the
British Handley-Page machines, just as the Ordnance Depart-
ment could have armed the American troops in trance with the
useful Lewis machine gun, but there was once more a strain-
ing after the ideal, and effort was obstructed by the usual
red tape. And two other combat planes of foreign make are
said to have been available. But at the end of our first
year of war not a single American-built fighting machine was
flying on our western front.
Although there were a few favorable comments concerning
•ublicity in this case, an apt summation of the publicity venture
is represented by the remarks of Julian Street v/ho, in a letter
to The New York Times, wrote: i
•..Of the difficulties in aircraft production I know I
little more than what I have read in the papers. As with
other branches of the Covernment, there was, of course, much
ill-judged publicity in the beginning in connection with air-
craft production, and this doubtless led our people and our
allies to expect more than could be performed. .. .^5
Before the time that all the facts were known, an edito-
rial report stated, apparently in complete support of the gov-
ernment's efforts:
...Details of design and construction have been withheld.
Information as to power, speed, serviceability, and v;e;lght
have not been disclosed. It is right that it should not
be.... 16
This showed the complete cooperation of the press despite
the fact that newspapermen and editors are zealous about acquir-
i,
ing as much information as possible for publication.
PUBLICITY IN AIRPLAJIE PRODUCTION
Ii
i
!i
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With an attitude of optimistic patriotic fervor, the
same newspaper saidi
•••But the American program for military aviation shows
that we shall he ready, when the time comes, to combat with
all the Taubes and Gothas the Germans can send aloft, to put
new obstacles in the way of the German artillery, to pass
over the enemy* s lines, and let the Germans know that we
have not entered this war without a firm determination to do
our share in all the operations and the means to put it into
effect. 17
But doubts as to the validity of publicity being issued
by the Vv'ar Department crept into the editorial columns of The
Now York Times when it stated:
•••The War Department is shipping engines and parts
"over there" to be assembled as rapidly as possible. It is
hinted that the result will exceed all expectations, but
secrecy was imposed by President i^ilson himself when he for*
bade the holding of aircraft exhibitions. The decision was
to be commended. At the same time, an intelligent publicity
(release] about airplane production would be welcomed by the
American people. They can put two and two together, and
when they see a report of German activity over our lines conv
temporaneously with an official effect to reassure them, in
the form of a document more argumentative than informing,
promising that all will be well in the future but avoiding
a present emergency, they, the American people, cannot un-
derstand what useful purpose is served by the policy of suj^
'
pression or what harm v/ould be done by being more explicit,^
Like production, organization, and the failure to observO
the chauvinistic tendency, the government's publicity program
also came in for its share of condemnation, as editors, real-
izing that they had been a party to a deceptive maneuver after
having fully cooperated with the government's program,
commented:
The World's Washington correspondent suggests that the
trouble with the Aircraft Board seemed to lie in the fact
that it mistook flamboyant press-agent ing for proper pub-
licity. •••^^

3ft
Where the aircraft program in this country has undoubted-*
Ij failed ia in the flamhouyant , even outra^^eous publicity
it receiyed--let us even admit that it sought— in its early
days, and in too much optimism. The public was misled, de-
I
ceived, bamboozled, • .20
! The third thing that has sustained this criticism is the
policy of secrecy practiced in the War Department .The pub*
lie has not been Informed, . .The greatest harm this secrecy
has done has been to arouse false hopes .^l
In its report on the situation, the Senate Military Af-
fairs Committee on aircraft production said:
The Government officers having the manufacture of the
Liberty motor in charge have made the mistake of leading the
public and the allied nations to the belief many thousands
of these motors would be completed in the Spring of 1918,
l| Information of this sort, not borne out by the facts, has
been injurious, and its constant dissemination the commit-
tee regards as raisleading and detrimental to our cause,
It was also stated that the minority of the committee in
a separate report insisted that the majority had failed to pay
sufficient attention to the difficulties confronting the Air-
craft Board and the Signal Corps, and that they did not give an
accurate impression of the immense work that had actually been
done,2
3
Out of the clamor of failure came a recommendation In an
editorial of The Hew York Times :
,,,Mistakes have been made, very serious mistakes that
cannot be denied. They should be frankly admitted and
promptly corrected. That is the best way out of a pretty
bad situation. That v/ay will satisfy the country, it is
the best way to hasten the production of airplanes for use
of American soldiers in France, 24
|l Eventually President Wilson appointed Judge Charles E.
Hughes to investigate the situation. His report, made public.
Included a recommdndation for the court-martial of Colonel

Edward A. Deeds, head of the Production Division of the Aviation
Section. Many of the misleading articles which appeared in the
press were attributed to Colonel Deeds, It is interesting;^ to
note the following comment with regard to his attitude toward
publicity!
...In regard to the acquisition by the Government of land
I in the Miami Conservancy District for the »Viibur Wright
Field, Colonel Deeds in a letter to one Ezra M. Kuhns wrote i !
"There is no doubt in my mind but what we will be successful*
Avoidance of publicity very essential,. , "25
Eventually, Colonel Deeds was exonerated by a special War
Department board of inquiry.
FINDINGS
1. The government agencies responsible for aircraft pro-
duction failed to appreciate the interest manifested by the pub-
lic in production records and goals. Tais failure prompted som#
officials of those agencies to make exaggerated claims, promise*
and statements wnich did not have any basis in fact. After the
press realized that it had been deceived and had been an accom-
plice in the deception of the public, it bitterly denounced the I
responsible parties and called for immediate corrective action.
1 2. The innate chauvinism of Americans was improperly con*
sidered as a factor in the transfer and exchange of war materiel,
Chauvinism can be an asset in raising morale, but is a liability
if it becomes a dominating factor in a war effort. The chauvin-
istic tendency of the press v/as apparent in its initial unques-
f^^slng attitude"«ndr^^he=fi«%gi^41e editoy4^3?g^ ^fefae^peried^ I =

CONCLUSIONS
3^
1, Public relations programs and publicity must be based
pn truth. The whole truth must be self-evident. To leave "un-
I
^aid" certain facts of questionable or doubtful value is to ne-
ii
^ate the entire truth. As an agency serving the people and the
taxpa;/ers of the United States, the Air Force must recognize ita
jsbligation to always furnish the public with the complete and
unvarnished truth, except in those cases where the limitations
^f security intervene,
2, Cooperation of the press is a primary requisite if the
public relations effort of an organization is to be successful,
the press, especially when taken into confidence and when asked
j
jjror its cooperation, must be respected--not betrayed. To betray
It is to invite disaster in any future undertaking, because the
|
iress
will not hesitate to investi^-ate and bring into li^ht all
f the pertinent facts, regardless of the harm it mi£.ht do to anyj
ndividual or agency. The continuing need for proper relations
Iprith members of the press is considered to be of utmost impor-
j^ance in the furtherance of the Air Force public relations effort
and is discussed at length in Chapter XIII,
|
I 3, The War Department's mis judg^nent of the chauvinistic
i^ittitudes of the American people indicates that continuing re-
search into matters of this nature is in order.
I
i].. As a servant of the people of the United States, any
Sovemment agency must, in all ita policies and operations, con-
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form to the public interest In what it does in addition to what
Lt says. The doinr^ is more important than the saying.
5. Personnel selected for important positions in the Aip
Force should he, in addition to normal qualifications for the
Ibasky evaluated for their past awareness and practice of the Air
[Force's public relations policies.
I
6. When mistakes are made they should be admitted, cor-
rected Immediately and information concerning such correction
should be publicly disseminated. The public and press will
liccept more readily frank admission and correction than they will
istortion or omission of facts. The public and press always
Should be kept informed, not only when commendable achievement
has been attained, but also when projects are in a state of
favorable progression.
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CHAPTER V
THE PROPHST OF MILITATiY AYIATIOK
STORMY PETREL: A harbinger of trouble;—from th«
belief that the petrel is active
before a storm.
(Webster's Collegiate Dictionary,
1948.)
Any student delving into the history and background of
Brigadier General William L. Mitchell, U.S.A., Retired, must
first understand the above definition, because Billy Mitchell
was indeed a stormy petrel. Newsmen ^^ve him the appellation
early in his career and it has been associated with hici even
after death. Like msmy great men, Billy Mitchell's stature has
increased since he died in 1936 and even his most bitter enemies
must now admit that he was a prophet. In an article entitled
"Airpower" that appeared in Life in December, 1941, the noted
military analyst Hanson W. Baldwin succinctly stated the case
when he said, "Mitchell's vision was great but his balance was
slight. He overdid it."-^
BILLY MITCHELL'S BACKGROUND
From a public relations standpoint, Billy Islttchell prob-
ably e:iorted more influence on the future of military aviation
in the United States than any other individual. This was true
not only durinr- his lifetime but also after his death. There-
fore, his career is discussed in considerable detail in this
.^j^hapj^e^ beoauw it l a .£aX%^^hafe=^)e^re ^0ae^^caa^&ppr»elate-%^=
f(
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'reasons for some of his actions. It is first necessary to under-
stand Billy Mitchell as a man. He was, indeed, a complex per-
sonality,
I
I
It is necessary to go back further than childhood to un-
jderstand the curious compound of simplicity, hauteur, daredevil*
iti»y and extreme democracy that made Lilly lliitchell heartily dis-
jliked in sone quarters and regarded as a hero in others. He w&8
['descended from the clan of MacGre^^ors who had been outlawed in
iiScotland and who had adopted the name of Mitchell when they cam*
to America, His rather startling defiance of precedent and tb»
powers -that -be was perhaps largely the outgrowth of a twig
atrongly bent by heredity and circumstance. His father was a
United i:>tates Senator and his mother was a highly educated woiiian
"Who was mainly responsible for her son's fluency in French, Span*'
ish, Italian and Crernian.^
It is said that Theodore r.oosevelt had some of the same
i
qualities as Kitchell and for the same reason. Theirs was a
democracy possible only to innate arlstocrats--meanlng aristoc-
racy not at all in the snobbish senee, but in the sense of
noblesse oblige, ^ In March, 1925, after the smoke had cleared
away from the bitter dispute Mitchell had waged with the General
Staff of the Army and the General Eoard of the Navy, Tne New
York Times said of himj
,.,In the backwardness of aviation he had a good cause,
as even his critics admitted, , .Most of the officers in the
two services who differed with him were as sincere as he
wa3,,,,Their knowledge of aviation in relation to warships
was AS good as his, or better* He was too dogmatic, too
II
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audacious, too reckless in iiis conclusions
A factor timt was generally lost sight of during iiis con-
troveraial period in the 1Q20»3 was that ho had l)eon in the ariay
since 1393 and had mad© the war ^am© his profession, lie had en-*
I
listed as a private at the a^e of eighteen and was made a lieu-
tenant wnile serving in the Philippines, He had investigated
the Boxer troubles in China, studied conditions in Asiatic
Russia, laid 800 miles of telegraph wire in Alaska and had built
radio stations in Cuba, However, due to the fact that at the
time he was the youngest officer ever appointed to the Army
Generml Staff, his experience and Intelligence became obscured
in the minds of the old-line general officers who regarded him
as an upstart,^ In addition, he was almost too eloquent for his
own good. There are always people who mistake fluency for in-
sincerity,
Billy Mitchell was unquestionably the father of bombard-
ment aviation. Romantic historians of air power, in establish-
ing the origin of the bomber as a new kind of striking power,
are drawn irresistably to 1912, the year Billy Illtchell and
some fellow officers tried pelting a target with oranges dropped
from a plane ."^ However, an article in Fort^one fixes the date as
1920:
*,«U,S. airmen who have given the best years of their
lives to the cause of the bomber date the start as 1920,
when General Mitchell, at the height of a knock-dovm and
drag-out argument with the Navy, vowed he could bomb a
battleship to the bottom of the sea,.,,The general proved
]
his point, not once, but tv/ice,,,.^
I
I
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Billy Mitchell was described as a practical and not an
armchair flyer by The San Francisco Chronicle in 1925, which
went on to say;
It is a habit with him to say precisely what he thinks,
and one that is all the more embarrassing to his superiors
I by reason of the fact that he really Imows what he is talk-
ing about
POST WORLD WAR I CONTROVERSIES
Billy Mitchell returned from France, where he had com-
manded the A.E.F. aviation forces, with six medals and a convic«»
tion that the Army and Navy were obsolescent and that the air
service was to become the "i^ueen of Battles." In August, 1919
when he appeared before the House Rules Committee, he had the
courage to say that "high War Department officials" failed to
realize the importance of aviation as a fighting branch of the
service.^0 V»'hen Mitchell added that the Air Service had lost
[many of its best officers "on account of the pathetic attitude
toward the development and maintenance of aviation," The New
York Times stated editorially:
I Pathetic was euphemistic. Army officers who served in
France and know the value of the flying corps would be in-
clined to use a different adjective.H
i
That was only the beginning of a struggle between Mltchei:
and the raxiking officers of the War and Navy Departments that
was to finally result in his court-martial and subsequent resig-
nation from the service in 1926.
In 1921 he was having difficulty with his own superior.
f ^^148^ Internal a^^bfei»x=^^^^^^^'>"^foyfe^^iroe s said «dltor iallyx
1
41
It is to be regretted that Major General Charles T.
Menoher, Chief of tne Army Air Ciervice, has asked Secretary
Weeks to relieve Brigadier General William Mitchell, the
Assistant Chief, Both these officers had excellent records
in France and have been invaluable to Array aviation,..
•
General Mitchell no doubt has the defects of his quali-
ties. He is full of energy and very sure of himself; a
brilliant, active, positive, outspoken officer, who is quick
to take the initiative and assume responsibility. He has
urged a unified air service in and out of season, although
he knows that his superior is opposed to it.. ..There is a
great deal of opposition in both services to the proposal
of a single air bureau, and as General Mitchell is its most
vigorous advocate he is regarded with disfavor in some
quarters. Lven Secretary Weeks, who is trying to compose
the differences between the Chief and his assistant, admits
that General Mitcnell is not always tactful..,.
It is to be hoped that Secretary Vveeks will succeed in
persuading General Menoher to change his mind.^^
That crisis was resolved, but Billy Mitchell was only
temporarily deterred in his aim to bring about a unified air
I
!
service. In the meantime he turned his attentions to the ques-
tion of the vulnerability of armed ships to air attack. In an
article published by The Saturday livening Post , Mitchell %rote;
,,.Try as we might, we could not get battleship targets
from either the War or Navy Department in either the year
1919 or 1920,,,Vife saw that our armament was rapidly becom-
ing sufficiently per rected to destroy the greatest battle-
ships. ...^^
His prediction of 1921 was accurate, because in a test
conducted jointly by the Army and Navy, the Army Air Service
planes successfully bombed three former German warships. They
sank a destroyer, the cruiser Frankfurt and the supposedly un-
sinkable battleship Qstfriesland . This operation will be des-
cribed in detail in the next chapter.

HIS FKUD WITH THE NAVY
4M
Statements made by him during and after the Qstfrlealand
operation incurred for Billy Mitchell the everlasting disfavor
of the li&vj. In an appearance before a committee of Con^^ress,
Mitchell said that he was "inclined to think that Captain
Johnson [who had charge of the bombing of the Ostfriesland^ was
taken to task for permitting the Army planes to sink the ship«"l^
The New York Times did not view his statement favorably:
What was the evidence? Only "hearsay," as General
Mitchell admitted. That is to say, he was insinuating bad
faith on the part of the Dlavy without any proof whatso-
ever. • .If General Iviitchell does not use more discretion in
carrying on his campaign for aviation before the investi-
gating committee, he will injure his cause and forfeit the
respect of his supporters, besides inviting discipline by
them.l^
Herein, General Mitchell violated two basic rules of
I'good public relations: (1) always be sure of the facta and then
stick to the facts; (2) do not try to enhance your own case by
attacking an opponent's product, integrity or performance,
jj
The Outlook pointed out that in attributing to others the
'Intent to deceive, Mitcnell had cast suspicion upon the credi-
bility of what he himself said. It felt that he had done incal-
[Iculable harm to civil, mil^itary and naval aviation. "His ex-
treme and at times apparently reckless statements are bound to
discredit to some extent all v/ho advocate governmental encour-
agement of aviation."
I In the basic airplane -battle ship controversy, Billy
|Mitohell no doubt had a more substantial oase^ as evidonoed by
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this dispatch to The New York American from its Washinston
correspondent, Charles B. Parmer:
The report which caused President Hardinc to call the
International Disarmament Conference was made by General
Mitchell after the Army fliers successfully bombed the con-
demned German battleships off the Virginia capes in 1921,
Neither that report, nor its specific charges and recommen-
dations, has been made public. Even the United States
Senate is Ignorant of its revealing facts,.,.
General Mitchell's report was so astounding that high
officials feared that if its contents became public the
system of Army and Naval defense would be overturned, 1'7
The Outlook admitted that sometimes sensational methods
have to be employed to arouse public attention to public needs,
but it maintained that General Mitchell's mistake was not so
much in the manner he chose to present his case as it was in
the substance of his statements
Vested interests in the Army and Navy are resisting any
change which will in any way curtail or modify their author*
ity or permit the development of aviation as anything more
than a mere auxiliary of their activities,19
Air power can destroy anv battleship that has been built
or that ever can be built,
As a defensive agent on the surface of the waters along
our shores, a navy's usefulness is gone ,21
Testimony given by certain agents of the government
shows wilful ignorance and falsification with intent to
confuse Congress,^2
The battleship is fading away as a sea power; it will be
a liability instead of an asset .^S
Billy Mitchell's long-standing feud with the Navy came
to a head in September, 1925 after the Navy airplane PK-9-1 was
lost on a flight to Hawaii and the dirigible t^henandoah had
crashed* He burst forth with a blisterIxig public statement
,
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llThese accidents are the direct result of incompetency, criminal
negligence and almost treasonable administration of the nation-
al defense by the War and Navy Departments 24 "phis statement
was Issued from an airfield in Texas, where he had been assigned
as a Colonel, after he had not been reappointed as the Asi^ist-
ant Chief of Air Service (an assignment which carried with It
the temporary rank of Brigadier General).
That he had gone one step too far in his "almost treason-
able administration" statement is evidenced by this editorial
from The Independent :
As we go to press, it seems that Colonel Mitchell, that
stormy petrel of our Air E-ervice, must be tried, or at
least investigated, as a result of his charges of criminal
incompetence in our handling of aviation. Like Ajax, he
has defied the lightning; he has asked for trouble, and pre-
sumably he will get it., ..There is more than an even chance
that Colonel Liitchell will overplay his part and lose his
audience. The public sympathizes with a victim of official
tyranny, but it quickly tires of the individual who keeps
on shouting that he alone is right and that everyone else
is wrong. .. .Colonel iVIitchell, unless he controls his pen
and his tongue, will be impatiently dismissed by the public
as a know-it-all. He protests too much.25
In the same editorial, hov;ever. The Independent admitted
that if Billy Mitchell could bring about a fruitful investiga-
tion and inaugurate a constructive program, much in his manners
and many of his statements could be forgiven?
We believe that beneath the smoke screen is a hidden
fire. Without taking him [Mitchell] strictly at face value,
WG agree that all is not well with our aviation. It is not
as bad as he says, but it is not as rosy as the Secretaries
would have us believe. 26
That he was one of the most controversial characters in
laodern American history la borne out by The Literary Digest * a
I{
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comments on the first results of the Coolidge Aircraft Probe
i
In turning the eyes of the public toward the need of
such an inquiry, several editors agree. Colonel Mitchell
has served a good purpose.
The Pittsburgh Post was more ebullient in its praise
of his actions
One can not help being impressed by the man»s earnestness
and his courage in risking even court-martial to get before
the iuiierican people what he thinks they should know, 23
HE IS REPLACED AS ASSISTAI^IT CHIEF OF AIR SERVICE
The public relations problem which had been created in
September, 1925 as a result of his "almost treasonable adminis-
jtration" statement following the Shenandoah catastrophe was the
Irekindling of a flame that had been fanned by the press and
I
public opinion in March, 1925 when the decision had to be made
whether Eilly Mitchell should be reappointed as Assistant Chief
of the Air Service, His four-year term had expired and unless
'Ihe v/ere reappointed by the President, upon the recommendation
jOf the Secretary of V/ar, he would be demoted to the rank of
^Colonel and given a new detail. On this. The Nevv York Times had
editorialized;
General William Mitchell made it difficult for his su-
periors to retain him in the post of Assistant Chief of the
Army Air Service by the position he took as a witness be-
fore the House aircraft investigating committee and by his
intemperate and extravagant statements,,..
No one linew better than General Mitchell that in electing
to go over the heads of his superiors as a witness before
the House committee and trying to force changes in the air
service by charging inefficiency he was inviting a repri-
mand j, if not a court-martial. He will escape both it
II
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appears, because in the backwardness of military aviation he
had a good cause, as even his critics admitted. But his
methods could not be tolerated if discipline v/as to be main-
tained* • • •
After the smoke of battle cleared away it became evident
that if t-reneral Lvitcaell were to iceep nia post as Assistant
to Greneral Patrick, he would loom bigger in the public ima-
gination than his Chief or than even Secretary v^eeks, both
of whom he had condemned by iiaplication, i or the good of
the service it became necessary to appoint a successor to
Generf^l Mitchell, 29
The Hartford Times felt that President Coolidge and Sec-
retary of 'xVar Weeks apparently did not realize the amount of
resentment that Mitchell's removal would cause* It believed
that the action was taken "without the sympathy or approval of
the majority of the American people •"'^^
I
"We may wait a hundred years for another such display
of courage," observed The Cleveland Press , which admired Mitchell
ibecause "he would rather be truthful for his country's sake than
llbe silent for the sake of his job at 'A'ashington and military
Propriety •"'^'^
In the opinion of The Indianapolis Star ;
General Mitchell should be credited .viih sincerity in
|i endeavoring to reveal a dangerous weakness in the country's
aerial defenses. The course he chose, perhaps, was dis-
tasteful to him, but he felt that nothing short of the
spectacular would attract national attention, 32
The vehemence of the controversy is evidenced by this
statement by The Philadelphia i^vening Public Ledger ;
if it is supposed in »»ashington that his removal will
settle the issues raised by his testimony before the douse
Committee, tnere is more folly amon^ senior military men
in Washington than we had supposed.^'^
To The New York American the Mitchell demotion "estab-
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lished the baneful precedent that bureaucratic inefficiency must
be held inviolate; that all errors and omissions of superiors
must be shielded, "^"^ On the other hand, The New York YJorld
rationalized that "there was nothing else for Secretary Weeks
to do, for General Mitchell lost his usefulness as an executive
officer in the Army Air Service when verbal paasa^^es between him
and his superiors became harsh and personal. "^^ Therein lies a
principle to be followed in the pursuit of good public relational
do not permit internal differences of opinion to reach the stage
of becoraing harsh and personal, and if possible, do not air in-
ternal squabbles publicly; settle the issue as amicably as pos-
sible and then make appropriate announcements concerning re-
orsanization, replacement and/or shifts of personnel, etc.
The Norfolk Virginian-Pilot logically pointed out in an
editorial:
General Mitchell's retention in Washington in close con-
tact with the very officers he has criticized and opposed
would have boen a source oi constant embarrassment and fric-
tion. It is one thing to remove him from an important
position in the .»ar Departiiient to prevent embarrassment and
friction, but it would be quite a different thing to subject
' him to official pei^secution, ihere nas been no hint of
persecution, and if Secretary V^eeks is wise there will be
none . , , .^^
Aiid there was no persecution. Colonel Mitchell was de-
tailed to a flying field in i'exaa and Oolonel James h, techet
was called to .Vaahin^^ton to assume tne role of Assistant to the
Chief of Air Service and the temporary rank of Brigadier Oen-
eral.
Colonel Mitchell issued the following statement to the
I
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press after the decision concerning his reassignment had been
announced t
There have "been few months that have ijassed when an
attempt has not been made to dispense with my services.
The question of my reappolntnerit in a small matter; the
question of the reorcajciization of our system of national
defense is a very bl^ raatter. We are spending too much
money, and getting too little for it, V»'e have only o.i»
most rudimentary plans for the future, {md no or^ranization
capable of carrying thein out in their entirety,^'
court-maflTial stirs national interest
To the surprise of all who were following the develop-
ment of the case, charges were brought against Colonel Mitchell
under the 96th Article of V/ar, The general expectation had been
!
that they would be brought under the 62nd Article of War, which
I
covers insubordination* The article under which the caarges
were brought covers conduct to the prejudice of good order and
military discipline. There were a total of eight specifica-
Itions, only one of v/hich related to the statement he made fol-
j lowing the loss of the Shenandoah.
That the officers sitting on the court-martial were a-
jware of tne public interest in the trial is evidenced by this
I New York x ime 3 editorial:
The army court-martial trying Colonel Jiilllam Mitchell...
cannot be cnarged with indifference to his full legal
rights. i?rom the opening day it has been scrupulous in
recognizing them, evoii to the point of giving the benefit
of every doubt • • .
.
Colonel iilitchell cannot complain that his rights are
being tampered ifcitn. The Court is so far from being arbi-
trary in its rulings that it iias allowed his counsel more
latitude than is usual in military trials. 38
(
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The New York Times felt tliat it was as essential that the
whole truth about the air services he brought out as that Colon©
Mitchell should have his day in court. It v»'as pointed out that
Tor once the audience included the whole people, and they were
pftyin^, strict attention to the proceedings;
Since the v/ar there have been more than twenty invest iga*»
tions of the air services. Possibly nothing new can be
brought out. lio'vvever, it must be remembered that the public
had paid little attention to previous inquiries. It is
intensely interested In the one i^oinz on at V.ashington, be-
cause the officer charged v/ith insubordination iias been an
aggressive champion of reform in military aviation, and in
criticiziiii,; his superiors has risked his commission. .. .The
public opinion is that the administration of aeronautics,
as well as Colonel Mitchell, is on trial, ...'^^
The Outlook complained that an illusion had been shat-
tered; that "the only court-martial that the public has known
much about in this generation la not the personification of
severity that courts-martial have been supposed to be."^^
In an article in The Independent of D<§cember 19* 1925
Samuel Taylor Moore pointed out the difficult decision that
faced the court-martial in arriving at a proper sentence for
Colonel Mitchell (it was a foregone conclusion that he would be
found (guilty). A severe sentence would at once elevate him to
a position of martyr, a role which would not have been unpleas-
ant to ililly Mitchell's tastes. On the other hand, a mere rep-
i
rlmand would be tantamount to a vindication of his views, ^e
further stated that:
Regardless of the decree of guilt returned by the Army
judges. Colonel Mitchell has achieved a position vmicxh
marks him firmly as the spokesman for air power as a pri-
mary weapon in national defense. .^l
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That Billy Mitchell had his following is evidenced by
Mr» Moore* 8 comment:
The great personal popularity of Colonel Mitchell and
his cause Is attested hy hearty applause whenever and
wherever his picture is flashed upon the screen of a
motion picture house.,..
While the court-martial was in process. Collier^ XDUb-
lishod an article which explained to some degree why Billy
Mitchell had sounded off from San Antonio after the Shenandoah
crash, almost before the din concerning his demotion had sub-
sided. A well-v/isher had pointed out to him that had he sat
tight and waited, he would have been retired in three years,
probably as a Major General, and Vi^ould nave then had the right
to speak his mind whenever and wherever he cared to do so,
"But," he exclaimed irapatiently, "can't you see that might be
too late? I've i^ot to talk now, quick, while people are lis-
tening and while I've got the nerve, The article went on to
say that Mitchell cheerfully faced court-martial and possible
disgrace, "because," as he explained, "l shall be a danm ?lght
more useful down and out than I ever v/as on top."^^ The article
also clarified a point on which the public had been confused:
...And by the way, he was not demoted from his brigadier
generalship, as is popularly supposed; it was a four year's
position to which he was simply not reappointed,^^
The record of the trial consisted of 1,400,000 words,
after seven weeks of testimony. At the last Colonel Mitcnell,
after being denounced by the counsel for the prosecution as a
"self-advertising demagog" and likened to Aaron Burr, was found
=44u41ty-jmd^ 8entenced^ to be swpaiadad^gojn^-raai&^^ooinmafid and
ii
and duty, with forfeiture of all pay and allowances for five
years • The verdict further stated, "The court is thus lenient
because of the military record of the accused during the World
War," 4^
In a statement made on the final day of the trial.
Colonel Mitchell told the court:
My trial before this court-martial is the culmination
of the efforts of the General Staff of the Army and the
General Board of the Navy to depreciate the value of air
power and keep it in an auxiliary position which absolutely
compromises our whole system of national defense,*'
But after all this dramatic shattering of precedent,
i«ditorial writers agreed that nothing was settled except the
iltechnical fact of Colonel Mitchell's conduct prejudicial to
!l
ilgood order and discipline, Mitchell's counsel. Representative
jFrank R, Reid, said, "Colonel William Mitchell is a 1925 John
iBrown, They may think that they have silenced him, but his
Ideas will go marching on, and those who crucified him will be
^he first to put his aviation suggestions into use,"^^
After the trial The Independent reiterated its confidence
in his sincerity, courage and resourcefulness. It felt that he
thad performed a valuable service in calling attention to obvious
flins of omission and commission in the conduct of our national
defense. It went on to sayt
His manner of attracting public attention has been spec-
tacular, imprudent and intemperate—for which he has been
soundly disciplined. But the public appreciates his honesty
and devotion. His own conscience is clear and iiis friends
are as of the sands of the sea.^^
In that statement The Independent was probably correct
,
BOSTOn UMlVERSiTY
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Xmt they erred in this prediction:
,i
I
In all probability, the severity of the sentence will be
'i mitigated, if not immediately, within a reasonable time,
I and Colonel Mitchell will be welcomed back into the fold of
j
active duty by all those brother officers who appreciate a
brave man and an honest one, knowing that he serves his
countrv devotedly according to his somewhat individual
code. SO
|i While the press as a whole upheld the conviction, if not
lithe sentence, the great majority of newspapers took the view
jlthat, despite his technical guilt, he had done the country a
i!
!
service by focusing the attention of Congress and the public on
! the needs of American aviation. Following are a few examples
of statements by the press, revealing the vast difference of
opinion concerning this unique personality:
The Colonel has been not only a troublemaker in his pro-
fession, but also a loosely grounded and regrettably vis-
ionary strategist. (The New York Herald Tribune
Colonel Mitchell destroyed his whole case when he ad-
mitted on the witness stand that nis intemperate assaults
on the heads of the Army and Navy were merely vehement ex-
pressions of personal opinion. ( The Chicago Daily Hews )^^
By making unsupported accusations. Colonel Mitchell did
a wrong to men who had brilliantly and efficiently served
the American people, (The Los Angeles Times ) 55
I As a result of his trial, improvements in our military
air service are sure to be made. ( The Boston Post
In the public mind, the score still stands in favor of
Colonel William Mitchell, (The Pittsburgh Sun ) 55
He is guilty of the charges, but the country thinks
j
none the less of him, (The Albany Evening News) 56
An overwhelming majority of the people think Colonel
Mitchell was substantially right, very courageous, but, of
course, indiscreet. (The New York American ) 57
SOy the court-martial seemed to have served no useful
I
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purpose. As soon as Colonel Mitchell learned that the sentence
had been approved by the President, he submitted his resii^s^a-
tion, which was promptly accepted, V/hereupon, he retired to a
farm in Virginia and took up the life of a country gentleman.
tIAN OF VISION
Billy Mitchell died in February, 1936, so he did not get
to see the fulfillment of his prophesies, which have come true,
almost without exception. In 1925 he cited the necessity of
coordinating the policy of national defense with foreign rela-
tions and financial ability:
Our national defense should be coordinated under a single
direction witxi a Secretary of National Defense having under
him Sub-secretaries of Air, Land and Water, There should be
a council in connection with this department having in it
the Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, and the
Sub-secretaries of Air, Land and Water to recommend the
policies of national defense to the President ,58
In response to another of his prophetic statements in
!l925. The New York Times cautioned:
It is to be hoped that Colonel Mitchell weighs his words
^en he says it is his belief that this biplane could fly,
with a single stop at Nome, to Peking, carrying a ton of
explosives ,59
The distance cited is approximately 5,700 miles and of
course presents no problem at all to current aviation. This
||was in sharp contrast to the statement made that same year by
General Hugh Drum, speaking for the V/ar Department:
Military aviation has been and will be auxiliary to the
decisive element of ground battle. As to the bomber's
radius of action, as far as we can see now, future develop-
ment Is going to limit it to 300 mllee.^^
II
(
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The incredibility with which some of Billy Mitchell's
predictions v/ere regarded is evidenced in this editorial from
the February 25, 1925 New York Times ;
The sudden decision of the House committee investigating
aircraft conditions to shut off the inquiry just v/here it
is caused a ^^reat stir in Washington. It was thought to
have mysterious significance .Perhaps there is no great
mystery about it after all. It raay be that the committee
waked up to the fact that its methods were degenerating in-
to opera bouffe. No witness was too absurd to be listened
to with grave respect, i'he most extravagant stateraents vwre
swallowed whole by some of the members of the committee.
Thus on Thursday last General uitcnell dropped in a casual
way his opinion that Japan could capture the Philippines,
the Hawaiian islands and other Ajaerican possessions in the
Pacific in two weeks time. Representative Reed of Illinois
was aghast at this, wrung his hands, metaphorically, and
asked plaintively if "we could not stop it." General
Mitcnell, as tne improvised military strategist of the
whole world, assured him that we could not •• ..Yet there
probably is no responsible officer in our navy, or in any
other navy, who believes that Hawaii could bo taken by
Japan at all. The general military opinion is that Japan
would never undertake so desperate an enterprise ,,, ,S1
However, the consensus in late December, 1941 v/as that
Japan could have taken Hawaii, had not her General Staff badly
[miscalculated.
In March, 1934, during the Army's air mail crisis, the
!
country squire was called to the V/hite House for a conference
and later went before the Senate Post Office Committee, Army
air service, he thought, was in wretched condition. Had it
progressed along the lines it was headed for in 1924, he believec,
that by 1934 it would have had planes flying 400 miles an hour
and cruising non-stop for 6,000 miles. ^2 ( visionary plane
bears a startling resemblance to the B-36 bomber, which appeared
Ion the ayiation seene aomo fourteen years later*)
i
68
Then he tossed out a chilling thought to the Senate com-
mittee: "Right now. United States Army hombers should be able
to fly through thick Alaskan fog directly into Japan. Some day
such flights might be necessary. In October of that same
year (1934) the followin^^ appeared as a letter to the editor of
The New York Times t
The press reported recently a statement of a most inflam-
matory nature made by Brigadier General William iVi;itcnell to
the President's aviation commission in V.'ashington. We can
well imagine the feelings of the Japanese upon learning
that a military man of influence in the United States had
asserted that "our most dangerous enemy is Japan and our
planes should be designed to attack Japan."
That the peace of the world can be deeply affected by
the idle mouthings of a few should be apparent to all,^*
Those who lost their lives at Pearl Harbor no doubt wish
that the "idle mouthings" of this seer of aviation had been
heeded. In ills book Winged Defense
,
published in 1925, he wrote
...Alaska should be provided with an air force of 500
planes, 200 of them for pursuit work and 100 for bombard-
ment ....The airways should be orgaxiized. . .from the United
States to Alaska as far as Jiome...and also down the Alaskan
Peninsula and the Aleutian Islands to the island of At-
4-11 65
w U. . . . .
However, it was not until the SumiTier of 1936 that the
Army sent three officers to Fairbanks "for the purpose of select
ing a suitable site for use as an aviation base."
In 1933 he had demanded a super air fleet built around a
force of 2,000 long-range bombers. No bombers of the kind he
described—craft txiat would fly 6,000 to 8,000 miles, rise to
1
35,000 feet and carry a huge load of bomb3--were then in exist-
ence. But they could and should be built, said Mitoliell.®'^
i
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He said in 192? thf.t aircraft could "stand off a hundred
or more miles and launch air torpedoes carrying hundreds of
pounds of gas, explosive or f ire-makin^^ ccwipoimds and hit a
place lil.e New York practically every time. Airplanes do not
have to fly over a place to attack it,"^^ Guided aerial mis-
tiles came into being during: World War II and with the advent
of television there is a possibility that before long Billy
Mitchell* s prediction of a plane hitting its target from "a him*
dred or more miles away" might become an actuality*
Also borne out during Vi/orld War II was his prediction
that "not only may they use the air torpedo but they can also
put wings on their bombs, which will allow them to glide for
many miles to their objectives #"^9
One prediction in his book (192^) has not yet been real-
izedt
I can say now, definitely, that we can encircle t3ie
glob© in a very short time on a single charge of gasoline .7^
With the development of atomic energy, it is possible
that planes will be able to encircle the globe without refuel-
ing, so time rrny prove even this prediction to be correct.
Like the Italian air general Giulio Douliet, Billy Mitch-
ell made a mistaice v;hich has frequently been made in military
history: oach new instrument has been extolled as the be-all,
do-all and end-all of v/arfare, Mahan's brilliant exposition of
sea power was often misinterpreted. Prom it grew tlrie wholly
erroneous notion that sea power was the principal determinant
i
i
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of history, that sea power alone won wars. The same nlstake v/as
made for land power, whose chief advocate vras the aernian,
Clausewltz, Douhet and Billy Mitchell v/ent overboard for air
power.
As was stated at the becinnln^, Billy Mitchell »s vision
was great hut his balance was slight, fie overdid it I
FUNDINGS
1, Billy Mitchell was keenly aware of the pov;er of
public opinion. He felt that only the spectacular could at-
tract attention and sometimes he was indiscreet to the extreme.
The courage of his convictions was so strong that he could not
tolerate divergence to his opinions. Diplomacy was almost en-
tirely lacking in him,
2, He v/as a man of great vision. His concept of aerial
warfare was fifteen to twenty years ahead of his time. He
aroused the public »s interest in aviation, but by his statements
] and methods he alienated many, who otherwise might have been
supporters of his cause,
3, He failed to appreciate the fact that every worth-
while cause nearly always suffers adverse opinion at the very
beginning. Had he been able to exercise tolerance and diplomacy
|the cause of aviation would have been advanced £:reatly,
CONCLUSIONS
I
1* Merely "being right** la not suffleient. In fact« It
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is of little value unless the doctrine or theory is accepted by
those who must support the project. Diplomacy and tolerance,
tooth vital factors in ^^ood public relations, are essential to
the furtherance of any cause,
2. Insubordination is sometin.es as valuable In its re-
sults as subordination normally is. So long as we are Aoiericans
we will cheer the man who does the big thing, the unselfish
thing, the right thing in a ^rave emergency, no matter how many
the precedents or how well established the custom or decorum
which he ruthlessly tramples underfoot in doing so.
3. Billy Mitchell was sorely in need of an outstanding
public relations officer. However, there is some doubt v^hether
such an assistant would have been of much value, due to the fact
that Mitchell was apparently an extreme egoist and possibly
might not have heeded the advice of his counselor.
4. Personality traits and characteristics play an im-
portant role in establishing proper public relations for an in-
dividual, and, in turn, the organization v/ith v/hich he is asso-
ciated. By some of his statements Billy Mitchell provoked and
irritated a certain percentage of the public and press. Con-
sciously or unconsciously, through association of ideas, their
feelings toward iMitchell were transferred to the Air Service.
5. The members of the General Staff of the Army and the
General Board of the Navy did not enhance their prestige in the
ijeyes of the public after their many encounters with Billy Mitch-
ell. It is felt that their blind adherence to tradition and
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CHAPTER VI
;| THE AIRPLANE-BATTLESHIP CONTROVERSY
i|
"Anger blows out the lamp of the mind* In the exam-
ination of a great and Important question, every one
should "be serene, slow-pulaed, and calm,'*— INGJ:i2iS0LL
"This controversy has caused more lll-feelln^^ between
the two services than has existed at any time in their history,"
wrote Robert T, Small In March, 1925,"^ He was referring to the
long-standing squabble between the Army and the Navy as to the
value of the battleship and the airplane, A climax in the ar- '
gument had been reached when the Army offered to sink any war-
ship the Navy boasted, and stipulated that the task could be
accomplished in from two to four minutes.
At this point. Congress decided to step in and examine
the merits of the conflicting claims. The New York ' Times noted
'j tditorially Uiat it was imperative that Con^-ress should "see
|!
the light," It pointed out that Congress had seemed to be con-
|Tinced concerning its responsibilities in the problem back in
I
1921, but noted that almost four years had passed without any-
I
I
thing having been done to execute the purpose of that time. Thai
Times felt that out of the controversy should come a stronger
2
air arm for both the Army and Navy,
EVENT'S LEADING UP TO THE BOMBING TESTS
According to Billy Mitchell, the Air Service realized
that during World War I aircraft had. not been used to any
1
1!
i
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appreciable extent against shipping, because the Allies had so ;
dominated the sea that the war had been won on and over the
land,^ He said, "Try as we might, we could not set battleship
targets from either the War or Navy ^departments in either the
year 1919 or 1920,**'^ That he had not the slightest doubt con-
cerning the capabilities of the airplane is shown in this I
statement
I
Our experiments had gone so far in the Pall of 1920 that
I was able to announce definitely to Congress ttiat we could
destroy, put out of coxnmlssion and sink any battleship in
existence or any that could be built,
^
This statement by the stormy petrel of aviation drew
mixed comments from the press. The Memphis Commercial Appeal
•aid, "The trouble with enthusiasts is that they are liable to
overstate the ability of the airplane,"^ Tlrie Bal timore Sun re-;
j
minded its readers that "while General Mitchell was doubtless
sincere in his opinion, after all it was only an opinion," '
|
Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels came out with the
,
statement that he was willing to take the bridge of an obsolete
war vessel while Brigadier General Mitchell dropped bombs from
|
an airplane to the deck. He said that he would take this ex-
treme course to settle the controversy, which he considered to I
be the sharpest in the history of the American Army and Kavy,®
In an article in The Independent , Laurence LaTourette Drigga
|
had this to say about Secretary Daniels's offers
|
The droll offer of the Secretary of the Navy to person-
ally mount a battleship and fight a duel with General Mitch-
ell in his aeroplane is not a convincing argument for the
jjgugeglojfjjy of_the_batt3e ahlp,^ It ijLsIigpJj Jiumoj^ aniL^
,

11
1 it is doubtless intended as such. The deliberate statement
of General liitciiell before the Comniittee of Naval Affairs,
however, is serious arid was intended as such. "Give us the
warships to attack, and come and watch it,*^ said he to the
coiiimittoe.^
Mr. Drigi^s then brought up the question in his article of
Whether we should scrap oui* navj'. lie aricirered his own question
negatively:
Certainly not. Aeroplanes caimot yet transport munitioni
and troops to rival the ships of the sea, ...But before we
cripple our air service by withholding funds which are ex-
pended on battleships, possibly dooraed to destruction, it ia
the part of wisdoiii to feive aviation a warship and "come and
watch lt."10
The following month (April, 1921), Billy Mitchell stated-
in an article in The World's Work that in order to develop an
adequate air defense a^^ainst a fleet that would carry an invad-
ing army to our shores, the Air Service had to first attack
t€U*gets "^that are as nearly as possible like the actual ships
wliich we Eiay have to fight—obsolete battleships, torpedo boats
and cruisers are sufficient for this purpose.
The Detroit Free Press snru^ged: "Josephu? is all riled
up again. ..and threatens co write to Secretary Balier about G-en»
•ral Mitchell." On the other hand, Tiie Kansas City Star voiced
Its approval!
The controversy is one that should be allowed full play,
for if-is out of such views that war's weapons are devel-
oped.^^
Many editors felt that the airplane did not need to in-
dulge in any argument to justify its existence and should not
have to make out a case against the battleship in order to
t;
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Secure rocot^nition
It was unfortunate that the controversy evolved to the
point where each of the participants was tr/ing to establish
its position at the expense of the other, without makinc allow-
ances for certain non-conflicting attributes. A more judi-
eious and mature attitude was apparent some years later when
Commander Ralph C. Parker, IJ.S.N, wrote in The North American
Review:
I'he status of the plane in future warfare has unfortun-
ately become a subject evoking more controversy than con-
sidered judgment; and few of the partisans od either side
recognize it as a question of relatiop rather than a choice
between this new arm and all others*^^
THE BOMBING TESTS OF 1921
Resolutions were introduced in tie douse and Senate
authorizing the bombing tests so avidly desired by the Air Serv-
ice, The Navy Department proceeded to draw up conditions un-
der which the ex-German vessels would be attacked. The site
chosen for the tests did not meet iilth the approval of Billy
Mitchell, who was in charge of the provisional air brigade that
was to represent the Army Air Service in the operation:
There were two other places that could ha\e been used
—
one at Cape Hatteras where tne himdred-fathom curve carae
within twenty aiiles of shore, and the other at Cape Cod,
where it ca^tie within ten irdles of land. But the majority
of naval officers were so sore that the air attacks would
prove ineffectual that it was desired to show as many Con-
gressmen as possible how little could be done by the air
j
force, and as the sea off, the Chesapeake was the best place
for this, it was chosen,
The reason the ships had to be anchored in one hundred
I•
6t
fathoms was due to the terras of an international agreement which
specified that vessels would be sunlc in deep water, Meverthe-
XesSf Billy Mitchell saw malicious intent on the part of the
Havy, "because our bombs would not have so great an effect as
they would if the water were shallow* "-^"^
The initial test took place on June 2, 1921 against the
•x-Gennan submarine V-117* It was anchored in the target
grounds about seventy-five miles off the Capes in an awash con-
Idition, The first units to attack it were three flying boats
of the Naval Air Service. On the first run the center of im-
pact struck the submarine squarely, split her in two and down
she went. It was a very severe jolt for those who still ad-
hered to the old theories,
j|
A couple of days later the Army Air Service was given as
a target the ex-Gemian torpedo destroyer Gr-102:
The attack was beautiful to watch; the accuracy of the
bombing was remarkable, practically every bomb going where
it was directed. For a few minutes the vessel looked as if
it was on fire; smoke came out of its funnels and vapors
across its decks. Then it broke completely in two in the
middle and sank down out of sight. The demonstration was
absolutely conclusive ,., ,A11 of the airplanes used in the
test, except the fairly new Martin bombers, were obsoles-
cent war machines entirely unsuited for the task.l9
The next test for the Army Air Service was to be the ex-
German cruiser Frankfurt , As it developed, some of the happen-
ings during this episode were to be the basis for later contro-
versy. According to Billy Mitchell, here's what happened:
The tests were to be conducted with varying sizes of
bombs and after each attack with a specified niamber of
,
bombss which were not Intended to elnk the ahlp< an in^
(
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spection would be made by officers of the Navy to see what
damage had been inflicted. These tests started on July l8th
and of course, the interest grew as they went on.^O
The 300-lb, bombs undoubtedly would have sunls: the ship
had not this part of the test been called off by the Navy,
At last cai.ne our chance to attack the cruiser with the I
600-lb, bombs. The board of Inspection was so slow that they
kept us flying: around way out at sea about an hour before
Captain Lawson had to signal that unless he was allowed to
attack within fifteen minutes he would have to return to I
shore on account of lack of gas. At last came the order I
to go ahead. The bombs fell so fast that the attack could
not be stopped before mortal damage had been done to the
ship. The control vessel made the signal to cease bombing
!
as the good ship was toppling over, so quick was the effect
of the bomb 3, 21
Then came the big test, the bombing of the ex-German
battleship Ostfriesland , which was thought by her builders to
be unsinkable, Billy Mitchell admitted that if the Air Serv-
ice could not sink this great ship the efforts against the
smaller vessels would have been minimized and the development
Of air power against shipping might have been arrested, at
op
least temporarily:^^
About July 15th we began the test, firing bombs of small ^
caliber. This bent up the equipment on her decks and caused
some other damage --enough to put her out of business, but
not to sink her,
|
I
At last we were allowed to take out our 1100-lb, bombs on
July 20, However, we were ordered to drop only one of these
at a time, instead of two at a time,,, .It was desired to
observe the effect without sinking the ship,,,,TY/o of these
j
bombs hit alongside and three hit on the deck, causing ter-
j
rific detonations and serious damage. Fragments of the '
battleship were blown out to great distances. Immediately '
the Navy control vessel made frantic signals for the attack
to stop. Lieutenant Bis sell had turned his flight and was
ready to finish her, as he had five additional bombs left.
That night she listed so badly that 2,000 tons of water
w«re_let iia^ Qri the other side to keep her straight up^ ao
1{
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23that alie would not roll over,
Durln/y the bombln?^ tests on the Ostfriesland, an lncident|
occurred which seems worthy of r^ention, because cf the public
relations factors involved. The following account is from an
mrtlcle in The Independent by C,W, Graj'beal, a former Air Serv-
ice officer who had participated in the operation:
The "Ostfriesland" was anchored a hundred irdles out at
sea. The Haval Transport **Shawmuth" stood by and directed
operations by radio. One day during the "bombing operations
all pilots were on the line at the flying field ready to
take off at seven o* clock. Headquarters received a radio
from the "Shawmuth" comnanding them to hold operations as
there we.: e heavy clouds around the ship. It was a beauti-
ful sunny morning at the flying field, sc out of curiosity
Lieutenant Johnson took a fast scout plane and flew out to
the ship to take a little closer look at the v.eather. On
returning to the field he reported that the weather was
perfectly clear around the "Ostfriesland," not a cloud in
the sky, and that the "Shawmuth" was not in 3.1 --^ht. But
on his wa:>' back he met the "Shawmuth" just steaming out of
Hampton Roads,
Needless to say, in the report of the joint Army and
Navy Board on the operations the statement w as included
that the Air Service was unable to operate for three hours
one morning on account of bad weather, ^4
To get back to the final chapter in tL-.e bombing of the
Ostfriesland, Billy Mitchell pointed oat in his story cf the
incident that there was a divergence of opinion among the Amy
A.ir Service personnel concerning the consequences of the exper-
iment. Some thought the Air Service should be restrained from
ainlcing the dreadnought because it might lead people to believe
that the Wavy should be scrapped completely, as a thousand air-
ijplanes could be built for the price of one battleship. Others
thought the ship should be sunk because air power had brought
1
(
(I
an entirely new elerrient into warfare on the water, and if the
United States did not draw the proper lessons from It, other
nations would, and we should he at a great disadvantage:^^
! Finally, the time came for us to attack the "Ostfrlesland
with the 2,000-lb. boabs, • . .Pour bombs hit in rapid succes-
S
slon, close alongside the ship, ''^e could see her rise 8 or
10 feet between the terrific blows from underwater. On the
fourth shot. Captain Street ahouted, "She's g^^^® ^-^ a niln^
!
ute the "Ostfriesland" was on her side; in two minutes she
I
was slidin£^ down by tho stern and t-orning; over at the same
I
time; in three minutes she was bottom side up..,, Then grad-
ually she went down stern first,
Thus ended the first c^^eat air-and-battleshlp tests that
the world has ever seen. It conclusively proved the ability
of aircraft to destroy ships of all classes on the surface •
of the water. 2o
^
In an article in The Outlook in June, 1925* ^ar Admiral
Joseph Strauss stated, "It is not perhaps generally known that
this old, leaky and unresisting warship Ostfriesland
J
Burvived twenty-two hours after the bombing commenced before
she sank. The effort to sink her extended over two days.
Ttiis is an excellent example of telling the truth, but not the
whole truth, leaving the false impression with the reader that
the Air Service was unable to sinli the vessel until tho second
day. The admiral then y/ent into the matter of the delay that
was mentioned previously in Graybeal^s article:
At first, there was a delay of 3i hours on account of thoj
weather and then the wearisome process of bonbin^ prooeedod
tlirough parts of two days, when finally, as a result of all
the accumulated damage, she sanlc#28
I
Such a statement reflected a lack of coordination in Navy'
public relations, because after the operation the Navy complain4
•d that thi> k^r Service had mmV the ,i35tfrlesland toe quickly t_
II
I
I
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When the Army airmen, by act of Congress, obtained the
opportunity in 1921 of sinkint'x the "Oatfrle aland," the Nayy ;
protested that the airmen, under General Mitchell, were un-
fair and that they disobeyed orders I'yj slnlcliX', this dread-
nought before the effect of each separate hit was observ-
ed.
Admiral Strauss made no mention in his article of the
fact that in September, 1921 tlie Air Service was given another
battleship to practice on, the Alabar.a « This time the idea was
to sink her as quickly as possible. The first 2,C00-lb, bomb
did its work and she sank to tne bottom in thirty seconda.^
Regardless of whether it was accidental or intentional,
another public relations blunder was comaiiltted by the Navy In
eonnection with the bombing of the Qstfriesland t
Before operations began a general order was issued to all
officers of the Army to maintain strictest secrecy about the
bonbin^, both during and after operations. But after oper-
ations were over, the l^avy liraaediately began to advertise
the fact that the Army strove desperately for two days be-
fore it was able to sink the ship, not mentioning, incident-
ally, the fact that the ship was sunk within twenty minutes
of the time the heavy bombing a tar ted. ^1
APTF.RMATH OP THE BOMBING TESTS
The bombing of the ex-Gorman vessels contributed nothing
toward resolving the long-standing controversy between the Navy
and Army Air Service. On the contrary, it only added fuel to
the fire. As was to be expected, Billy Mitchell was right in
the middle of the controversy
i
Brigadier General William Ilitchell, of the flying corps,
who recently took his case in Woodrow Wilson fashion direct
to the people by writing a piece for the magazines, hinted
darily that he has received a "confidential communication"
from Saoratary of War Weeka, leaving the inference that h»

has been severely/ called down for tr;"ing modestly to toll
some of the exploits of the Army's flying service.
In his "piece" he plainly stated that if the Navy had
permitted the airplanes to have their way they could \uiV6
sunk the ship targets assigned to them "quicker than a
wink," But the Navy conductors of the test were constantly
calling "halt"} shrieking their siren for "stop firing" and
doing other thinj^s calculated to make the Air Service seem
a bit slow in sendinj^ millions of dollars of steel and iron
to Davy Jones's locker.
The Kavy, led by Secretary '».llburi has been denouncing
the Army Air Service for mkins statements oat of accord
with the facts. That is the polite public way of saying
"you're a liar,"32
The Mew York Times showed signs of losing patience with
the stormy petrel after he had made charges which the Times felt
reflected on the integrity of some of the i^aval officers in-
volved in the tests I
When General Mitchell cools off he will realize that in
aotacklng the naval managers of the bombing operations he
assailed their honor, "In ray opinion," he wrote to Secre-
tary Vveeks's request that he account for staterients of an
extreme character, "the Navy actually tried to prevent our
sinking the 'Ostfriesland' • " If taat is true the officers
responsible should be court-martialed and dismissed from the
service, ,He spoke of the conditions under wnlch the bomb-
ing was done as "a deliberate attempt to handicap us in the
accompliahment of our mission. That we did not lose a num-
ber of our pilots and the crews of our airplanes with the
aircraft we possessed then was a very happy circumstance ,."33
The Time
s
editorialized that the conditions laid down
i^y have been too severe a test of flying skill, but that there
was anything like a conspiracy to prevent the success of the
Army aviators and to imperil their lives, no one acquainted with
[the standards of the sea service and its spirit of fair play
34
Would believe for a moment. The Times shewed its usual editor-
(lal acumen when it said that the controversy had generated mov
III
I
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httat than light.
COMPARISON OF RELATIVE COSTS IS ARGUED
One ar^ijment which never falls to crop up when the air-
plane-battleship controversy begins is that pertaining to the
relative cost of the two weapons. This factor was first cited
In an article in the DIovember, 1908 issue of The Y/orld' s Work ;
Already prepared in detail is a plan for coast defense
by big dirigibles which will not only give warning of the
approach of hostile fleets by wireless but v/ill drop tor-
pedoes upon the vessels,
Wiien it is remembered that the cost of building a battle-
ship runs into the millions cf dollars and that after th©
first ones are constructed, ^;reat airships a tiioasand feet
long, fully equipped with searchlights and wireless, should
not exceed JlOG,000, while the LeBaudy craft 528 feet long
cost only 1-60,000, the
^
advantages of balloons for coast de-
fense boco:ies obvious, "-"^'^
Early in 1921, when Billy Mitchell v/as making his bid for
the bombing tests. The Boston Herald cited the cost-comparison
argument
:
General I'itchell's main contention is that a thousand
airplanes could be built for the cost of a sin£;;le dreadnought
and with 3,000 airplanes we could construct an adequate air
|force for the protection of the T^-hole country. Thus he ap- i
peals to the taxpayer as Tnuch as to the military expert,
The Milwaukee Sentinel suggested that it might be ^^ood
business policy to cut one big battleship off the program and
spend the amount thus saved on aerial equipment. The Kansas
City Star was more enthusiastic and ^'would even spend the price
of two or tnree battleships on developing aircraft.
Shortly before the bombing tests on the ex-German ships.
II
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iThe Independent noted editorially:
Public opinion and Congressional opinion will rear up on
its ueels if ii.5,000, ^,10,000 and C20,000 airplanes see^ flble
to blast out of the water ships such as the six battle
cruisers we are soon to have, coating f.39,000,000 each, six
battleships costing $38,000,000, alon?^ with many others,*^®
The Navy side of the cos t-cojnparison argument was pub-
lished in an article in The Outlook by Captain L.M. Overstreet,
U.S,N, in January, 1923:
Many have jumped to the conclusion that because airplanei
can be built for |>40,00G, whila it takes sorae fj^; 40, 000,000 to
build a battleship, aviation is very cheap. Already- the
United Air Force in Great Britain is accused of spending
more for bricks and mortar than for aircraft. It costs
millions to build bl^ flying fields, hangars, runvaj's for
launching seaplanes into the water, barracks for the avia-
tors, shops for repairing tie planes, etc, Horeover, this
$40,000 plane may not last a year, while a battleship ruay
be useful for twenty, .There ie no short cut to victory,
A new weapon does but add increased expense,
Ij
The issue was not brought into the limelight again until
1933, Newsweek coirsnented that Billy Mitchell "would have enjoy-
ed life last week. The argonent that had once cost him his Army
job--an argument officially pigeon-holed twelve years ago—was
ionce more stirring up Washington, " ^0
The argument is simoly this: It would cost at least
150, 000,000 to build a" battleship. For <'i^50, 000,000 the
United States could buy at least 500 bombi- g planes. Any
one of the bombers could destroy the battleship. Therefore,
why soend any :nore money (let alone a billion dollars) on
battleships
With the exception of the monetary values involved, prac-
tically the sarie argument was used in an article by Alexander
P, deSeversky in June, 1941:
The latest capital ships being built by our Navy cost
about $100,000,000 each—a srm. that could pAy for the eon"*

Btructlon of 250 bombers capable of flying to a European
target, dropping their explosive loads, and re turning, ^2
ANOTHER STORMY PETREL?
Major deSoveraky could appropriately be dubbed a "stormy
petrel" as was Billy Mltciiell, because lie also has been a ''har-
binger of trouble"--as far as the Navy is concerned. He too be**
comes extremely enthusiastic over the potential of air power and
as such is prone to make positive statements of a radical i~»ature
such as the following which were extracted from an article in
American ^>iercury:
t
As we approach the end of the second year of the Second
World War, It is startllngly clear that the navies of all
nations have already and irretrievably lost their function
of strategic offensive action. They still play a defensive
role--afr.ain3 1 otner naviea--but only in waters as yet beyond
the reach of aviation. ,, •^'^
The moment when Air Power can reach across oceans as eas-
ily as it now bridges narrower waters will mark the fliial e-
limiiiation of Sea Power as a primary element In warfare,,,"
The grip of cliches on the mind of man is not easy to
break. In 12ngland, as in ou.r own country, the notion tliat
"the country's chief defense is the navy" has acquired the
force of a commandment handed down from Mt, Sinai,,,,
Air Power, reduced to an accessory position, harnessed
to an older and slower and no longer self-sufficient weapon
is certain to be defeated by genuine, untramr^ieled Air
Power , , ,
,
From a public relations standpoint, the validity of tnesa
statements does not seem to be the main issue, I.Iajor deSeversky
lhaa been established as one of the outstanding authorities on
aviation and the potentials of air pov.'er in the world today.
B'ltf like Billy Mitchell, he does not seem to weigh the effect
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Iwhlch such extreme statements v/ill have on harmony among th©
aervlces. It is believed tliat auch harmonious relations should
^not be sacrificed so that air power mi^ht receive proper rciccg-
iiltion. It is considered to be in the public interest that both
service harmony and air power be fostered. Yet with the current
*• auper•bomber va. super-carrier" controversy on the verge of be-
Ing Investigated by a Congresaional coirmiittee, it seems that
little progress has been inade toward the establishment of not
only technical unification but a truly harmonious relationship
amoiig the services,
TIIE MORE TOLJiHAIJT ARGUMEl^TS
Fortunately, all statenentB and editorials on the subject
of the airplane vis-a-vis battleship have not been vitriolic and
Intolerant, In 1921, during the heat of the controversy. The
World's VJork stated in an editorial:
Aircraft show that another elonent must now be consider-
ed—the control of the air. Any navy which henceforth
wishes to obtain domination at sea must be master in all
three elements, .The Immediate task of naval exports is to
discover some way to control the air,,,, The British navy and
our own are building, or are preparing to build, a nev< type
of ship known as a plane carrier,^'''
In 1925, an editorial in The New York Tiraes pointed out
tliat "new instruments of v/ar, whether on land or sea, have been
looked into by our military authorities tliroughout o\xr history
and have been adopted when a positive demonstration of their
48
value has been riiade" t
So it will be, undoubtedly, with the adoption In every
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feasible form of airplanes &3 now indispensable auxiliaries
in naval operations. 49
A Navj officer. Lieutenant Barrett Studley, exhibited
vision and balance when he wrote in The North Axnerican Keview
in 1929s
In these days of mechanical achievement we can call noth-^
Ing impossible, Unquos tioaably, transoceanic flying Virill
some day be feasible from the military point of view. Levi-
athans of t]ie air capable of circling the f^lobe in one
flight may traverse the skies of the future, When that
occurs, our probler;} of national defense will bo radically
changed. But we are not now living in the future. If our
country should be attacked today, we must defend it vita
present da^' means. The employment of aircraft for this
purpose roquiros appreciation both of their capabilities and
of their limitations, 50
After pointing out the important part that torpedo bomb-
ing played in the sinking of the German dreadnovii^ht Bisiiiarck
and the role of aircraft in the German victory at Crete, Hanson
Baldwin stated in December, 1^41:
Tliere is no evidence in past or present e:iperience to
warrant the belief that the fi-^htin^ plane--no\v or in the
foreseeable future—can usurp the functions of the flighting
ship. So far, no modern battleship ever has been sunk by
an air attack and no battleship, new or old, has ever been
sunk' by air attack during; war,
1 Both mines and torpedoes have done more damage to capital
ships than bombs, .j,, On lighter warships, bombis have been
more effective, , , .^^
The plane tias not made the battlesliip or the surface
ship any more obsolete than the submarliie did,,,. But there
is no doubt that from now on the fighting ship will play a
more limited role than it used to play,^^
WIIAT 13 THE AilSWSR?
The Pacific Campaign of World Viar II was foreshadowed in
'I
an editorial In The Hew York Times on February 28, 1925
J
Airplanes are "Indispensable to the fleet," declared Hear
Admiral Hilary ?• Jonea of the General Board of the Navy
when he appeared before the House Aircraft Coi-maittee, • . •
He rai{^^ht have referred his questioners to the report of
the Special Board of the Havy in which it v/as maintained
that, as the air branch could not occupy an enemy territory,
the Navy would have to "stand by" and the Army would have to
land from transports, and therefore there was interdepend-
ence as between the air ann and the sea and land forces
In June, 19^^-0 an article by Colonel John Callan 0» Laugh-
lin pointed out that "while the air is affecting the design of
warship and naval strategy and tactics. It has not usurped
their function," He stated that to the contrary it was demon-
strating that each had its own sphere of operation and that
coordination of all three was essential of victory In war.
Probably the best answer to the airplane-battleship
(more currently the airplane-carrier) problem is a co^nposlte
solution aa given in 19i|.0 by some top-flight Avmj and Navy of-
ficers. This was cited in an article by Alden P, Ar^aagnac in
Popular Science Ivlonthly i
How do all the factors of air-power vs. sea-power add
up? Evidently the balance is cl03e--unless the scales are
tipped violently, one way or the ^^her, by the particular
mission of the sea or air forces.^3
So, from our own viewpoint, air-power and sea-pov/er be-
come merged into one. Taken separately, neither one corri-
pletely assures our security. Reinforcing each other, .they
constitute a mighty defense team to safeguard America.^"
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1, Bitterness lias marked the airplane-battleship contro-
i
.
veray tliroughout the years and was a contributing factor toward
the lack of prof-ress made in reacliing any reasonable solution.
Both the iMavy and Air Force liave been guilty of statements and
actloni In the past which have resulted in widening the gap in-
•tead of encouraging a rapprochement.
2* One of the fundamental errors committed by the Air
Force was in following the premise that the airplane and its re-
•ultant air power were absolute weapons and should be adopted by
the United States to the exclusion of sea power. This violates
a basic principle of good public relations, whereby an individ-
ual or an organization should not endeavor to obtain support for
a cause or a product by attacking the merits of a rival's or/^-an-
ization or product,
3. Extreme statements were made by spokesmen for both
the Kavy and the Air Force on occasion, often perhaps in the
heat of debate, vVhen read by a dispassionate public, wliich may
or may not be fully cognizant of all attendant circumstances,
such statements may lose supporters of a cause, even though the
•ubstance may be basically valid.
CONCLUSIONS
! X. The long-range cause of military aviation was not
advanced by the bitter dispute over the relative merits of the
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airplane and tne battleship. In the interest of national de-
fense, it was certainly necessary for the United States to de»
.termine v/hether battleships, cruisers, and lesser naval vessels
could be sunk by airplanes. However, this should have been don«
jln the manner of a scientist making a laboratory experiment.
Instead of as two adversaries locked in life-or-death struggle.
jit is felt that Congress and the Executive uranch v/ere as nuch
to blame for this situation as either of the services involved*
After Billy Mitchell had forced the issue and Congress hau au- -
thorized thetes ts in 1921, an Executive order could have clari-
fied the matter to the extent that the Navy would not have been
panic-stricken lest its appropriations be pared to the point of
its becoming dominated by the up-and-coining Air Service.
I
2. The truth is usually a matter of qualification, de-
gree and relativity and as such is far less impressive than ex-
tremes of statement. The latter are uriques tionably excellent
for the pui-pose of calling the public's attention to an issue,
Ijbut it is felt that the public interest ia not served when such
extremes are used. Too great a percenta:_,e of the public accept*
the printed word at its face value and does not realize that on
many occasions such statements are primarily attention-grabbers*
3, It is believed that there will always be a need for
land, sea and air forces, regardless of the extent of technical
developments in the future. The relative importauco of each
might shift as conditions and circumstances chainge, but there
will always be sua interdependence among the services and the

8X
more tliat fact is stressed and developed, the greater v^ill be
our natlcaal sacurity.
||
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CHAPTER VII
THE FIGHT FOR A SEPARATE AIR FORCE
The progress of military aviation in America was retard-
ed by several factors, one of the most prominent being the inter^
minable controversy conoernin/^ the status of the air force. Had
the effort which was spent in lobbying for and against an air
ai^ coequal with the Army and Havy been directed toward the ad-
vancement of aviation, the United States air potential at the
time of Pearl Harbor probably would have been considerably
greater*
The Ilavy has actively opposed the idea of a coequal air
service from the very beginning. Ironically, however, the need
for such a shift in our national military organization was first
called to the attention of the public by one of the Navy's il-
lustrious sons. Rear Adniral R« E« Peary, in a letter to the
editor of The New York Times in June, I916 which said in part;
There are three fundamental features of national pre-
paredness which, were they in actual being today, would
cause a universal feeling of peace and security throughout
the country that does not now exist:
(1) A fleet of 3i>-knot battle cruisers, eight on the
Atlantic and eight on the Pacific, •
(2) A separate independent aeronautical department with
a seat in the President's Cabinet*..
•
(3) A system of citizen military education and train-
ing. . .without making them a permanent burden upon
the finances of the country or taking them from
their ordinary occupations or professions.
Of these three, the question of the country's air service

I85
is of the most immediate importance, .-^
In April, 191^ # one year after America had entered Vi/orld
War I, Admiral Peary was still convinced that adequate progress
would not be made until the air service had been made autono-
mous :
The only remedy for the present moat unfortunate condi-
tions in our aeronautic affairs is the in^^nediate creation
of an entirely separate and independent department of aero-
nautics under one-man control. Every day of delay in
creating such a department increases tiie risk of catas-
trophe to the United States forces abroad.
^
It seems worthy of mention that examination of magazines
and newspapers for the next twenty-three years failed to reveal
another statement by a naval officer, favoring the establish-
ment of an independent air force.
CONPUSIOlf IN TERMINOLOGY
Semantics played an important role in the controversy,
because a variety of tei^ns were employed by both sides, the
nuances of which were undoubtedly confusing;; to the public.
1
'Various proposals over the years advocated the following:
A Bureau of Aviation, with a new officer in the Presi-
dent's Cabinet.
A Bureau of Aeronautics that would be under the Depart-
ment of Commerce.
A Bureau of Air
A Department for Air
A Department of Aeronautics, the head of it to have a
seat in the Cabinet.
An aircraft depajrtment as reoommended )»7 General Foulois*

6<
A Department of Aviation with a Secretary in the Cabinet
Department of National i^efense with coequal Sub-secretaries
for the Navy, Anny and Air Forces,
An independent air command, operating coequal with the Army
and Navy.
Independent air force*
Independent air service
•
Separate air department.
Separate air force
•
Separate air service.
Unified air service.
United air service.
Unified defense.
Pev/ writers took the trouble to explain the shades of
meaning to their readers, so it is probable that the average
citizen quickly tired of the controversy and passed it off as
just another interservice squabble. Hov/ever, in February, 1925
a civic-minded citizen wrote a letter to the editor of The New
York Time
s
,
citing the need for clarification of the terrrs being
used in connection with the Anny E.vlation's struggle fov auton-
omy:
The similarity of the terms United Air Service, Separate
Air Force and Independent Air Force is probably partly res-
ponsible for Irhe confusion in the mind of the public as to
just what the proponents of aviation wish. An understand*
ing of what these rather loosely tieflned and still more
carelessly used expressions mean. ..may serve to make more
understandable the controversy now agitating the country...
The United Air Service plan provides for combininf, the
present services of the army, navy and Post Office and
placing the personnel under a single control. •••It wo\iXd be
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a service like the Marine Corps.
The Separate Air Force would be a branch of a department
of defense coequal with the Army and Navy, all three direct<-
ed by a Secretary of Defense, the aviation branch being
under an Assistant Secretary,
•
An Independent Air Force is the first step proposed by
aviation advocates to be taken tov/ord the previous plan.
As outlined in the Curry Bill, a Secretary of Aeronautics
liaving a Cabinet portfolio woiild head a Dopartment of Aero-
nautics. • •
It will be seen from the above proposals that aviation
supporters do not desire coniplete freedon train control of
unsupervised development. However, they do appeal to the
country, for the sake of the national defence, for an im-
mediate opportunity for independent action and later, v/hen
their assertions are further demonstrated, a place with
other protective agencies commensurate with the importance
a national air policy vjould warrant, (Signed) Lester D.
Gardner3
It was generally felt that underlying all of the objec-
[
tions by the Army and Kavy was the fear of loss of power, pres-
tige, and/or appropriations if a separate air force were estab-
ilished. Outwardly, however, the Army's principal argument was
the loss of control in the field, -^hen he testified before a
i| Congressional coimnittee in 1925» <>eneral Hu^h i>rum stated, "An
independent air force is diametrically opposed to the fundamen-
i
tal principle of 'unity of coTomand' and, if adopted and main-
tained, can only contribute to disaster and defeat in war."^
However, later that year, in an article in The Outlook , Laur-
ence Ls.Tourette Driggs, an aviation writer of the period, point-
ed out the difference between "air service" to which General
Drum was referring and "air force" about which Billy Mitchell
and his contemporaries were vitally concerned:

88
A clear distinction should be drawn between the terms
'*air force" and "air service" as applied to warfare. Air
service is the service accomplished •»y the aviator for the
benefit of the other arras, such as observing and reporting,
such as mapping enemy territory, correcting artillery fire
by wireless, doing patrol scouting, etc,..
Air force is the inherent power of the airplane itself--
its gims and its bonibs--to effect a victory over an oppo-
nent. Thus in a contest between two hostile air forces,
only fighting machines are engaged. The supremacy of the
air depends upon the superiority of one or the other force.
Regardless of the activities of the Army and the Navy, this
conflict between the air forces must be decided before
either the A37my or the Navy can operate without fear from
air.
It is the air force that American aviators want divorced
from its old masters..*
If the nation wants the best that can be produced in
aviation, it is the part of wisdom to turn aviation over to
the aviators unhampered by the restrictions of unsympathetio
masters.
5
MP. Drigga was ahead of his time in his concept of air
power and the role it v^ould play in wars of the future. The
advocates of a separate air force would have done well to ham-
mer home to the Ainerican public this distinction between "air
service" and "air force" or as it later became "air power." As
long as the Vvar Department generals could convince Congress and
the public that the Array would be disastrously weakened if its
air support were removed from its command, to the point of in-
viting defeat, the chances of necessary legislation being ap-
proved v/ere indeed slight.
LEGISLATION OVER THE YEARS
The Dent bill, that was introduced In Congress (1917)*

8f
called for a Bureau of Aviation with a new Cabinet officer at itfl
head. However, The New York Times felt that it was ill-timed,
since America had just entered the war:
\\ There is no opposition in Congress to the appropriation of
$639,000,000 or more if necessary, for the upbuilding of
military air service, or to tiie enlistment as aviators of
as many men as may be needed, •••It is exceedingly doubtful
whether the creation of a new bureau of Aviation, with a
new Cabinet officer at its head, is wise in the present
crisis. .The formation of a separate Department of Aero-
nautics might well be postponed until the other plans for
air-service extension have been put into operation. •• ,To
the common mind a Secretary of Aviation seems as unneces-
sary as.a Secretary of Ordnance or a Secretary of Merchant
Marine,^
It is to be noted that in its editorial The New York
jTimes used two different terms—Bureau of Aviation and Depart-
ment of Aeronautics—although the same agency was the referent.
The public* s confusion is understandable,
f The issue was dormant until the Curry Bill was introduced
In the House of Representatives on July 28, 1919* This provided
for a distinct third service; but in the emergency of war the
units of the new service would be "under the command of the des-
ignated commander of the land or sea forces, or both as the case
may be. "7 Once again the legislation seemed inopportune, be-
cause the coTintry had not forgotten the aircraft production
scandal, which is discussed in Chapter IV. Said The New York
Times
:
It is the duty of Congress to give its sober attention
to the question of air defense. The Curry Bill, with its
provisions for minute organization and distribution of ac-
tivities, looks top-heavy. If it is to go to the statute
book there must be much pruning. The country will not tol-
Tat« again the aoandaloua waate of mon»y that marked the
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attempt_to carry out an ambitious aircraft program two years
ago,..«^
After the defeat of the Cxirry Bill, a measure was intro-
duced by Senator New a few months later, calling for a separate
Department for Aeronautics* In an article in The Independent
Laurence LaTourette Driggs accurately predicted that the New
Bill would not be passed:
The Senate will probably pass it but its chances for
success in the House are doubtful. This doubt is occasioned
by the present masters of aviation--the heads of the War
and Navy Departments--who express skepticism as to the mil-
itary value of aviation in one breath and in the next de-
mand that they be permitted to retain their grip upon its
skirts. Our Congressmen are confused. .9
The New York" Times noted editorially that sometimes it
seemed as if Congress were adverse to the plan of a separate de-
partment for no other reason than its adoption by Prance and
Great Britain, It pointed out that such a sentiment was not
flattering to the national intelligence, because those allies
had begun to make satisfactory progress in aeronautics only
after they had created Air Ministries .^^ The editorial gave
further evidence of objectivity when it stated:
That there was amazing and shameful waste of money in
attempting to carry Jut the war aviation program is not to
be denied. The fiasco was a national reproach. But at
least it should have taught the wisdom of putting aero-
nautics into one department, where there could be unity of
counsel, unity of design, and unity of control. ,, ,Shall one
of the great lessons of the war, the determining value of
the airplane in any conflict on land or sea, be lost on us
because we love our isolation and prefer to muddle along in
our own self-satisfied way of doing things crossing a bridge
only when we come to it, a habit for which we always pay
dearly?J-^
In May» 1920 the Asrlal Defenss Bill was Introduoed by
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Representative iCahn, Thia measure proposed the creation of a
Bm'eau of Air on which the War and Navy Departments v/ould be de*
pendent for air materiel, personnel, construction and training.
However, it was a compromise in that it provided that the Bureau
"would not engage in any aerial operation of a military or
naval character." When hostilities came the supreme and direct-
ing commanders were to be officers of the two existing services.
In analyzinf^ the Kahn Bill, The Mew York Times aaids
It is the judgment of specialists who are not partisans
of either the Army or the Navy that the United States should
have a separate Air Departxrjent if aviation is not to remain
under a cloud in this country. .The New Bill, which the
Senator from Indiana withdrew soon after introduction, pro-
posed an Air Department, and now Congress is called upon to
take up the Aerial Defense Bill of Representative Julius
Kahn, an Intelligent and seasoned champion of preparedness.
...As drawn, it leaves room for improvement, but I£r.
Kahn has made an honest attempt to give the United States
a skilled flying force for defense. '^^
The measure was tabled, but the following year the pro-
posal was again submitted to Congress. About the same time the
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, headed by Major
General C. T. Menoher and Admiral D. Ta;ylor submitted a re-
port to President Harding recoimiiending that a single department
for military, government and commercial purposes should not be
created. However, it did recoitbtaend a naval air service, an army
air service and a bureau of aeronautics in the Departx'ient of
Commerce. The President approved the committee's report and
submitted it to Congress, thereby killing the prospects for
approval of the Kahn Bill.^^
1
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That the advocates of a separate air force were undaunted
by past failures Is evident in this account in The Literary Di-
^est of an article by Peter Vischer, a special writer for The
New York V^orldi
•••The airplane vs. battleship controversy is up again,
as well as the oft-reiterated demand for a separate Air
Service, what then can we do to help solve our aviation
problems ?
In the first place, we lacK: a policy, iVe don't know what
we want in avlatioxi, .Ve are devolopin^; our aviation from
moment to moment and every year we have fewer and fewer
serviceable planes. Contrast this with the rapid progress
now being made by England, France, Italy, Japan and Russia,,,
Wha.t the Army actually wants is this: Greneral Patrick
wants a definite aviation policy which will allow him
flO,000,000 a year for the next five years for the purchase
of new aircraft,,,.
Furthermore, President Coolidge is taking a personal
interest, believing as he does, that iiiis nation must in-
sure its national defense in the air. And he does not in-
tend to confine his attention to the advice of old-school
Generals and Admirals, many of whom are still more or less
hostile to aviation, because of their ignorance,
Furtherjiore, another effort will be uiade to bring about
a separate air service. General Mitchell, who is the great
crusader for this, said that lie expected a bill similar to
the Curry Bill, which died in committee, would be introduced
soon after Congress reconvened, TMs provided for a sep-
arate air service under a Secretary of Aeronautics. And
j
General Llitchell frankly predicted that the bill would be
1
through by Christmas.^
Mr, Vischer pointed out that a close study of the sit-
uation in Wasiiington indicated that General Mitchell was being
overly optimistic. And this tm^ned out to be the case, Kowevei^
Vischer predicted that some day, in all probability, there would
be "a separate Air Service or Air Force, or whatever it might be
o&lled*" But he surmised that the d&^ seemed to be a distance
I
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off in the future.-^
|i The persistence of Billy Mitchell and the other advocates
of a separate air force is apparent in a story from The Literary
Dlgeajt, December 12, 1925.
One of the liveliest babies ever laid on the Congression*
al doorstep was howling loudly when Congress caine back home
for its winter session, to find the aviation squabble again
I
on its hands. The chief issue in all the mass of reports
and reconiDiendations on the subject is the sharp difference
of opinion between the House (Laiiipert) ooramittee, which has
I
been investigating aviation, and the President's coirimittee,
headed by Mr# Morrow. The Lanipert Committee believes in
|;
uniting our land, sea and air forces in a new Department of
i
National Defense, , the Morrow Committee declares flatly 3
against this, • • •-^''^ ^'
Two weeiis later The Literary Digest was more stinging in
its comment on the relative merits of the reports submitted by
the two coimiiittees ;
:
In sharp contrast to the recent cheerful findings of the
Morrow Air Board, which President Coolidf-e declared, "ought
I to be reassuring to the country, gratifying to the service
and satisfactory to the Congress," is the testimony of the
I
Mouse's Special Aircraft (Lamport) Coiamittee, vmich after
nine months of investigation reports that "an alarming situ-
I
atlon still exists in the Army and ijavy Air Services as a
result of a failure on the part of these services duly to
appreciate the importance of air power," This agrees in
general outline with the sensational picture to which Golo-
I
nel uiiliaia -.litchell has so persistently called the public's
attention, 17
....
1
Concerning the Idorrow Report, The Philadelphia Record
maintained that "Mr. Morrow wished to make the sort of report
that would gratify the President, The President wanted a report
that would not call for a great deal of money and that would dia*
turb the official hierarchy as little as possible. He got that
kind of a report," 1^

IBy this time the matter had reached the point where it
assumed the proportions of a national issue and was clearly be-
yond the stage of interservice bickering. The New York Time a
j
expreeaecl confidence that Con^^ress would respond to the demand
for constructive legislation "to settle a controversy demox*al-
Izing to the military air service and prejudicial to civilian
aviation." 19
I
The Chicago Eveninji^ Post preferred to endorse a middle-
of-the-road compromise, supporting neither the Morrow nor the
Lampert report:
I
It is yet to be shown, we think, that the Air ^ervic*
I should be wholly separated and made coequal v/ith Army and
Navy; but the difficulties which now arise from division of
authority in the air would be eliminated under a imified de-
fense, 20
I
Although Billy Mitchell had been court-martialed in Decem-
ber, 1925 and had resigned from the service early in 1926, the
fight for a separate air force continued. This time, however,
a less drastic laeasure was proposed:
!'
...The bill in-croduced in the House by Mr. Wainwright of
New York to create a sepai'ate air corps in the Array is evi-
;
dently desicned to carry out the ideas of Major General Pat-
ricli, as presented to tlie President's Aircraft Investi^-ating
Coirmiittee at its first meeting on September 21, 192li....
...The Wainwright Bill sets up a "United States Air Corps"
and provides for an Assistant Secretary of War for Air.... In
fact, it is almost as much a Mitchell as a Patrick Bill....
If out of the agitation and discussion comes legislation
that will give the country an air service v/hich the beat
minds in the army agree would suit tlie requirerients of r:;odem
warfare, well and good. But the danger is that prejudices
may be excited and passions aroused, with the result that
aviation v.'ill becouie a "football of politics," and then there
will be no sound leKis3AMoa_8t all. ( The New York Time a) 21 J
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The cause of the advocates of a separate air force recoiv-
|>d a setback when a lobbying venture on the part of some Air Serv-
jlce officers came to the attention of the public. Secretary of
ar Davis ordered an inquiry into responsibility for a circular
hich was addressed to persons presuiried to have political promi-
j[ienco, asking them to see bheir Senators and Representatives and
'^people of prorAinence in your State." Such action was prohibit-
ed by General Army Order Hmiber 25f which aid not allow "efforts
to influence legislation affecting the army or to procure person-
al favor or consideration except through regular ciiaimels." The
||^ew York Tiaos, although it consistently had supported the moves
jboward air force autonoray, disapproved of this action:
...There is reason to believe that it originated with the
Army Air Service ....
...The point does not need to be labored that propaganda
by officers of the Arjiy ^^ir Service to bring about legisla-
tion that they want and that the President as ComLiander-in-
Chief regards as unwise raust be subversive of discipline. 22
A fundazjiental public relations principle was violated in
jthis instance, when one of the "rules of the game" was not ad-
iiered to some Air Service officers v.'ho became overzealous.
jPublic opinion is not apt to favor a participant in a controversy
who stoops to iinauthorized measures, although lobbying by cora-
jnercial interests is a legal procedure, it nevertheless aas al-
^rays borno an unfavorable connotation in the minds of the general
public. Therefore, when members of the artiied services resort to
such practices, althoUfgh they are specifically prohibited from
- dQjpg—
a
o, unfavorable publ i c re acti on can be expected , and their -
i
i
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cause is actually hurt instead of being abetted.
After the unfortunate "lobbying" episode in 1926, the
separate air force issue lay dormant until I93I4. as far as Con-
gress wa3 concorned. Of course, proponents of air force auton-
omy v^ere still to be found in the Araiy **'lr Service, but the
economy drives during the depression years precluded the possi-
i
bllity of favorable consideration of the establisbraent of an
independent air orj^anizatlon, despite the fact that its advo-
cates predicted reduction of expenditures through consolidation
of aviation activities.
A special committee on aviation headed by former Secre-
tary of War Newton D.Baker recornmended in 193I4- that the fight-
in^^ air £;ervlces shoald not be nier,';ed. Tiie licw YorK TiiiiOSj
which for the most part had supported the advocates of a sepa-
rate air force until the "lobbying" incident, now endorsed the
recoirdiendatlons of the Ba'.-:er Board:
...Mr. Ba]r.er's coiiimittee has taken the follo'V'^infj, position)
We are second to no nation in aeronautics. Tliis being so,
and having been achieved through the device of sepai-ate serv-
ices, why change the plan? The reasoning; seems excellent.
It is to be hoped that Con4;^recc and the President T;ill fol-
lov; it ...
.
...The air services of Clreat Britain are merged, v^hich
is one of the chief arguments advanced v/hy we shoald adopt
a similar plan. The Baker cofficiittee and other opponents
respond that combat^ conditions for this covuitry are basi-
cally different. . . .23
In an article published in March, 19^4-1 Major Alexander
P. deSeversky denied the validity of the arguaient of the Baker
1
Committee that had been endorsed by The New York Times in 193I4-I
]
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•••The common denominator of all the objections Lto a
separate air force] is the claim that the United States has
built a fairly creditable air force under the aegis of the
two older services. The rebuttal is sl7nple. It is that at
present the United States has no air power at all I iie have
a miscellany of warplanes, but no air power. •'4-
In August, 1914.0 Senator Bennett Champ Clark introduced
a bill to set up a Department of National Defense in which the
Army, Navy sind Air Force would be coequal!
Ever since the ^^Vorld Vvar, aviation leaders have advocated
the establishment of an air force separate from the Army and
Navy, like those of En^jland, Germany and Italy, These pro-
ponents of an independent air arm have grown niore Insistent
since the start of the air expansion program, .Advocates
of the plan believe the Army and Navy should be permitted to
retain some planes for the specialized tasks such as recon-
naissance and manning aircraft carriers, but that the nation's
chief air weapon should be a large flexible force, capable
of operating either with the land or sea branches, or inde-
pendently. To this thesis, neither the Army nor the Navy
has ever agreed, chiefly because of the fear that an Inde-
pendent Air Force would not be siifficlently familiar with
the problems of the older services to be of great help In
action. That events in i^urope have not changed the minds
of the generals and admirals becajue evident last week when
both thw »Var and Navy Departments forwarded reports to the
Senate Military Affairs Coiamittee opposing Senator Clark's
legislation, (Newsv/eek, August 12, I94-O) 25
So, once again the torch carried by the advocates of a
separate air force had flared up, only to subside without effect.
'
However, successes achieved in the Battle of Britain by the
R.A.F., a completely Independent air arm responsible only to
I
;
the War Cabinet, and by the Luftwaffe, separate Crerman air
j branch subject only to the General High Command, added fuel to
the separate air force school's enthusiasm in the United States*
h
jjAnd on June 16, 19l4-l> despite persistent opposition to the sepa-
ration idea by American Army and Navy Chiefs, including Under
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Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson and Secretary of the Navy
Frank Knox, Senator Patrick McCarran introduced a bill that
would set up an independent air force under a Secretary of Mili-
tary Aviation.
That there was considerable force behind the movement
this time was apparent liaen five days later Secretary of Aar
Stimson countered the ?/icGarran move with a compromise. Declar-
ing that "we favor autonomy of the air arm rather than se^^re-
gated independence" and that such autonomy would facilitate and
insure the joint action of air, ground and naval forces. Secre-
tary Stimson announced a reorganization of the Army Air Corps
to streamline its coamiand.
Under the 3timson plan, the two parts of the Air Corps,
General Headquarters Air Force (combat units) and the Training
Division under the Chief of th© Air Corps were consolidated and
placea under the single command of Major General H.H.Arnold,
who was answerable to General Marshall, the Chief of Staff. "The
reorganized group, to be known as the Army Air Forces, will be
given sufficient autonomy to permit the fullest development of
its efficiency," said Newsweek , 26
ARGUIffiNTS TO SUPPORT THE DRIVE FOR A SEPARATE AIR POHCE
Examination of testimony, committees' reports, editori-
als, letters to editors, etc. daring the period 19l6-I|.l indlcatoi
a variety of argments used by the advocates of a separate air
=£a3?eet Kxamplea of tho s e points which were olted moat froquentla^
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are as follows:
1918- What is wanted to brine order out of what threatens to
be chaos is a central authority, a strong man with ideas
and energy, to talce charge of the Industry and regulate,
direct and accelerate it to the maximum of production.
(
The
New 'fork Times ) ^'
1918- It is so obvious that military aviation is too big and
complicated to be a mere appendage to the Army and Navy De*
partnents that opposition to turning over aerial problems
to a new^department is incomprehensible »
(
The New York
Times) 2u
1918- An Air Department head- -call him by what name or title
you like --would have the authority, that no one seems to
have now, to regulate and speed production and systemati-
cally to furnish the army and navy with the planes they
require ..« .He would have to reconcile independent and con-
flicting policies. His word would-be law. He would be
responsible. ( The New '^ork Time
s
) 29
1918- There still remains a demand in some quarters for a
"one-man top" with full control over the airplane as a
war-arm on sea and land, an Air Department coordinate with
the Army and Navy Departments
.
(The New York Globe ) 3^
1919- From the point of view of economy in administration,
there can be no comparison. One department will certainly
^lend less money in experimentation and in overhead charges
than will two rival, though friendly, departments like the
War and Navy, ... (The Independent ) 3l
1923- It is surely high time for the three branches (army,
I
navy, post-office) of the air service to be placed under
unified control, duplication eliminated, archaic regulatiatu
rescinded, and opportunity given for inventive genius and
organizing ability. ( The Independent ) 32
!
192lj.- Our aeronautical activities are divided anong 21 bu-
reaus. There ir? no responsible head. There is little co-
operation, much competition and jealousy and some overlap-
ping. There is no policy. (Peter Vischer in The Mew York
y^orld ) 33
1925- Representative Perkins .. .has struck a keynote in his
contention that economy is not the only principle to be
considered in the proposal for unifying the air force. But
in such unification lies the only hope, not only of doing
away with the dangerous and expensive duplication. • .but of
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pror:ress as well. (The Independent )3^
193!}.- Many students of taxation and administration who a year
ago questioned such a proposal have come to look on a
single department under a Secretary of National Defense
as a useful plan, (Letter to the Editor, The New York
Times) 35
19l|JL- •••But fundamentally, and of basic importance, we must
develop an air strategy shaped by men who conceive of the
use of air power in new terms, men who can handle fleets
of planes in air missions independent of surface control
and beyond the reach of armies or navies, we must always
remember that air power has introduced a new principle of
war, that it ma^ no longer be necessary in the world of
the future to defeat the enemy's arrjed forces in order to
win a war; that air pov;er leaping above conventional battle-
fields can strike directly at the enemy's will to resist
by bombing the eneiay peoples, the enemy industries and
centers of resistance, (The Hew York Times)3^
During the Congressional hearings on the Curry Bill,
Pilly Mitchell made a valid observation when he stated! "Psy-
chologically, there is a lack of temperamental ability on the
part of the vVar and Navy Departments to see aviation as it is,,.
Each department of the governaent—and there are about twenty
that are interested in aircraft—wants its own special service
for its own needs, MeanwhiLte, the main work of aircraft de-
fense of the country is being neglected. No department is spec-
ifically devoted to aviation now that is not tied up with some-
thing else which aviation threatens, "37
OPPOSITION TO THE PLAN
Opponents to the proposal for a separate air force were
just as articulate in their rebuttals, although some of the
statements by officers of the War and Navy Departments were of a
>
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general nature and on occasion seeined to stem as much from loy-
alty to their respective services as from logic, as is indicated
in this cross-section of the arguments used in opposition to tht
plan:
1920- The War and Navy Departments are at present opposed to
the plan of a separate Air Department .The Havy is per-
haps more adverse to talking units from such a department
than is the Army The objection will be rjiade that the
stern duty of economy forbids the appropriation of money
for an expensive Air Department • (The New York Times )39
192ij.- General Pershing, in reconrjendin^;:, a stron:, flying arni,
is not carried away by illusions about aviation values in
warfare. He observes: V. .The infantry still remains the
backbone of attack, and the i.'ole of other arms is to help
it reach tl'ie enemy." It is nevertheless as an indispensable
auxiliary that General Pershing views the air service. (The
New York Times) 39
1925- General Drum has stated that in his opinion the present
deficiency in the Air "^ervice lies only in materials. The
personnel, he feels, given adequate equipment, is fully
capable of functioning without duplication under tiiree de-
partmental heads. (The Independent) h-'-^
1925- ...The President feels the policy of the Administration
is toward unification rather than establishment of new and
independent services. (The Literary Di^^est) k-^
1925- "It is simply incredible," remarks Secretary of War
Weeks, "that such men as General Pershing, General Harbord
and General Eines should wish to take any course relating
to the development of the air service wLich could not be
for the best interests of the future defense of the United
States," (The Literary Difqest) 42
1925- Statement by Admiral Sims: "The civilian today sees the
Army and Navy are failing to coordinate and act in unison,
but matters would be a great deal worse if still another
bureau were created. That would ma'ce the situation ex-
tremely involved. This policy has already been put on
trial in England, where it has turned out to be a failure.
During the war an air bureau would only tend to make a csim-
paign more complicated and would be detrimental to a smooth"
running plein of attack." (The Literary Li?;est) 4-3
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1925- Such action, in the opinion of Carl P, Egge, superin-
tendant oX the air-mail branch of the Post-office Depart-
ment, would damage the keen spirit of cooperation and high
morale which now cfiaracterizes the Air Mail Service. (The
Literary Dip;est) W
1925- I'he flier is liicely to exaggerate the value of the air
service, the naval man the naval service, and the military
man the military service. To the directing head, such as
Acting Secretary Davis and Secretary of Navy Vfilbur, all
are but contributing factors to a common end. It may be
advisable to have a department of aeronautics for the reg-
ulation of commercial and civilian flying. But the Army
and Navy should c continue to hav^ control of their own air
forces, (i'inneaoolis Tribune) 4^
Of all the arguments against a separate air force, the
following extracts from an article in the December 1, 19)4-1 issue
of Life by Hanson Vv. Baldwin seera to be the most valid:
...But there are even raore compelling reasons why the
Billy Mitchell dream of a separate and independent ilrnerican
air force should not be realized today. The creation of
such a force would require a complete reorr,:anisatlon of our
defense structure at a time when our defenses are already
imdergoing unprecedented expansion. The current program
might be fatally delayed by such radical reorganization.
Even if a separate air force were created, its existence
would be meaningless unless there were also created a high-
er General Staff with over-all strategical authority. Only
such a staff could fully integrate the air force and the
surface forces. Without such integration a separate air
force would be of a-nall value....
.. .Finally, an unhappy but human fact must be faced. A
separate air force today would create service jealousies
and service bitterness. It would construct a wall of opin-
ionated emotion which would do more toward preventing ef-
fective coordination of effort than any other factor....
This is no tluie for a separate air force. That day may
come. Certainly .-iraericans must keep an open mind as air-
power spreads its wings. But now—today in the midst of
Armageddon—now and throughout tlie war--we must preserve a
proper proportion oetween the new, which may not be so abso-
lute as its enthusiasts imagine, and the old, which is al-
ways being modified^ but can never be superseded. 4^
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Six da;ys later the Japanese hit Pearl Harbor- -and the
dream of Billy Mitchell, a separate air force, was once again
shelved until a more propitious time for lighting the torch that
had been carried by the stalwarts of aviation for so many years*
Fimims
1. The issue becajne complex to the extent that the public
was confused* During the period 19l8-3i[. there were fifteen air
service inquiries and some of the reports rendered by the inves-
tigating boards were almost diaiuetrically opposed in their rec-
oiamendations* The dearth of expressions of opinion by the pub-
lic In "letters to the editor" coluims bears out the belief that
the public's confusion resulted in an ultimate loss of interest*
2. The advocates of a separate air force, notably Dilly
Mitchell, were overzealous on occasions, and certainly erred
when they violated Army orders by lobbying for legislation fa-
vorable to the autonomy of the air force. However, over the
years their argments seem to have been sounder than those of
the opponents of the plan*
3« From a public relations viewpoint, the advocates of
j
the plan v.ould have done well to concentrate on terminology,
I
Even among the proponents of a separate air force was tc be
foimd a lack of uniformity in the goal they were seeking. This
I
violates a fundaniental principle of advertising and publicity,
i
l,e, adopt a naiao or slogan and then hammer it incessantly into
I
*-rhft iniprts of the puhTl o . so tha t, ifc wn.l never be forgottan or

10i|.
confused \v5.th another cause or product,
||
ij.. Advocates of a separate air f orco had acre success
after they aligned themselves v/ith those who favored a Depart-
ment of National Defense and made the status of the air service
a secondary issue, subservient to the public Interest of a
strong over-all national military organization. Sincere as they
might have been in the early years of the controversy, tiie air
service enthusiasts were considered suspect by the Army and Navjj
who psychologically were not able to abandon the idea that some
jOf the ainTi.en were Interested primarily in eniianexn^; personal
prestige and power. Personal animosity toward General I'oulois,
Billy Mitchell, and soi3ie of their contemporaries served to abet
resistance in the War and Navy Departaients.
CONCLUSIONS
1. It is felt that greater progress would have resulted
if the proposal had never been made that the air arm of the
Navy shoi.id be incorporated into an Independent air service,
i
Comparifcf^s with the Royal Air Force were not valid, due to an
entirely different strategic situation. The Navy opposition
j thus Incurred, plus the natural tendency in the Army to resist
'any change, combined to present an insurmountable barrier to
success,
2, As was cited in Chapter V, Billy L'itchell was a nan
of great foresight, but it is doubtful if he actuallj- abetted
|l the cause of -Attaining aufcon^yL-Xor the Air Forc e * Tn 19g5-3aft=

105
envisioned a Department of National Defense with a Secretary in
the President's Cabinet and an Air Force coequal with the Army
and Navy, as was established in July, 19^7 • However, his intol-»
erance with those who disagreed with hiai and his lack of tact
and diplomacy probably did much harm to the basic stru^>:/:le*
3» It is believed that success would have been attained
In 19ii.l or 19^2 had it not been for vVorld V.ar II. The role of
I
air power had been established in the minds of the people by
that time and the issue had been more clearly defined ty\e
advocates of a separate air force durin.^ the late 1930»s. Also,
by that time many of the older officers of the Army, who still
thought of aviation in terms of their own experience during
I
World War I, had been retired and the War Department was more
temperamentally adaptable to the new concept of "air power" as
'contrasted to the "air service" of World War I,
j
Real unification of the armed services is the slow
.result of growth and educativn* It stems from within arid is a
I
product of heart, mind and spirit* It Is felt that it cannot
be imposed from without.
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CIIAPTKR VIII
ii
THE Aim' CARRIES TIiE AIR KAIL
I
The "Air Mail Fiasco" of 1954 draTra tic ally illustrated
the role that public opinion plays In affairs of national inter-
i
est. At the outset of the controversy, when President Roosevelt I
•uddenly cancelled the air nail contracts held hy the corffiiercial
i
air lines, public attention was focused on the issue of whether
the President was justified in taking such drastic and abrupt
action. Colonel Charles Lindbergh didn't think so, and figured
|
prominently in public criticism of the President. However, af-
I
ter the Army Air Corps had suffered a series of fatal crashes
duping the first few weeks of its operation of tue air mail,
there was a definite shift in public opinion. Compassion for
the air lines changed to pity for the Army, The main issue was
no loiiger whether the President was justified in cancelling the
air mail contracts, but whether he had the moral right to dump
the job into the lap of a service imtralned for it,^
Before any contracts had been cancelled by President
Roosevelt, he had received assurances from the War Department
that the Army was competent to handle the job,^ An editorial in
The Mew Y^ork Times stated, "When Major Jones, comjriander of the
eastern air mail zone, says 'We '11 carry the mail, don't worry
about that,' nobody ought to worry. "^ The Tim,e8 further edi- jl
torialized: "To carry the mails in an emergency is a pleasure
,
aa well as a labor ^ for the AjrTOy_avi^^ggg^,iye jglad to have all^
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the experience wiiich the detail will p;ive them,"^ TVils state-
ment was unqualified, so it may have been merely the opinion
of the editorial writer. However, considering the customary
i
cautiousness of the Times , one would surmise that it based its \
•tatement on a quotation of a member of the Array Air Corps*
It later developed that the Air Corps did not have the
•qulpment needed to accorapllsh successfully the assigned mission|i>
Thla reflected more unfavorably on the organization than would
have been the case if a frank adml.sslon had been made in the oe-
glnnlng that the Air Corps could not perform the task -vfith the
equipment available. A report of an investigating committee of
I
the House of Representatives was made public in June, 1934 and
gtated in parts
Greneral Foulols was quite certain the Army could handle
the job with ten days preparation. Yet testimony before
the committee showed the total lack of preparation made
by the Chief and the Assistant Chief of the Air Corps for
the welfare of the personnel engaged In carrying the mail,^
The General, the committee declared, testified tliat Ajjny
pilots had from thirty to sixty hours of night flying experience!
when records showed tnat some of those who crashed had far less,^
General Poulols's sincerity of purpose was unquestionable^
He had been taken into the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps
in 1908 because he was considered small and light enough to fly
•afely the premature box-kite machines of the day and he was one
7
of the pioneers of flying, I>uring 1910, he alternately flew
and assisted his eight enlisted mechanics m patching up Army
iAliTplane No, 1 at San Antonio, Texas, drawirig. |500 from hia

in
own meager salary as a first lieutenant to aug^nent the '^1$0
Appropriated by Con^^ress for repairs to the newfangled flying
machine vjhen breakage exceeded the official budget,^ The ad-
vancement of Amiy aviation Y;as uppermost in his mind and undoubt#»
edly prompted him to accept the responsibility of taking over th^(
air mail routes. He failed to reckon with the consequences
which failure v/ould bring about
»
PUBLIC STATEJ^iENTS
In a radio address on February 27* 193^ > after the initial
series of fatal crashes. General Foulols said, "I should like
to ask you to discount as unfair, unlotinded and untrue certain
of the recent accusations and headline-seeking phrases which
have reflected not only against the efficiency of the Air Corps
personnel, but also against the present administration*^'^ This
violates one of the basic principles of public relations j put
your affairs in order and thsn tell your story to the public,
xinglossed and unbiased* If you have a convincing argument, thsy
will believe you and will discount other stories which they
have heard. It should never be necessary to ask tlie public to
discount the "unfair, unfounded and untrue accusations,**
During the last week of February, 193^1- Major C, L. Tink-
er, commander of the Seventeenth Pursuit Group, charged with
flying the mail from San Francisco through the Sierra Nevadas
to Salt Lake City, declared, "It was next to impossible in the
short length of time between receipt of the Executive Order»««
4 =
!
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and the initiation of Army fliers into the work to make any prep-*
aration for it,""^^ This certainly was not in consonance with
|
Major General Poulols*8 remarks in the radio address on February
27 # when he maintained that the Amy was quite capable of fly-
ing the air mail,^^
I
This is a good example of the embarrassing situations
|
which can develop as the result of contradictory and/or incon- !i
ilstent statements by responsible Individuals or agencies. It
la to prevent occurrences of this nature that centralized con- I
trol over public statements by members of the armed forces is
j
considered desirable • However, in the past and even today,
regulations which have been intended only to insure consistency
in statements of policy and principle have been misinterpreted
|j
by the public and by some members of the armed forces. It has
been charged that such measures serve to implement the desire
of higher headquarters to "gag" officers in the field. It is
true that a serious curb on individuals* freedom of speech could
be exercised for a limited period, if the responsible authori-
ties so desired. However, it is doubted if such a "gag" could
be maintained for any great length of time, because it wouM in-
evitably come to the attention of the public, and public opinion
would be so strongly opposed to such measures that necessary
•tepa would have to be taken by higher headquarters to allevi-
ate the condition. Therefore, it is felt that the advantages
to be gained from a system of centralized control over public
gtatementa^qnoerning poliey and principles outwe igb. the
i
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Indistinct threat to freedom of speech.
A letter to the editor of The Nev/ York Times pointed out
the flimsy arguments presented by some Air Corps officers in
defense of the Army's unfortunate experience in flying the air
mail I
We have been told that the explanation is that these men
1
and their equipment were put at a job for which they were
j
not prepared, , .Certainly commercial pilots need not be
trained to fly in formation or to drop bombs. But Army
pilots should certainly be trained and equipped for long
|
cross-country flights, for blind-flying and for radio dir-
ections. One high officer said that in war the enemy would
,
not guide our fliers to their objective; hence, training
Army fliers to follow radio directions was useless. That -g
'
is absurd; but many would accept it because of the source.
Th« writer of the letter had a valid objection to the
explanation that had been offered to the public. In the prepa-
ration of releases for public consumption the fact should be re-
membered that a vast segment of the American populace is fairly
;
well educated and it is that portion of the population which
|
guides public opinion. Therefore, responsible government offi-
cials, civilian or military, should never talk down to the people;
should never underestimate their intelligence; should never try
I
to pawn off on them a flimsy, half-baked explanation,
l|
Even official orders can liave a public relations aspect.
If they are not restricted from the public and the press. A
||
letter to the editor of The New York Times cited a "most urgent"
order issued by General Foulois to the pilots of the air mail
service
:
All pilots must thoroughly understand that under certain
ataospheric^conditiona ice will^^orm on the planea^,_grQi|^ell*>__
(I
or, hubs and venturl tubes of Instruments normally between
28 degrees and 34 degrees Fahrenheit, and no flights will
be continued Into weather conditions conducive to ice for-
j
mation.
The reader commented that if, as appears from this or-
der, the pilots assigned to air mail duty by the army were not
acquainted with the conditions which result in ice formation,
j
they were certainly not fit to perform the duty which was being
13
required of them. The order issued by the General no doubt '
was intended to serve merely as a reminder and not as a bulletin
of instruction. Nevertheless, the writer of the letter, and
|
probably thousands of other readers of the Times took the order
at its face value.
Another order resulted in some embarrassment on the part
|
of the Air Corps, The Army resumed carrying the mail after the
President's suspension was lifted, but the order that no pilot
should leave the ground without a 3,000-foot ceiling had to b©
rescinded when Army officials discovered that in several regions^i
notably over the Allegheny mountains, such high cloud banks were
seldom encountered more than once or twice a month, A later
order allowed them to fly in daylight with a 500-foot ceiling,
a condition described by Army regulations as "dangerous" but
one in which commercial lines had been flying with perfect safe-
ty,^^ When operational mistakes such as this are publicized, ^
it is a natural reaction for the public to question the capabil-
ities of the Army's air service.
I(I
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TliE PUBLIC'S ATTUZm
i
Public opinion, as reflected by letters to the editor of
|
j
The New York Times , seeiued to be divided on the subject of the i
!
Army's air niail experience. One reader su^jgested a general boy-f
cott of air mail service until "the govornuient is brought to it^
senses, while another reader maintained that the fatal acci- ii
dents merely substantiated the testiruony of General Mitchell as
to the ^Jiipreparedness and inadequacy of our aviation units
Another felt that the unfortunate experience might serve to con4|
• vince Congress and the public that the United States had been
I
niggardly in providing the money essential to the development
of a potent army of defense or aggression»17
The writer of The Literary Dir^est ' s coliasin, "At The Ob-
i
servation Post," felt that the air ruail episode had taught the
|
country a valuable leascn—naiuely, "that the Air Corps deserves
a better all-round training and the facilities to promote it«"-^^
In a letter to General Foulois in connection with the resumption
of air mall carrying by private coupanies on Lay 0, Postmaster
General James A, Parley stated:
The country and the Congress will, without doubt, give a
more adequate support to the Ariny, will see to it that it
has the moat modern equipment obtainable, and that suffi-
cient funds are provided for the fliers to have the addi- i
tional hours of flying which have so long been needed. ^9
;|
1
i Despite the fatalities, loss of equipiiient and some loss
^
! of face due to the aforementioned public relations and operatiaiji'
i al miacues, the Air Corps actually einerged from the air mail II
ii
iI U6
episode In a stronger position than it enjoyed before it was
called into the breach by the President. The struggle for appro-
priations to bring about the status promised in Postmaster-Gen-
eral Farley's letter is discussed in the next chapter,
FINDINGS
1, The Air Corps was loss responsible for the unfortu-
nate air mall episode than was generally realized at the time,
mid certainly leas culpable than is commonly believed today by
persons who have only a vague knowledge of the facts surrounding
that chapter in the history of American aviation. Extremely bad
weather was an Impartaat factor which caused a large percentage
of the fatal crashes. In addition, equipment possessed by the
Air Corps at the time was not adequate to enable it to perform
the mission satisfactorily, I^evertheless, President Roosevelt
had received assurance that the Air Corps was capabt, of handling
the air mail before he cancelled the commercial contracts,
|
! 2, Major General Poulois, Chief of the Air Corps, failled
to reckon with the consequences which failure would bring about, ^
when he assumed the responsibility for the carrying of the air
mail. His sincerity of purpose was beyond question. He felt
that the cause of Array aviation would be advanced by the suc-
cessful accomplishment of the air mail task. However, he failed
to realize that the same cause would liave been furthered if he
had made a frank admission to the V/ar Department and President
Rooaevelt that the Air Corpe was incapable of accompllahing the
ii
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mission, due to a lack of adequate equipment and training facil-
ities. The Impotence of American military aviation In 1934
could have heen forcefully brought to the attention of the
people by a public admission of the Air Corps's inability to
perform the air mail task with the equipment at Its disposal,
3» There was a lack of coordination from a public re-
lations standpoint. Conflicting statements were made by memb-
ers of the Air Corps. In addition, obviously implausible ex-
planations v;ere offered for the fatal crashes and the failure
of the Air Corps to satisfactorily perform the air mail task.
Such statements were exposed for their true value in published
letters to newspaper editors. Some improper orders were issued
and subsequently had to be amended, after receiving public no-
tice. This did not reflect credit on Air Corps operations and
did not contribute to public confidence In the Air Corps.
4, There was a shift in public opinion after the series
of fatal crashes. Compassion for the air lines shifted to pity
for the Army. Ultimately, the air mail episode served to con-
vince the country that the Air Corps needed more adequate train-
ing and the facilities to promote such training,
CONCLUSIONS
1, The best interests of the Air Corps, on a long-range
basis, would have been served if Major General P'oulois had
frankly admitted, when questioned, that the equipment in the
haialg of the Air Corpe and the statua of training of Ita piloti
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did not warrant taking over the air mail project. Frank admis-
•
aions of the truth will resolve or avoid public relations prob-
lems in most cases and are much preferred to evasive answers,
decoy excuses, or false claims. Where security precludes dis-
closures of the truth at the time, that fact should be explain-
ed and a release of authentic information should be made at the
earliest practicable date.
2. Labels play an important role in public relations.
Whenever it is determined that a product or agency is being giv-
en a label which bears an unfavorable connotation, steps should
be taken to discourage the use of that label, because the label
will stick in the minds of the public lon^^ after the actual
facts surrounding the incident have been forgotten. The phrase
"Air Mail Fiasco,** which was used extensively by newspapers and
aagazines in 1934, is a good example of a label that has linger-
ed in the minds of the public, to the discredit of the Air
Force. Efforts to bring about the discontinuance of the use of
undesirable labels by newspapers and magazines should be subtle
and tactful. Requests of such nature should be liandled on the
basis of personal relationships with members of the press. Tlmt
the public interest would be served by not using labels with un-
favorable connotations should be stressed when such requests are
made.
3. Centralized control over the issuance of public
|
statements by members of the armed forces should be maintained
in the interest of consistency* The public becomee confused
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when contradictory statements are made by persons of authority
and such confusion may lead to loss of confidence. However, it
is believed to be in the interest of .-^ood public relations if
explanatory statements are issued prior to the effective date
of any regulations which provide for centralized control over
public utterances. This will preclude the accusations that
armed services personnel are being deprived of their freedom of
•peech, that higher headquarters Is apprehensive lest individu-
als in the field divulge information that would be embarrassing
to higher echelons, etc*
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CHAPTER IX
AIR APPROPRIATIONS
The backbone of the modern business corporation is its
financial condition and the fact that it has something to sell
which other people desire. In order to operate profitably, it
mist produce goods, pay fair wages to its employees, remunerate
Stockholders with dividends and enjoy good relations with its
many publics, in addition to other factors.
The Air Force, too, has these responsibilities. Yet,
While the corporation has a tangible product to offer to the
public in the form of a durable and real item, the Air Force
has an intangible abstraction called "Air Power" or "Air Pre-
paredness", the present value of which can bo determined only
by its effectiveness in the future for protective purposes.
To obtain funds, the corporation must issue stocks and bonds
and enjoy favorable public opinion for their satisfactory dis-
posal. The Air Force, -unconcerned with stocks and bonds, in-
stead must seek its operating funds from Congress,
Therefore, to obtain maximum efficiency and operating
performance and to obtain the funds it deems necessary to con**
duct its business in a satisfactory manner, the Air Force must
•njoy good relations with Congress as well as with the public.
In a sense, this factor could be compared to good board of di-*-
llipectois relations in a business corporation.
Although the first appropriation of :#30,000 was granted

^
Congress for military aviatiofTlLn 1909# the years up to the
Mexican Punitive Expedition were ones in which constant criti-
cism was heaped upon it and the War Department for not showing
L practical realization of the assistance in military operations
to be derived from airplanes. The Mew York Times stated that
most of the responsibility seemed to rest upon Congress which
jjttliose to be economical.^ Later in that year, 19li|-# Secretary
|0f War Garrison extolled Congress in his annual report for mak—
^|ing a good start in putting aviation on a substantial basis and
said, "This work should be followed up and consistently pressed"?
The implication in his remarks that good Congressional relations
were necessary in the Aviation Section's public relations poll-
oles cannot be disregarded.
The need for obtaining public support for military avia-
tibn was demonstrated when G, Douglas Wardrop, editor of The
Aerial A£e, in a letter to The New York Times , called for pub-
lic action to insure the passage of a substantial appropriation
for aeronautics:
...The aeroplane is the latest instrument of war, and as
such it symbolizes a department of the Government's activi-
ty, in which neither pains nor money should be spared to
attain to perfection such as will insure the supremacy of
America in the air. The intelligent citizen should have a
tremendous Interest in the development of national aeronaut-
ics as a whole and the reason for this is the fact that it
is the taxpayer who must find the money for that develop-
ment. 3
Mr. Wardrop's statement serves to bring into focus the
fact that it is the taxpayer. In the last analysis, who provides'
th« necessary funds for the operation of our air service. Many
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business corporations have found it necessary to develop in
their stockholders interests other than monetary* Likewise,
the Air Force, not being able to grant a monetary dividend, must
•eek to sustain and encourage the interest of the public in this!
matter of appropriations.
On the other hand, the sustenance and encouragement of
that interest requires the dissemination of reasons the money Is
needed, what it is to be used for and how it is finally spent!
If the Army and Navy Air Services have been starved; if
the budget for aviation has been pared to the bone, either
by Congress or the War or Navy Departments*
.
#then it is
high tii^e the public knew the facts. 4-
The dissemination of information concernin^^ funds must
be dealt with in a truthful manner inasmuch as it is the public
who pays for the operation of the Air Force.
The public is also concerned with the matter of executive
administration of funds. Shortly after Congress appropriated
,tl3»28l,666 in 1916, Henry V/oodhouse, a noted aviation enthusi**
ast, in a letter to The New York Times stated:
What the public wants to know is how Colonel Squier...l«
planning to give the United States a thousand trained avia-
tors in the shortest time possible.
Public opinion iias crystallized itself into a demand that
soiTiebody be put in charge of this important branch of the
service, who by personal experience and personal executive
ability, can build a substantial air service in the shortest
time possible*,.'
During the first World War, public opinion and the press,
i
realizing the military significance of tiie airplane, called for !
Increased appropriations for air. At the close of 1917* General

Squier, Chief Signal Officer of the Array, in asking Concress for
an appropriation of |l,130,2l4.O,3li{. for the fiscal year 19l8-1919|
ipecified what it was to be expended for, although this is nor-
mally not done when a country is involved in warfare. Editori-
ally, it was stated that a billion dollars added to the previous
I
I appropriation would not be an excessive price to pay for oara-
I
/
I
mountcy in the air«
|
Although Congress granted sufficient appropriations dur-
ing the war, the immediate years following found it to be econ*
omy-minded, despite editorial opinion in favor of increased ap-
|
propriatlons for the building of the air am* ifhBn fl5#000,000
I
was requested in an Urgent I>eficiency Bill in 1919* The Grand I
Rapids News wrote:
..•No one will quarrel with Congress for its desire to
practice economy, but it seeras that the coujitry ought not
be niggardly in its expenditures for flying machines. ,7
The New York World said:
• ••The imitiediate danger is that, while Congress is grop*
ing blindly in search of a way out of its perplexities, the
Air Service will be crippled beyond repair, Vs/hat it needs
at once is a liberal appropriation for the construction of
new airplanes of the latest types to replace the obsolete
machines now on hand and soon to be discarded as worn out.
No new ones can be built next year unless Congress immedi-*'
ately provides the funds, fiind as matters stand the Army to-
day could not equip three squadrons, if needed, for active
service
A discordant note ^a.s struck by The Miimeapolis Journal 8
The position of the Plouse is understandable. It finds
no coordination whatever a:-i.ong the departments, no co-oper-
ation, no consiaered plan for the developraent of the air-
plane. The War and Navy Departments are at cross purposes./

It Is axiomatic in public relations that a house divided
will fall. Industries in the same field of endeavor must not
.jattack each other for if they do they seek public censure for
the entire field. It is common for many people to regard the
disruptive efforts of a few as representing the whole*
I
Lack of cooperation serves no greater purpose than to des-
poil and mutilate the final common effort. Although there was
a good amount of favorable public opinion in this case, the a-
pove cited unfavorable editorial in The Minneapolis Journal
served to demonstrate that the War and Navy Departments had not
I
proved to Congress that they were operating in a spirit of coop-
iration and coordination nor tiiat they had defined an air policyi
Congress and the public are constantly aware of these factors
in the interests of economy and business management. The Air
jjPorc© through actual practice and from a public relations view*
point must seek to satisfy that awax*enesst
It is high time that the aeronautical administration
should show how every dollar is spent. If our methods are
wasteful, they must be reformed. . . .10
As it was stated before, the Air Force has an intangible
product to sell# Therefore, it must convince the American pub-
jlic and Congress of tlie need of its appropriations, by the in-
surance factor of its operations, as a defensive force in the
future
:
A business man who has insured his factory for many years i
does not complain that he Irias paid premiums for nothing be-
cause there has been no destructive fire in his building;
nor if he is a practical i^ian, does he consider insuring his
property for ^10,000 when^ it is worth ten timeg^ as much. Con^.
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gresa does not look at insurance of the country against the
waste of v.ar as sensibly. Constantly are heard complainbs ,
that too much money has been spent upon the amy and navy
for national defense, and when appropriations are wanted
to equip a branch of the military service adequately a half
or a third is allowed, no matter how good a case is made out
for more. Thus the country carries less insurance than it.
should have, which is bad business
In 1923, The New York Herald pointed out:
...Our Air Service, • .should be maintained as a goinQ con-
cern, rather than as a mere skeleton organization, -^^
In 1939* the ITev/ Republic stated!
It is also well to consider that appropriating money now
does not mean airplanes tomorrow. It may not even mean
planes next year. Any plan for defense must tal^e into ac-
count the time-lag; foresight is an essential quality of the
military planner. ,• ,-^3
Decrying the inadequate equipment of the Air Service in
1923 despite the fact that our aviators held many records for
speed and endurance. The New York Times stated that American
people would not take an interest in aviation unless our army
eould point to its pilots as the best in the world. It further
stated:
,,, Public opinion must be behind a movement to supply
the army's needs., .It is not pleasant to thinly of, but offi-
cers and men have to do hazardous things in racing against
!
time and in making non-stop flights over mountains and des-
erts in order to create a sentiment that will influence
Congress to malie the appropriations which Major General
Mason M. Patrick asks for.,,,-'4
Approximately a month later, the same paper said:
•,,Our success as record makers is easily explained,
j
American records are made by army and navy fliers with the
best machines they can get the manufacturers to turn out,
and the object of the campaign, in which our soldiers and
sailors constantly risk their necks, is to arouse such in-
terest in the United States that something substantial will 1
be done by Gongresg^rAj^^j
(
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And again in 1927 it said:
•••To stimulate public interest General Patrick had to
develop adventurous flying officers and call upon them to
make records, . . .-^^
In the processing of Air Force appropriations bills # of-
ficers must testify before Congressional committees. It is es*
sential that these individuals enjoy the confidence and respect
of Congressmen. Following is an example of good and poor rela*
tions:
An example of bad relations ;
•••The House Military Affairs Committee soon started a
feud with Major General Benjamin D, Foulois, chief of the
corps, that badly crippled its Air Corps relations with
Congress, Pressure from that body resulted in an entirely
new system of plane procureraent that stalled deliveries for
months. • .Last August, the voluntary retirement of General
Foulois opened the way for a Congressional rapprochement
An example of p:ood relations :
...He Major General Oscar l/'iestover has a name in the
Army for level-headed decisions. Extremely thorough about
everything he does, he never has been known to go off half-
cocked when he encounters progressive ideas. Rather, he
will insist on going into all ramifications of a defense
plan. Accordingly, if Senators wish to know intimate avia-
tion details of the War Department's 1937 appropriations
bill now before the upper House, General »Ve stover will have
them at his finger-tips.-^^
FINDINGS
1. Despite the fact that Congress bears the major brunt
of negative public opinion when it develops that insufficient
appropriations have been allotted to the Air Force, it is nev-
ertheless a continuing responsibility for the Air Force to keep
Con6:ressmen^ully apprised of military aviation's flnansLlaJL—
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status and thereby aid them in reaching proper decisions con*
cerning appropriations
•
2« By its participation in flights which can be viewed
and appreciated by the public > the Air Force is able to obtain
and sustain support which is ultimately reflected by the actions
of Congresstaen on matters concerning appropriations.
3# The dissemination of factual information is as much
of an absolute requirement in the Air Force as it is in business.
IAny incidents which reflect adversely on the honesty or Integ-*
rity of the Air Force have a definite beariiig on the public's
opinion of the organization*
The human factor cannot be disregarded so it is essen*-
tial that Air Force officers dealing v/ith Congressmen on approp-
riations matters be held in high esteem for their intelligence
and integrity.
CONCLUSIONS
1. There is a continuing responsibility on the part of
Air Force public relations personnel to clearly define the pub«»
lie relations problems which can result from poor internal bus*
Iness management within the service. Conversely, good businesd
practices by the Air Force which result in more efficient man-
agement and ultimately in more preparedness for the taxpayer's
dollar can be utilized to good advantage by Air Force public
relations personnel in establishing and miaintaining public con- i
j
fidenee and support^
^
I
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2. It is believed to be in the interest of good publlo
relations for the Air Force to avoid entanglements with budget*
ary problems of th3 other services. This harkens back to one
of tlie basic principles of public relations whereby an organiza*
tlon'3 case should be built on its own merits and not designed
to attack or destroy its competitors*
3« Tha "defense insxirance" argument for air appropria-
tions tlia.t was set forth by The
^
New York Times in 1921 appears
to be one of the most logical presentations of a problem that
has plagued the Air Force from its earliest days. It is felt
that public support can be most effectively solicited if this
type of reasoning is employed and the public is kept advised of
the air policy that has been agreed upon by the responsible au-
,
thorities.
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CHAPTER X
THE PERSONNEL FACTOR
It is a principle of management that the four resources
necessary to accomplish a Job are space, time, materiel and per^
•onnel. It is qiiite possible that the future might bring a re-
arrangement in the importance of these factors but, until the
present writing, personnel has held the greatest significance.
For without the human potential, everything else becomes meaning-*
less in this world of ours.
I
The Air Force, of course, is dependent upon the same re-
sources. It can exceed any other military power in equipment
but a warplane is only as good as the man who flies it.^ In
1940 W.B. Courtney stated that "in mechanized war man is more
important than the machine. .E*verything is expendable in war
except time—and men."^ This statement is open to question and
^^the answer may rest in technical developments of the not too
distant futiire.
While the United States has always maintained a defensive
military force, its efforts in peace time have always taken the
course of building a small, highly-trained nucleus for war ex-
pansion. The personnel factor, as important as it is in our
r
peace and war efforts, has even greater implications with re-
gard to public relations policies. In various media, these
in^lications have been expressed in connection with recruiting.
(
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educational requirements for enlistment, pay, promotion, morale,
housing and race discrimination during the period of this study*
In 1916 the War Department received sharp criticism for
an appeal it made to the public through The New York Sun for
the addresses of certain individuals who were aviators or were
interested in aviation* !Fhe appeal was made so that the where-
abouts of these individuals would be readily available in the
event of outbreak of war. Some of the people were well-known
to the public, othere already were in government service, and
still others were of foreign descent who had departed the coun-
try. Addresses of individuals such as Orville Wright, Glenn H«
Curtiss, Vincent As tor, and Lawrence B. Sperry were requested.
II
Although The New York Times editorial containing the S€UP«
castic criticism admitted that the underlying idea of having on
hand in the War Department the names of everybody who could be
called upon to help the cause of aviation was "a good and propeiP
one, the product of an intelligent mind,** it was also stated
that in **the carrying out of the plan... the bureaucratic mind
worked after its familiar kind and injected the usual element
of absurdity. '*3
In the following year the War Department was editorially
complimented for correcting a false inpression that recruiting
standards for aviation were so high that many individuals did
Jiot even attLempiL to enAeiLJthe ^Air Benlce^ The edltorJAl aaid i
RECRUITING OP INDIVIDUALS
(I
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•••Thousands of young men anxious to serve their country
as airmen liave been led to believe that the chances of en-
tering the United States Army in that capacity were few. It
has been the general belief that the airmen were all com-
missioned officers and that no recruits from civil life
would be admitted imless they had college degrees. The
official announcement that thousands of. recruits are wanted
for air service is therefore tixaely,
. .
.H-
The editorial also contained full information concerning
the location of recruiting stations as well as other enlistment
factor». Good public relations for recruiting was engendered toy
this editorial. It replaced improper beliefs with correct infor-
aiation*
I
However, in a letter to The New York Times signed by "A
Patriot** In 1917» reminiscences of the inefficiency expressed
in the appeal for addresses in I916 appeared again^ This oc-
curred when an individual who had passed all the requirements
for entry into the Officers Reserve Corps of the Signal Corps
*'by May 1 at latest" still had no word concerning his commission
Ion J\ily 3t
• ••Ho thing but silence has coiue from there--aiid we are
going to win the war by our aviators] Surely our Government
is going about it in a peculiar mannerl^
Shortly before the Armistice in \fi/orld V/ar I came good
publicity for recruiting purposes:
I
...General Kenly has lifted the Aviation Corps from the
doldrums to altitudes of efficiency that seemed unattainable
a few months ago, but he still lacks Indispensable human
material.
The service is very responsible, requiring a high order
of intelligence. Applications from civilians are solicited.
Here Is an opportunity for keen-witted youngsters to desire
to join the Signal Corps, to which they may be referred.
They^ must not let the grass _E3P&LJmdev their Xeet* Army
I\
i
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aviation is being rapidly developed these days.^
The problem of expanding the Air Corps in 1939 brought
forth another example of inefficiency although the blast was
primfiirily directed at Congress. Since warplanes cannot fly
without men in our present era, it is natural to assume that any
provision for increase in equipment in the Air Corps would log*
Ically call for an increase in personnel unless other equipment
vere deleted. Such was not the case when the Saturday £veninfi
Post said:
Most of the politicians blissfully took for granted that,'
no matter how rapidly and how far we expanded our air forcef|>
we would have plenty of pilots. When they talked of their
airplane-building plans they didn't give a thought to the
very real problem of finding men to fly the planes.
'
Shortly thereafter, the Civil Aeronautics Authority de-
veloped the college training program to provide a nucleus of
trained aviators in addition to those ?*iich the Air Corps was
already turning out.
Credit for stating cold truth in its publicity was given
the Air Corps six days before the co\mtry was plunged into World
War II, giving further credence to the fact that publicity which
is unvarnished and accurate will receive better editorial treat*
ment than its cotinterpart. This occurred in a magazine whose
"production method is so impersonalized that nothing but a
8tory«8 Intrinsic worth is considered in the managing editor's
final decision."^
On June 30 last year there were 51*000 officers and men
in the U.S. Army Air Force. Today there are 210,000. By
:
next June^jthege wjJJL^e^385^Q0Q« Within two^ yearsjbheye
I
I
13$
will be a million.
The Air Force last week did not boast about these cold
statistics. But if it had been so inclined, it would have
announced to the world that it was working, a miracle, • .it
was creatinp; the greatest air force the world has ever
EDUCATIONAL REqUIHSMENTS
Educational requirements in the Air Force have been high-
er than any other branch of the service. While there may be
||
sufficient and adequate reason for the Air Force wanting colleger-
trained personnel, no evidence was found to indicate that the
explanation had been commented upon editorially during the perl*
od involved. Instead, criticism was pointed at the Air Force
for its 'high-flung" ideals in acquiring personnel.
The problem was pointed out in 1939 when it became dif-
ficult to keep Kelly and Randolph Fields up to full strength
In training because of the rigid educational factor. A let-
ter to The New York Times in the following year stated:
•••Does the Air Corps perhaps believe that a couple of
years in college automatically adds to a man's Intelligenot^
courage or ability to act in an emergency? If so, some
revised thinking is indicated.
H
Despite the air conaciousnoss which pervaded the country
in 19^1-0, there was a shortage of new enlistments in the Air Corps
that was contrary to public expectation and led to the following
editorial comment;
...While the physical requirements for fliers are proper-*
ly strict, more question must be raised about some of the
educational requirements. Pilots must know or be capable
. of learni_rig_the^echanlsm of engines and iaachlne^una^ and ^
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at least a certain proportion must be capable of learning
navigation; but these requirements concern capacity to learn,
rather than prior education. Apart from this, the great
flier is alcin in his qualities to the great tennis player,
golfer, inarksinan or automobile driver; what counts is
physical and mental coordination—endurance, delicacy of
touch, natural sense of timing, instant and dependable re-
actions—qualities which have no necessary connection with
formal education, .-^^
Finally, in 19tJ-» Mgh educational requlreoients for pilot
training forced many, who desired to fly in the war, to enlist
In the Royal Canadian Air Force, Two letters written in that
year emphaslsse the point that the personnel involved would have
been more desirous of flying for their own country:
.•In tliree weeks 1*11 be in Canada, getting advanced
training , • *
,.,The R.A,P« is making good fighter pilots out of the
l8-year-old high school graduates. Why can't the United
States Army do it? Why can't I fly for my own country,
especially since I have already qualified for a license?
With proper training, I»m sure I could be as good and as
clever a pilot as any college iiian,13
,.,My son, who is only I9, is already in the ii,C,A,P, ...
He, too, was not eligible for service in the United State*
Array Air Corps because he was not 20 and did not iiave two
years' coller:e training, although he did have tiiree years of
aviation training—both theory and mechanics.
,,.Why can't the United States do something to keep our
American-born boys at home?^4
Wliether public opinion did or did not force the issue, '
the Air Corps adopted the Flying Sergeant program in August, l'^l\X
but not without the comment from The Hew York Times that: |i
It stepped down from its high horse and this policy
finally went by the board, ,, the vagueness surroimding the
flight-sergeant prograiu is because of the Army's unwilling-
ness to admit that an enlisted^jium ean make as good a pilot
a« a com^jg^lnnad jafXiiier^
Ii
i
I
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PAY OP PERSONNEL
Unlike workers in civilian industry. Air Force personnel
cannot strike for higher wa^iea because of the intrinsic nature
of the performance of their duty which Involves patriotism in
an ultra sense in the defense of their country. But the Air
Force cannot set its own wage scales for officers and enlisted
men. This comes about only by action on the part of Congress
and the President. However, another factor Involved in this
process is the force of public opinion which currently de.riands
an adequate wage regardless of whether the individual is in the
service or industry. It cannot be assuaned tlxat the patriotic
spirit alone holds men in the armed services. Other factors
such as salaries, opportunity for advancement, education and
security are additional inducements which cannot be overlooked.
Patriotism, indeed, is an important element in the build*
ing of the Air Force, Retaining an individual in the service
is a hardy task in view of the fact that he is obligated to
change his residence approximately every three years which re-
suits in varied environments, hardship on his family and the
making of new friends.
Despite these difficult terms of employment, qualified
personnel iiave remained in t^e service. Others iiave left the
service because of the adverse factors cited above and the in-
ducement of a larger emolument. The matter of pay of personnel
is of gigantic importance to the Air Force because of eompetiticBi
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from civilian industiT" in seeking the best personnel for a job
and tiie fact that it will pay for a qualified individual it de»
sires. Adequate salaries become, therefore, not only a matter
of retaining personnel wrho lalght otherwise transfer their affil*
iation but also a matter of providing a proper living standard
which will compensate in part for trie lack of a normal civilian
life.
Favorable editorial opinion has been indicated with re-
gard to pay for personnel of the Air Force,
j[
In February, 19l8# when Secretary Baker proposed in a
bill submitted to the Senate Conmiittee on Military Affairs to
repeal extra allowances to army aviators and create a new gradt
of civilian aviator to be paid $150 a month. The New York Timei|
editorially objected:
It would be unfortunate to discoiirage volunteering for
conimissions in the Aviation Service wiien tnc deinand for
officers must rapidly increase if the enemy is to be driven
from the air by America and her allies,
It would appear tiiat extra inducements must be offered
;
if a full comple.^ent of officers is to be obtained, -^"^
j
A letter written by the "Flying: Cadets" of Gerstner Field,
Lake Charles, Louisiana, cited that the measure would not bring
desired results, was unnecessarily severe and would tend to
affect the morale of American aviation forces. In addition, th#
document stated that the average amount of equipment, not fur-
nished by the government, which flying officers needed cost
approximately ^l\2l\. and brought to light the fact that some of-
jfloeriLhad to xely upon charity to obtain- flying egul;
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The National Special Aid Society of New York City has
been of great assistance in this siatter and has aided a
large number of aviation officers and cadets. Is it not
a pity that this Government should be shifting the re-
sponsibility upon t' e shoulders of private individuals
and should, at the aaiae time, contemplate a reduction
i instead of an increase of the all too little pay of its
' flying officers ?17
While the foregoing was a problem of retaining extra pay^
the late twenties found coioment appearin^j concerning an increase
in pay which was closely allied to promotion and the factor of
competition from civilian industry:
•••With promotion of junior officers lagging and the
lure of better pay in civilian aviation, there la a drift
away from the Army Air Service. General Patrick says that
twenty-one valuable officers resigned during this year
J
"So long as such conditions exist and no steps are takea
to correct what is believed to be an injustice done these
junior officers, it may be expected that more and more of
j
them will separate themselves from the service."
ij Let it not be tho'aght that the younger officers fall in
j!
devotion to the Air Gorp3.,,But officers and tneir families
have to live....-^"
ij
I
Two years later in cominenting favorably on the Flirlow
bill which would provide for a separate promotion list in the
Air Corps, The New York Times stated!
. ...Some of the ablest flyin.^; officers, men whose names
I
are known all over the world, still draw the pay of First
Lieutenants. Amon£^ them are Jar^os A. Doollttle and Lester
J. Maltlaiid. They entered the World War as Lieutenants,
and still hold that rank. "Undor present re^julations,
"
said i^aitland recently, "I could not be a Major until
19'^Q [I933J. The c;c»vernment is losing and will lose many
of its highly trained fliers because it doesn't take care
of them properly.
Statin^5 that the Air Corps was more efficient than ever
in 1930, The New Yorit; Times again oommented that pay was not
3
sufficient for Air Corps personnel. 20 In 1939 the problem of
competition from civilian industry was reiterated when it was
said that "some of those who finish [flying school] would be
York rimea has always talten the stand for favorable promotion
policies for tae Air Force, In 1926, in connection with a five*
year expansion prosra^* it stated that stagnation in proraotion
beclouded the prospects of luany promising officers and that
"unless the promotioa question is settled with justice to all,
tne expendit^ire of large sums of money on an elaborate con-
struction program would be of doubtful wisdom. In connection
with the proposed Purlow bill, it said, "If the United States
is to have an effective Air Corps the flying officers should
get a little better promotion. "^^ In 1932, the newspaper said
that the Air Corps was suffering from two serious handicaps:
sluggish promotion and shortage in aircraft and quoted F, Trubet
Davison, Assistant Secretary of War for Aeronautics as stating
that "backward promotion 'raises havoc' with morale. "Sij.
An incon^ij'ruous situation from an employee relations
•tandpoint occurred in 193^ which is explained by the following
quotation:
It has been an open secret for some time that morale in
I
the Air Corps has been under unnecessary strain, due to in*
I
equalities of the temporeiry promotion plan.
PROMO TIOIT
The matter of promotion is analogous to pay and Tlie ITew

A particularly sore spot has been the existing system of
temporary promotion in the corps which disrupts the sense
of leadership. Under it, promotions are restricted to the
area in which the designated officer is stationed. When
transferred, he may lose his temporary rank, and the anom-
alous situation occurs in which an officer* s rank may be
higher than that of a classmate today, but tomorrow may be
below that of a junior officer, • , «2>
HOUSING
I
i Little editorial mention was made concerning housing for
llir Force personnel during the period of this study. But the
housing program for air fields received favorable comment in 1926
When an editorial concerning Mr, Davison's annual report In The
Hew York Times saidx
•••Mr, Davison has something to say about housing which
doesn't make pleasant reading. It is far behind and making
slow progress. Less than one h\mdred and fiftieth of the
permanent housing for Air Corps officers was completed at
the end of the fiscal year. The noncoms ^"r* a little the
better of it--one hundredth completed. At this rate it will
be a long time before the officers are comfortable. Slow
promotion, pay at a standstill and poor quarters make a very
unsatisfactory combination for men whose service is often
dangerous.
Two days later, in commenting upon the annual report of
Pwight P, Davis, Secretary of War, the same newspaper said:
,,,It is the Secretary's opinion tliat,,,if the housing
program is expedited, the permanent establishment will be
"unequaled in morale and professional effectlveness^"27
RACE DISCRIMINATIOH
In considering Air Force public relations policies in
eonnection with race discrimination, it must be assumed that

ll
lit.'2
minority groups constitute a large segment of the American pub-
lic and therefore must be given consideration wherever new pol-
icies are originated which might affect them.
Evidently the problem of race discrimination did not
exist or significantly affect the Air Force in the first World
War and only began to loom into the picture prior to Pearl Har-
bor. A letter written to The New York Times by George E.
Haynes, Executive Secretary of the Federal Council of the Chiircha
of Christ in 19^1-0 pointed out to the public that:
...In the face of national danger Negro young men who
could meet all the physical and mental requirements cannot
enter the training for the Army Air Corps. Color prejudice
and discrimination are cutting the Army and Navy off from
one of the most potential sources of good men, many of them
college graduates. 2^
In 19ip. the bar was lowered to admit Negroes to the Air
Corps with the formation of the 99^^ Pursuit Squadron. The ad-
mission of Negroes constituted an advance in Air Force public
relations but an even greater problem was posed:
...Many Negroes applauded.
.
.but many squawked. Their
complaint: segregation of the 99th. Until Negro cadets
went to the same air schools, joined the same squadrons
that white fliers did, these fighters for race equality
would consider it a Jim Crow Air Corps. ^9
The Negro problem points out the importance of recogniz-*
ing that new problems which arise in America may have a definite
beairing on the fiinctioning of the Air Force. Thought processes
in the American society may take certain shifts and bring about
changes, all of which must be taken into consideration in the
daterminfttlon of public opinion*
s
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MORALE
Evidence has been provided which Indicates that morale
touches upon every phase of personnel mentioned in this chapter,
Purthermore, it is believed that the question of moral© cannot
be divorced from any situation, small as it may be, in iirtiich tht
human factor is involved.
Commenting on the mistreatment of flying personnel in th«
first World War about which Lieutenant Colonel Hiram Bingham had
written in an article in U,S. Air Service , The New York Times
saidt
!
..•The woes of the aviators were due in no small part to
the haste in which the flying corps was organized and the
unavoidable difficulties that delayed their reaching the
front and beginning the work to which they eagerly aspired.
'
Besides these, however, there were troubles, many and great,
otherwise caused—caused by a strange tactlessness in hand-
ling them, a stranger disregard for their peculiarities of
temperament, and a strangest Inappreclation of their firm
!
willingness to risk their lives in a service where death
, was so likely to be the reward of patriotic devotion.
I
All these things were bad for morale,,.-'^
The importance of humor in the maintenance of morale was
cited in an editorial concerning the joint maneuvers in the Og»
densburg. New York area in 19^0 vhen one side attempted to cut
off the other's supply lines so that coffee would not bo avail-
able in the morning:
j
Some stay-at-home military critics may think that this
I
sort of fooling is out of place even in a mimic war, for if
a mimic war is worth spending money on itb preparation for
something tragically real that may happen some day. They
are dead wrong. Nothing is better for a soldier's morale
than an occasional outburst of plain foolishness. Our
; awni flM have alwAyB^Jhad A aexiAB imm¥^*^J^^ reilefit*.
(
the confidence and vitality of a youthful race.
The jokers, practical or otherwise, in our mimic wars,
will be on hand if the real war ever comes. They will fight
the more bravely, because amid the terrible ironies of con-
flict they will still enjoy the camp joke, the unexpurgated
camp son,'^, and the little absurdities that always occur when-
ever healthy men are gathered together. 31
j
FINDINGS
1. Administration within an organization can affect its
public relations. Improper administrative procedures, such as
the War Department requesting in the newspaper the addresses of
prominent aviators, serve to discredit the organisation and may
cause the public to lose confidence in its overall capabilities.
I
2, In the case of the misunders tanding by the public of
the Air Pore© requirement of at least two years of college for
flight training, one of the basic principles of public relations
was violated when a complete explanation was not published, Th#
main issue, from a public relations standpoint, was not whether
a college man could fly an airplane better than a high school
graduate. Instead, it was a question of failure by the Air
Force to logically set forth the reasons underlying its require-
ment for a minimum of two years college experience,
I 3« The maintenance of high morale among members of the
Air Force has an essential bearing on Air Force public relations*
When Individuals are ardent supporters of the organization to
which they belong, they will invariably project their enthusiasm
to that segment of the public with which they have contact.
/
CONCLUSIONS
1, There is a continuing:; responsibility on the part of
Air Force public relations personnel to explain to administra-
tive flections the adverse public opinion which can result from
inefficient administrative practices of which the public becomef
cognizant.
2. Continuing research is indicated and recommended in
the race discrimination problem inasmuch as minority groups con«<
stitute a segment of the American public to which the Air Fore©
looks for support,
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CHAPTER XI
AIR ACCIDENTS AND SAPETT
From the day of its inception, the airplane has always
possessed a curiosity value. It is young in development and
when the sound of an airplane engine is heard, people look into
I the sky to watch the progress of new invention, to judge prepar-
edness with their own senses or—to be horrified by the mishaps
of aerial pursuit.
The very nature of the airplane commands attention and
when an accident occurs the national public is witness to its
•very detail through the speed of communications. Proof is not
necessary to indicate that the public is interested in every
phase of aviatlon--the mere emphasis given to it by publications
makes this fact self-evident. This interest develops into a
triangle involving military aviation, commercial aviation and
the public, all of which are concerned with accidents and ef-
forts to eliminate, or at least lower the number of, mishaps foy
the mutual safety of all.
Accidents propagate safety. In the beginning the safety
element in aviation played a secondary role, but as accidents
occurred they brought lessons which resulted in the development
of safety devices and procedures. As the aviation industry
grew older, as it acquired experience through the ventures of
its military and commercial progenies, it attempted to antici-
I
pato safety requirements.
II
^9
This awareness of the element of safety meets a require-*
aii«nt of the American public. The future of commercial aviation
depends on it. The public also is concerned with the eliminatiol
jiof accidents and progress of safety In the Air Force. Por^ in
addition to such factors as loss of valuable airplanes and crewSj
the recklessly flown airplane may become a medium of destruction
of the public. This is not only true in peace but also in war
jwhen accident prevention and safety can be the means by which
il
{more airplanes are sent into the air to subdue an enemy force.
I
The interest in accidents and safety has paralleled the
Tlae of military aviation In the United States*
THE PUBLIC RELATIONS POTENTIAL OP AGCIDEl^TS
In the normal course of war time events, the American
public accepts the possibility and inevitability of death. How*
ever, the loss of life through an accident not Involved in actual,
leombat normally results in criticism. Such was the case in 19I6
When newspapers almost daily reported the death of one or several
aviators who were undergoing instruction in aviation training
eamps!
The development of this vital branch of our fighting
machine has not been accomplished without arousing sharp
criticism because of many fatal accidents that have been
recorded from the training camps. The death of a combatant
in a battle in the air seems but the toll of war, but the
death of men who are still in training for this valuable
array service has caused much comment by the press in this
country.
Press criticism of such sacrifices in the Air Service
la decidedly detrim^Ti^^i t
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Howsver^ the public also realizes that aerial achievement
Involves the taking of certain calculated risks* The futiire of
.aviation experimentation depends on those pathfinders who will
•ndanger their lives for the sake of progress* This fact is
generally accepted and was commented upon favorably by The New
York Times in 1919 although the saiae paper had made disparaging
remarks about training camp accidents in the previous year:
Americans may justly take pride in the performances of
the army aviators who are flying across the continent in
good and bad weather and at tremendous speed. There have
been casualties, it is true--five of the fliers have been
killed; and on that account there may be criticism of the
War Department's enterprise. But aviation cannot be devel-
oped without risks. Those who entered it were volunteers,
and they understood that there could be no insurance against
!
accidents.
,..V/hen eighty or more airplanes start on coast-to-coast
and return flights for a test of speed and stanchness, mis-
haps and some casualties are to be expected.,,^
it board of inquiry in connection with an airplane accident re-
sulted In detrimental editorial opinion in 1922 when a brief
•ummary but not the full report was made available to the press*
writer and also left the public and the service hanging in mid-
air inasmuch as they Imew of the accident but not of the partic-
tilars. In this case, the report had been forwarded to the Secre-
tary of War upon whom rested the decision to publish it. The
The withholding of information concerning the findings of
This served to lead to conjecture on the part of the editorial
would be best for the interest
of the army not to pigeonhole the report.
While there are cases in which mechanical deficiencie»
II
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Ban cause accidents, the human factor Is always Involved* In
•erne cases the ability of the pilot may correct or offset the
mechanical difficulty. However, human failings do not mitigate
the public relations problem and as a result of three accidents
i
In 1935» it was said:
!
••In aviation, improvement of the machine is tending to
outrun the humeui factor.
••.Human error will creep in to invalidate skill and ex-
perience* « .Unceasing vigilance over the human factor in
flight. ..is more than ever imperative. h-
The fact that the law of averages will take its toll in
kirplane accidents is obvious. An outstanding example of public
l^elations and the proper handling of an awkward situation oc-
curred during America's preparation for V/orld ¥/ar II when, as
imore airplanes took to the air, more fatalities occurred. Time
itated that the press noted the increase with alarm and assumed
that the Army and Navy were to blame. However, Brigadier Gener-
111 Herbert A, Dargue held a press conference and told the partic-
ipants to expect more crashes and more deaths, in addition to
jlssuing exact statistics for purposes of comparing the accident
1;
tBites of current and previous years. General Dargue further
Utated that as long as the human element was the human element
there would be accidents and nothing could replace experience.
In commenting on his remarks. Time saidi "The Air Corps
ean and does penalize the reckless, preach care, cull out the
pongenitally unfit. But it cannot be over-carefiil, A pilot
Who never takes a chance may lose his life and plane in combat."
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The War Department, in releasing General Dar^ue^s gloomy
forecast, said, "Let us face this situation with a calm realiea-*
tion that preparation for war takes its toll as well as war It-
lielf."^
I
It is interesting to note that this situation, almost
ilimilar to the one which existed in I9I8 when trainixig camp
j accidents evoked harsh criticism, brought about what may be con»
sidered favorable publicity in light of the happenings. The de-
velopment of the story indicated that the Air Corps took imme-
diate steps to counteract unfavorable publicity by the issuance
Jof cold facts which would enlighten the public and let it know
ii
the true aspect of the situation and the -underlying reasons.
SAPETT AS A PUBLIC RELATIONS FACTOR
The press has consistently encouraged safety in liiilitary
aviation although it has realized tiirough the yeairs that safety,
while an important factor, was not the prime consideration in
military aviation. In 1919» The New York Times , already con-
jecturing the possibilities of an Atlantic flight, said:
But there never would have been an airplane flight, long
or short, if "safety first," or even last, had been the
guiding and controlling., rule of aviators. They are real
men, and danger, instead of deterring, attracts them, as it
always does all.real men when the object to be accomplished,
is worth while."
In 1923» the Tltaes again noted that hardly a day passed
in which army aviators* deaths were not recorded and said:
To say that they should not be allowed to risk their
lives would be absurd, for to do that is their business,
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their profesBlon; but certainly they should not be con5)elled
to take unnecessary risks...'
One month later, the same paper, commenting on the same
ubject, brought out favorable information which showed that:
Danger inheres in routine array aviation. It must be in-
curred as part of the day's work. There is flying in forma**
tions called for in active service. The practice includes
pursuit of an enemy and "combats'* in the air.
.
.experiment-
ing with manoeuvres.
.
.quick climbing, emert^ency landings,.
»
nigiit flying. To a considerable extent war conditions are
inseparable from the training. It must^be kept up to pre-
pare aviators for the ordeal of war.,,,^
Four years later this trend of thought was continued when
The Literary Digest , in excerpts from an article written by
George Lee Dowd, Jr. in Popular Science Monthly, pointed out
that military aviation was not safe and that safety was not th«
j|main consideration in military flying. However, Mr, Dowd asked
the question,. "Does the public know the difference between the
risks which the military aviators must taice and those which the
civilian pilot should avoid at any cost?"9
II Although editorials in heavy accident years had informed
the public of the conditions under which army aviators operated
in comparison to civilian air lines, the above indicated that
this process of information was not a continuing one. It is
advisable for the Air Force to publish accident statistics an-
nually. In doing so, it will impress the safety factor of mil-
itary aviation in the public mind and create a confidence that
will offset the years in which the accident rate is excessive.
When the Air Force points out the safety features of aerial
i,fXi^t» It encourageg faith and jsiood will for all aviation^
I
Such was the case in 1930 when The Mew York Times report-
Ad that army aviators flew 32,500,000 miles during the year with
one fatal accident for every 855t900 miles:
..•In mimic battle, and in training for it, the evolution*
required of the military pilot test his courape as well as
his skill. He faces risks to which the coramercial aviator
is a Strang- er. The days work of the Army Air Corps is al-
ways of a high class. ...^^
ACCIDENTS AND THE PRESS
There is a parallel to the experience of the Air Force
and American railroads in the handling of accidents as far as
press relations are concerned. Prior to the tiriAe that the Penn-
sylvania Railroad employed Ivy Lee, a pioneer in public rei&tioii
,
\a8 its public relations counsel in the early 1900*s, the policy
iiad been to try to keep as much accident information from the
ipress as possible. As a result, members of the press became
bitterly unsympathetic toward the railroads and when news of an
accident leaked out, as it inevitably would, the newspapermen
combined bits of factual information with conjecture in order to
i'
jirrite their stories. The erroneous implications which often re-
Bulted proved to be embarrassing to the railroads on many occa-
•ions. One of the first recommendations by Ivy Lee was to pro-
Vide a special train and all available facilities to take news-
papermen to the scene of railroad accidents so tiiat they could
Obtain complete and accurate information on which to base their
Ippeports. This new departiire in press relations paid dividends
Jamaediately because the newspapermen became Sj^iapathetic toward
i
Ii
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th© railroad aiid always gave it the benefit of doubt in their
ftories. The fnerits of this policy were soon evident and the
practice became universally accepted by all Anierican railroads.
As airplane crashes becaii© liiore frequent, military and
©OMiiercial aviation began to encounter press relations problems
•imilar to those of the railroads at the turn of the century.
Unfortunately, the experience of the railroads was not utilised
to maximum advantage. The Air Force, as late as 1939* received
unfavorable publicity on occasion because of the manner in which
the press was handled at the scene of airplane crashes.
An excellent example is to be found in the events which
followed the crash of Lieutenant Kelsey's airplane after the
itranscontinental record flight described in Chapter XII.
i
Lieutenant Kelsey had crash-landed his plane on a golf
Bourse adjacent to Mitchel Field, New York with the ship becom-
ing almost a total wreck. Passers-by had removed him from the
bookpit, slightly injured, but soon an army cordon shoved them
lII away—"to keep the Air Force's secret a secret. "'-^
!
The reported "shovln^^ away" of passers-by by the Army
ijiordon carried an unfavorable connotation and did not reflect
fepedit on the Air Force, It was certainly proper to post guards
mround the airplane in order to deter souvenir seekers and to
prevent anyone from making a close technical examination of the
newly-developed aircraft. However, since the passers-by had
krrived at the crash before the guards and had boon close enough
• the plane to extract the pilot from It^ the subsequent actioni
I
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l9y the guards seems to have been unwarranted.
Inasmuch as the military does not have control over areaa
outside of government reservations^ it, therefore, has no auth-
ority to prevent photographers and newspapermen from witnessing
•vents which have high readership interest*
In order to maintain good press relationS| there is littli
point in denying proper information to newspaperiaen when they
already have a skeleton of facts upon which to base their storiai»
Instead, complete cooperation should be given within the limits
of security.
SAPEr/ IN EQUIPMMT
As mentioned in Chapter VII, semantics plays an important
role in public relations. The incorrect use of v/ords in a pub-
licity release may contribute to tne downfall of a project in-
•tead of the creation of desired results. An excellent example
of this occurred in l^ll^i
Between the assertion of Lincoln Beachey, that our array
aviators are using obsolete and patched-up aeroplanes, and
that of Secretary Garrison— Those in charge of the army
equipment tell me that the type of machine in use is the
best available"—the choice is indeed wide. Both intend to
tell the truth, doubtless, but Mr. Beachey speaks from per-
sonal knowledge of aviation and aeroplanes, while Secretary
Garrison does not, and the word "available" is open to
several interpretations.
The illustration also indicates that in statements made
ito the public, acceptability is more likely if the information
offered is firsthand rather than secondhand.
In 1921, af^er_fahe_oraai3^Qf a military ^I'pT nr'*^ »>^^ch =

ISI
••yen Uvea were lost, editorial opinion demanded federal regu-
lation of the air and further stated that sane and sound con-
•truotlon of airplanes ca^iie first in importance in increasing
13the margin of sadTety in flying.
After twenty-five army fliers had been icilled in the
first six Jiionths of 19^7 » the safety factor of equipment was
•mpha3i25ed in editorials throughout the country. The Literary
3Jd£est, quoting; a Consolidated Press dispatch, said that the
fatalities were reviving reports that economies enforced in the
javiation service for the previous three years had brought the
general run of equipment "to a state of decrepitude dangerous
to the life of personnel." The Manchester Union reported:
...It is much better to have some of our flyers idle
than to see them needlessly sacrificed.
The Milwaulcee Journal said!
For more than two years it has been said that our avia-
tors were riskin{i, tlieir lives in planes that ought not to
be flown.
The Hew York Times stated:
The two (Captain Curtiss \7heeler and Lieutenant Sack)
were killed in a crash of a biplane of a type which the
Army authorities now regard as obsolete and which they are
proposing entirely to abandon. What will create a bad im-
pression and arouse suspicion is the contemporaneous an-»
nouncement of the War Department that it is to scrap all
planes of this model by September 1. People will ask why
they were not already scrapped. -^4-
In addition to the detrimental publicity concerning
aafety in equipment, the last comtaent raises the importance of
properly timing press releases with regard to the pulse of pub-
iillc opinloQ In the light of current and pa»t events, Aa a pub-
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lie relations procedure the issuance of a press release in it-
Self does not solve the problem, but, when the issue is of con-
tern to the public, it should be presented at the most opportune
oment*
PLYING OVSH CONGESTED AREAS
Although the Air Force publishes regulations prohibiting
Individuals or groups of fliers from flying over congested areas,
this subject continues to present a public relations problem.
On occasion it may be impossible to avoid flight over congested
areas* However, there always will be individuals who will dls-
Bbey reg\ilations and thereby create unfavorable public opinion,
Uhe public, in its plea for aviation to stay away from congested
Areas, is concerned with the damage which may be done to proper-
ijfey, the noise element and the possibility of personal injiiry or
ifatality resulting from a crash or a forced landing.
The situation was presented in the form of a letter to
The New York Times in 1922 when Francis J, Cannaughton wrote:
Will you permit me through the medium of TlIE TIMES to
raise a protest against the flight of airplanes and other
machines over large cities, such as New York, and even
villages and townships? Accidents have occurred in conse-
quence of reckless €ind even carefully conducted flights, and
it is needless to say will occur again. In the event of
these machines falling to the earth, there is no protection
of any kind for unfortunate persons intervening between the
ground and the machine. It is to be hoped that some effort
will be made by the authorities to restrict airplanes and
dirigibles to areas in which sudden and unexpected contact
witti the earth will not be productive of tragic results,
That the Air Service was aware of the problem was apparent
{I
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for in 1922 a civilian pilot holding a coiiimission in the Air
Service Reserve Corps had his comoLissioxi revoked for circling
over tho Lincoln Meiaorial in Washington, D, C» while President
Harding was delivering a iiemorial Day address, Althoutbh the
pilot was only in the reserve corps and was not flying a mili-
tary plane, favorable public opinion was obtained for Secretary
of War Weeks who, in a letter to the President on the subject
of unre^jUlated civilian aviation j pointed out "that while the
•nay and navy can, and do, control their pilots, they have not
Jurisdiction over the contLaercial and unattached airmen, pro-
fessionals or aaateur. "-'•^
When the Air Corps msuieuverB were annovmced in 1931 and
Included the mimic bombardment of several large cities, criticiai
of the program was made in a letter to The New York Times by
Herman J, Padelford wno said, "Citizens of Boston have already
entered protest, on thc> ^-^round of the danger to the health of
tlie sick from such a noise. "-^7
Taking, cognizance of the fact that maneuvers were re-
quired by the Air Corps for proficiency purposes, an editorial
nevertheless warned:
The arn^ air manoeuvres,
.
.have been criticized. as
dangerous on account of many planes flying in formation...
..It is obvious the duty of the War Dep8U?tment to leave
nothing, undone to £uard the safety of aviators and civilian!
during the manoeuvres. Formations must not be too close.
The flight of planes over cities must be what the Department
of Commerce prescribes, and local ordinances must be respect
ed. Mimic bombing attacks should net be so prolonged as to
cause alarm...
i
i6o
Secretary Hurley promises that he will make changes
in his plans, if necessary, to reassure the nervous,
Secretary Hurley's recognition of public attitudes in
connection with a major decision was evidence of good public
relations. Further proof of this appreciation of the public in-.
terest was provided two weeks later when GenerauL MacArthur, then
CQaief of Staff of the Array, stated that the maneuvers were not to
b% a "oircus" but a test of preparedness of the air branch for
irarfare and brought forth the following favorable editorial
opinion
:
•••The war games of 1931 should be viewed as an exhibi-
tion of the potential resources of the United States as an
air power. ...
...The people.
.
.have an opportunity to judge of the
success of the equi|)ment and the training of officers and
men. It is of great importance that they should behold a
spectacle proving the defensive and offensive power of the
air branch... .^9
By the satisfactory performance of the maneuvers and the
Correct handling of a public relations situation, the Air Corps
I
[received accolades for its performance in the air. Editorial
opinion noted tiiat the criticism sustained beforehand waa not
Warranted:
..To have flown so many planes on so many successive
days, under various conditions of weather not always favor-
able, without a single casualty and, so far as is known,
with but one trifling accident, speaks volumes for the
training and skill and discipline of our army airmen. The
most diffic\ilt evolutions and squadron formations were gone
through with perfect success...
.
Criticism of this exhibition of air power came from
varied sources and put forward diverse complaints. One was
that the manoeuvres would be dangerous to civilians. But
the order canceling the proposed night flight over New York
{i
l6l
City pretty well disposed of this, and in the result, as
there are millions of interested observers ready to testi-p^
fy, no haj»m was done to a single person on terra firrria..,, ^
A conmiunity relations problem for the entire Air Corps
was posed in 194-0 when two ariny bombers crashed in mid-air and
fell into the homes of several people in Bellerose, Lon^. Island,
Hew York, not far from Mitchel Field, The safety anxiety of in«*
dividuals residing nesLP an air base was expressed in a letter to
The New York Times:
Some consideration is due to the hundreds of owners and
inhabitants of small homes that have sprung up over the
vast areas of >^uoens and Nassau sine© the PHA plan went into
effect. Tliese horaes are the expressions and aspirations of
hundreds of hard-working, thrifty people. To live in con-
stant fear of a crash is nerve-racking.
To dismiss yesterday's accident as "one of the inevita-
ble accidents of training" is to ass-ume a fatalistic atti-
tude toward the service men,,,^-*-
Further criticism was sustained for the Air Corps the
followinr: day when The New York Times editorially commented:
Bellerose is in one of the most thickly populated areas
of Lone Island, It is the testimony of residents there thati
pilots from the Army training base at Mitchel Field have
been flying carelessly over t:iese houies for a long poriod
and that Monday's catastrophe was the inevitable result of
a practice which should not have been tolerated. Past com-
1
plaints have been disregarded. Army men say that civilians
! are poor judges of the height at which planes are flying.
But whether or not the planes were at an altitude of 2,000
feet, as required by the regulations, there is no apparent
reason why they should have been over a congested area at
all. There is plenty of room around and beyond Mitchel
Field, where the ground below is not massed with resi-
dences, ,
,
1
If a public relations policy in connection with accldentg
had been established at Mitchel Field, it is possible that the
criticism of the accident^ whioh claimed many lives, would hava

pointed out some of the facts in favor of the Air Corps. In a
long-range program some factors such as the following may have
been publicized for the information of publications and ooramu-
nities surrounding Mitchel Field:
1. That pilots are forbidden by regulations to fly low
over congested areas and that violators are severely punished
When proven guilty. To eliminate the possibility of calling
this mere "lip talk", and to serve as a deterrent, it is recom-
mended that the Air Force publicly announce punishment meted outl
to violators.
2, That what may be considered "careless" flying to the
layman may in actuality be intricate flying necessary for pro-
ficiency of the Air Corps.
I
3. That wind direction is the factor toverning landings
and take-offs and that on occasion it is impossible to avoid
flying over congested residential areas in the proximity of
Mitchel Field.
Ij., Tliat complaints from civilians will be followed up
and the results of investigations reported to them.
I
The statement that Army raen considered civilians poor
judges of altitude was ill-advised and undoubtedly caused the
Air Corps to lose many friends. Education of the public in the
types of airplanes which the Air Force possesses and the alti-
tudes at which their numbers could be read with normal eyesight
jwould serve to allay the fears of the public insofar as low fly«J
ing airplanes are concerned, and probably wo\ild decrease the
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number of complaints.
Proper press relationr: has a tremendous effect upon pub«
11c relations. In contrast with the previous case, the Air
Corps's side of the story was told in Time in 19^1 when a P-39
crashed into houses in Hempstead, south of Mitchel Field, kill-
ing three children. The story in Time corrected misinformation
published by IJewsday
.
a daily newspaper serving Nassau County
in which Mitchel Field is located. Officials at Mitchel Field
used proper public relations procedure when they did not try to
conceal facts that might have been considered derogatory had an
effort been made to suppress themi
,,.Pew days later, Mitchel Field officers read their
neighborhood newspaper, found themselves the objects of
bitter denunciation in a letter which subsequently got
into other papers.,, It was addressed by Mrs, I, Arthur
Kramer, mother of one of the children, to Eleanor Roose-
velt :
"Maybe you can do something about planes flying over con-
gested areas at low heights for experimental purposes,.
»
(My child's) little coffin was covered with flowers, but
not a single word of condolence, not one little flower from
the U.S. Army, •
,
"About one-half hour after the (crash) a Second Lieuten-
ant—shavetail—came into our home. He dared to thrust a
paper into the badly buj^ned hands of (the child's father)
and said: 'Sign here for no property damage,'"
In the face of this indictment, Mitchel Field was cau-
tiously close-mouthed. Yet, it had a telling answer for
every charge that was made.
Its flying is not experimental, , .At places like Hemp-
stead pilots are forced to fly low over the city in land-
ings and takeoffs.,.
After Pilot Scott's crash, Mitchel Field's chaplain Paul
J. Giegerich visited the mother, next day attended the fun-
eral as Air Forces representative. Because the Kramers are
i
1j
i
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Orthodox Jewa he advised fellow officers to send no flowers
in keeping with Orthodox custom. But flowers were sent to
the funerals of the two other victims of the crash, who
were Roman Catholics. The request for a so-called damage-
to-property report was routine, if undiplomatic at the time*
It called for no waiver of damace rights.
In the face of these facts, Mitchel Field »8 airmen ¥er©
hard put to it to explain Mrs, Kramer's indictment. .^-^
FINDINGS
!
1. Unexplained accidents can result in unfavorable pub-
lic opinion whereas the proper disclosure of facts pertaining
to accidents, including the findings of accident boards, serves
to create understanding of the situation and promotes tolerance
on the part of the public.
2. It has been stressed to the public that safety in
military aviation, thoxjgh of great importance^ is not the prime
eonsideration. The progress of aviation requires the taking of
certain calculated risks.
3. The proper utilization of semantics in press releaseij
has a considerable effect on the acceptability of news releases
by the media. Improper timing of press releases serves to ne-
gate the desired goal in the formulation of public opinion.
ij.. Proper public relations procedures may help to assuag
much of the criticism directed at the Air Force, resulting from
accidents.
CONCLUSIONS
It Civilian and commercial A3tiation organlgations ahoul^
*
i
e
i
{i
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benefit by Air Force accident experience. The dissemination of
j
accident Information would aid the public relations effort of
the Air Force and gain many new friends.
2. Public relations policies and procedures to be fol-
lowed in the handling of airplane accidents should be establish4
•d and disseminated to all Interested personnel. Continuous
dissemination of educational inforraation to the public and presi
concerning flying activities is more desirable than attempts to
justify the Air Force position after an accident has occurred.
3, It is recommended that all public information offi-
cers become acquainted with, if not proficient in, semantics
inasmuch as it is an important tool in the practice of public
relations.
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CHAPTER XII
NOTABLE FLIGPITS m: U.S.ATRICEN
As early as 1916, the value of airplane speed and endur-
ance tests toward the advanceinent of aviation in the United
States was being debated. In its editorial columns. The New
York Times posed the question as to Just what and just how much
would be accomplished by the establishment of an annual race
across the continent for a trophy and large money prizes, as
had been proposed by the Aero Club of is^merlca at the suggestion
of Mr, Ralph Pulitzer. After wel/^hing the pros and cons, the
Times recommended that the experiment be tried."'* It pointed
out that America had become too indifferent toward aviation and
I
that the "aeroplane" should be regarded as more than merely an
i| attraction for expositions and state fairs; that far too rruch
of America's aviation experience had been along the line of
'I
1!
doing ixnnecescary things and taking needless chances, resulting
in a long list of fatalities among our aviators; that the cross-
country flying in such a race would be far more useful and far
less dangerous than aerial circus stunts.*
The advent of World war I shelved the issue for a few
years, but in 1919 it cropped up again. And the problem still
I exists today. Kot a single record flight is made even now but
what some critic of aviation pops up with the question, "«Vhat
jjgood did it accomplish?" Therein rests a problem for the Air
Force public relations offleer
»
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Once again the answer lies in one of the basic principles!
of good public relations that has been cited previously in this I
treatise: Have a sound, logical story and tell the complete,
unvarnished truth* Flimsy reasons are too easily punctured by
the experts and once this has happened, the public will no long-
er have confidence in the project, regardless of its underlying
soundness
•
In June, 1924 Lieutenant Russell L, Maughan set a new
transcontinental record when he flew from Long Island,New York
to San Francisco between davm and dusk at an average speed of
156.2 miles an hour. The New York Times termed it a flight
which must have been heard around the world. However, despite
its gloYsring praise for Lieutenant Maughan and his feat, the
Times cautioned its readers:
The official reason given for Maughan* s flight was that
its success v^ould be a proof of the atility of the Amy Air
Service to mobilize anywhere in the United States in an
emergency in war. But there are nine corps areas and in
each there should be at all times an adequate and efficient
air organization. There should never be occasion to assemble
on one side of the continent several squadrons of planes
stationed on the other side, or require their arrival in
eighteen daylight hours. ?^oreover, every aviator is not a
Faughan. If he had fallen to his death, the cause of pre-
paredness would have suffered damage.^
In commenting on the same flight, the Times made another
valid observation, which is as true today as it was then:
It should not be necessary to multiply hazardous missiorai
to extract appropriations from Congress. It would be to the I
advantage of the Air Service tc devote more time to recon-
j
naissance, pursuit and combat tactics, including marksman- ,
ship. Particularly needed in war would be aviators who J
could shoot fast and straight and use bombs with precision.

iS9
In lieu of record flights and stunts the Army Air Forces
•dopted a much sounder program In 1941, when It scheduled mass
flights over various sections of the country. Editorially, Tlie
New York Times supported this idea of bringing home to the Amer-
ican public the might of our then expanding: air force. It point-
ed out that a military airplane is pretty much of an abstract
thing to the man in the street unless he happens to live in the
;
Icinity of an air base. The Times lauded the Idea of large
flights of aircraft in formation, announced beforehand, and
olted that they would serve to visualize the modern fighting
plane for the men who make them, yet who seldom see them whole;
for the youn/r ifien who will be trained to fly them; and for the
citizens of all ages «hom they will protect. It was pointed
out that during the early days of V/orld 'i/i'ar I Great Britain ex-
perienced a sharp rise in production and a still furthering
stiffening of morale when its workers in airplane factories had
an opportunity to inspect on the ground, and watch in flight,
concentrations of the aircraft they were producing*^ This pol-
icy has been adopted to a large extent by the Air Force today
and is an important factor in maintaining closer relations with
the American public,
ARMY PLANES PLY ROUND-THE-WORLD
One of the most controversial epij: odes in the history of the
Army Air Service was the roimd-the-world flio-ht in 1924* The
ject frnt off on the right foot from a public rfilatlons-
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standpoint, but there were several slips before the final smoke
!
had cleared away some nine months later. In January, 1924 The
Literary Dip:est advised its readers that the Army was making
preparations for a globe- clrclinr flight:
The greatest aerial expedition in the history of aviation;
is getting under way at various airports of the United i
States Army* In March, possibly, or in May at the latest, I
I four big air- cruiser 8, manned by Army airmen, will start to
'
encircle the globe, •••The Army has not advertised its at-
tempt very widely, but several air specialists who have
looked into the preparations and the spirit behind the whole
enterprise predict that It will certainly succeed,'
A public relations faux pas was committed by the Chief of
i
the Army Air Service, Major General Mason Patrick, when the four
airplanes were named after cities of the United States. General
I
Patrick explained that the names So. Chicago, Boston, Seattle
and New Orleans were selected because they were considered suf-
I ficlently diverse and sufficiently typical to represent the en-
tire United States, The New York Times, usually a supporter of
the Air Service, took Issue with General Patrick on this point:
The General is a bold man--as a general ought to be, of
[
course—but has he the prudence without which courage, espe-
cially that of a military man, is not perfect? The cities
thus complimented by him are all right in their several
ways, but thus to separate them from Innumerable other cit-
ies is distinctly invidious, and the more sensitive of the
others are sure to reaent lt--to ask the general for expla-
nations, witnesses and affidavlts,
•
That The New York Times was objective in its editorial I
|i policy is evidenced by the editorial it ran on the day after it
had taken General Patrick to task for the Ill-advised naming of
the four planes:
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The American imdertaking is planned on acientific lines
to avoid wet seasons and violent storms. Its purpose is
twofold: to estallish a world record for America and to
promote the interests of commercial aviation. The latter
is more important,
•
An enterprise so methodically planned and conducted by-
such seasoned pilots deserves success. ^
The four planes took off from Seattle on April 6, 1924,
and on April 30 the flight suffered its first mishap, when its
oommander, Major Martin, crashed into a mountain in Alaska, How-
•er. Major Martin and his mechanic S/Sgt Harvey escaped without
serious injury and were eventually rescued. In connection with
this incident. The New York Times on June 5 commended the Air
Service for the manner in which leadership of the flight was
hiandled. This is a good example of the way that proper Internal
relations can often result in favorahle press and/or public re-
lations:
After Major Martin had wrecked his machine on an Alaskan
mountain, he was missing for some days and his companions
went on, with the command devolving on Lieutenant Smith, the i
next in rank. When the u'ajor proved to be not dead, but
very much alive, the others were well on their way to Japan,
and he was ordered home. He was told, however, that he could
travel east by train and ship till he met the other fliers
and then resume the command for the rest of the journey
through the air.
That was right and for the head of the Air Service to
have done anything else would have been to inflict a sort
of punishment on I.'ajor Martin for having been tinfortunate.
Bat the i»tajor saw that in another way it would be only tech-
nically right for him to supplant Lieutenant Smith after
the latter had been leader over what is probably the most
difficult and dangerous part of the long route, and cruel
to deprive him of the honors which will be the leader's in
Europe and on arrival home.
So the Major writes to his chief telling him that while
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he would esteem it a privilege again to head the little
fleet of airships, it would be unfair, or at least unkind,
to the deserving lieutenant and he asks another assi,f;nment.
The request is promptly granted, and if everybody is not
happy, at least everybody has been courteous, considerate
and honorable, and the country can be proud of them as
"officers and gentlemen,"
It was unfortunate that such a favorable story did not
come out until early in June, because the May 7 issue of The
Outlook indicated that there had been a shift in public opinion
concerning the flight:
We Americans cannot take a very great deal of pride in
the series of mishaps, seemingly due to technical defects,
that have almost succeeded in making the round-the-world
flight of the American planes a subject for a joke,,,.
...Itisapity that we Americans gave such an amount of pub-
licity to our own performance, especially when our planes
I
seem to have a hard time standing up to the strain put upon ;
them.^l
The cropping up of such a reaction as a result of the
difficulties experienced by the round-the-world fliers is para-
[
doxical when compared to the sympathetic attitude shown by the
public in 1934 during the air mail episode. The difference be-
tween the two reactions was no doubt due to the fact that lives
were lost during the series of air mail crashes, whereas only
equipment was damaged on the round-the-world flight. The build-
I
up had been so extensive in the case of the globe-circling ef-
fort that the public *s expectations were too great and a letdown'
was suffered when performance did not measure up to advance no- !
ticea. It would seem to be in the beat interest of good public
relations if predictions of attainments were to be minimized,
i^irnpn.A^jtVpnn^ng Yij publlc relati on s of
f
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include action designed to cope with possible reversals, even
though they may be only temporary in nature, as was the case in
the round-the-world flight.
The very next week The Outlook jumped to the defense of
the men who were making the flight and explained to the public:
Nature Is going to extremes casting obstacles in the way
of the round-the-world fliers, •Since leaving Seattle, the
Americans have fought wind, snow, hall and fog... .12
A British aviator, Captain Stuart MacLaren, had departed
on a globe- circling flight about the same time that the American
fliers had left Seattle and by the middle of May it began to
appear as if he might complete his trip before the United States
group. Again The Outlook manifested a typical American reaction-jf
Bupport of the underdog in a contest:
Speculation as to whether the Americans or British will
first succeed in their quest should not confuse the differ-
ent purposes of the two ventures. The Americans are using
four planes for technical and scientific reasons. They vir-
tually are charting a new and hitherto unmapped route as far
as aerial navigation is concerned. .. .The Americans are gath-
ering all sorts of metecrological data for the future armada
of the air which must one day use that route in world trans-
port."'-'^
By the end of Kay the three planes had oor.pleted the haz-
ardous crossing of the Pacific, but they were almost a month be-
hind their schedule. About this time, feeling was running high
In Japan as a result of the United States exclusion act. Tever-
theless, The Outlook reported on I ay 28 that it was "particular-
ly pleasing to know how much the Japanese have done to aid the
American fliers and to make them welcome. "-^^ The following week,
patch iipim ^p&n advised^^^hat - l^ie^ visit of our^vlatora_
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and the extraordinary personal Influence of Ambassador '^-oods
are doing much to dissipate the unfriendly faellng toward America
In Japan, "-^^ Tills serves to emphasize the importance of proper
conduct by personnel participating in projects which take them
into foreign countries. They should be briefed prior to depar-
ture from the United States concerning the public relations and
international relations potential that exists as long as they
are in another coijmtry.
On Axigust 13, 1924 The Outlook cornmentedi
As the round-the-world American fliers neared the Atlan-
tic coast the Interest in their success deepened; but, from
the time they left the Orkney Islands, anxiety also increas-
ed because of the weather conditions they were almost bound
to encounter in the journeys to Iceland, Greenland and Lab-
rador, -"-^
In the same issue. The Outlook reported that the Foston
had failed to complete the flight between Kirkwall, Scotland and
Hornafjord, Iceland. However, Lieutenants Wade and Ogden were
picked up by a rescue ship and were not injured. In the mean-
time, word had been received that the British plane, piloted by
Oaptain MacLaren had been forced to abandon Its flight.
On Septei?:ber 10 an editorial In The New York Times paid
glowin;T tribute to the airmen who completed the round-the-world
flight and commented philosophically on the ramifications of the
accomplishment
:
The chief value of the earth-girdling flight of the avia-
tors will not be comr:iercial nor military. It will lie in the
effect that the return of these ships of the air, ..has upon
the minds of men, women and children...
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...It has never been proved that the Copernican concep-
tion of the imMrerse has ever had any appreciable effect
upon the lives of the individuals accepting it in place of
the old Ptolemaic system, but it ia hardly possible that it
should not have given to thoughtful persons a sense of the
immensity of the universe in which the earth was no longer
the center. But flying about the earth... also gives a new
idea of the solidarity of mankind in t*5e presence of that
Immensity.
...The imagination of everyone can now travel around the
earth with ease and become habituated to look upon the world
as having a common interest. This is a noteworthy service^
and for the present the greatest service that these circtim-
naviators have given to America. .. .Their intangible contri-
bution to the spirit of the nation will he rrreater even than
any benefit to the country's material resources.
Prestige of the Air Service rose to its hlpihest point
subsequent to V.orld war I. The "most gor<^eous adventure of mod-
em science" was the way The El Paso Tines and practically every
newspaper in the country described the flight. ^8 To editors who
asked the practical use of the flight, v^ich took so long and
cost so much. The St . Joseph Pioneer Press rrave a typical answen
That it will brine: to the world useful knowledc:e which
will promote the develonmer; t of lon^^i-di stance flights is
assured. TTiese pioneers in a flight arotmd the world have
blazed a trail that will b© as common a means of communica-
tion between the continents as is now made by sea. It will
spell the beginning of the end of isolation for any of the
nations of the world.
Boston Transcript Major General Mason Patrick
expressed quite well the original purpose of the flight:
The purpose of this flight has been to demonstrate the
feasibility of establishing aerial commimication with all
the countries of the world; the practicability of travel by
air through regions where surface transportation does rot
exist, or at its best is slow, tedious and uncertain; to
prove the ability of modem types of aircraft to operate
under all climatic conditions; to stimulate the adaption of
aircraft to the needs of commerce; to show the people of
the world the excellenoe of American-produced aircraft and
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thus stimulate our American aircraft industry; and lastly,
to bring to the United States, the birthplace of aeronautics,
the honor of being the first to fly around the world. 20
It is felt that the best interests of Air Service public
ptlations would have been served if Oeneral Patrick had outlined
the purpose of the flight when it was initially announced to the
public. That he was keenly aware of the value of public oplnlcn
Ls evidenced by the following from The Aeronautical Dlp:est in
January, 1924, when plans for the flight were being formulated:
The round-the-world flight was conceived by Major General
Mason i.!. Patrick, Chief of Air ^"^ervlce, wao has been instru-
mental in obtaining the approval of the Secretary of War for
an increase in the present Air ITorces, and who has, during
his teriri of office, created nationwide interest in the future
of aeronautics by sponsoring the participation of Array Air
Service officers in various aeronautical events, thus bring-
ing the United States for the first time ir. history the dia-
tinction of holding every world aeronautical record of valu^
including world records for high speed, altitude, endurance
and distance. 21
A good example of the way In which minor factors or epi-
sodes can affect the trend of public opinion Is shovv-n in the
follovdng extract from The Literary Dip::eflt , which had favored
the Air Service previously as far as the round-the-world flight
was concerned:
High-speed red-tape cutters at the hands of some of our
great statesrien may be necessary for the assistance of our
globe-girdling yoiing aviators. It seems, according to the
Philadelphia Inquirer, thet each one of the six. ..has spent
considerably more than a thousand dollars out of his own
pocket. Unusual expenses of various sorts kept coming up
while quartermasters and such were far away. ...This brings
up the whole question as to what we are goin{* to do for
these six aviators. !,:ost commentators [^\oovxllj foresee
that we shall do—nothing.,.. V.hat d' d v/c do for the davm-
to-dusk flier I/iaughan, or for the Atlantic-Pacific fliers,
i.:acready and Kelly, asks The Dayton I'ews—nothlnr.... Cer-
t^inTy ATtiarj ca will aaem a very cold and unappreciative
|
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country If Ogden and Harding have to go back to sergeants
and men like Smith, el son, Arnold and wade receive no flid-
vancement whatever, chorus a score of powerful papers throu^ij*
out the country* Especially after all the hurrahing there
has been.,,,^^
There Is a probability that such an article mln-ht not
have appeared If the Air Service In 1924 had been as public rela4
tlons conscious as is the Air Force of today and if the standard
operating procedures now in use had been in existence twenty-five
years ago. Today, editors would have been furnished the complete
facts. If it developed that it was adinlnlstratively impossible
to promote the individuals at that time, the reasons therefor
would have been explained and any editor, no doubt, would have
been understanding.
It is highly desirable to prevent such stories as the one
olted above from ever appearing. Although an explanation or pos-
albly a retraction may appear later, many persons who read the
original story will mln-s the explanatory edition or will dis-
count it as "whitewash." Proper relations with the staffs of
newspapers and magazines are invaluable in preventin-; the publi-
cation of incorrect or incomplete information. However, this is
not to be ml.sinterpreted and confused with the improper function
of requesting editors to "kill" derogatory stories. If this is
done and the truth eventually leaks out, the public relations
problem has been magnified many times and the public will lose
confidence in the agency concerned.
One feature of the round-the-world flight was its sus-
ftd jjr^tgreat^ Too frequently a feat la praised for a few day
(
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and then Is nearly forgotten. Fowever, three months after it
had been completed, the rorind-the-world rij.i3ht was featu^^ed in
an article in The Literary Dif/eat entitled^ "?/h.at Good V/as 'i^ne
World Plif^ht?" Professor Alexander Tvlemin of the Department of
Aeronautics, New York l^niversity, was quoted as having stated
that the world cruise had been a test of the reliability and
endurance of the modem airplane^ In an abs tracts The ScientifIq
American said:
The world flight showed that the fire hazard has already
been lar^^ely eliminated. It has proved the reliability of
the general fuselage design. It has Indicated liiany possi-
bilities for future development in the power plant, ...^^
Despite the mishaps on the flight and the public relations
3versighta, the round-the-world effort did much to advance the
aause of aviation, military and civilian. The Literary Dip^est
itated when the fliers finally retu.rned to Seattle, the starting
point:
. .
.\'?hatever be the imnediate results, agree most w-riters,
we have all seen an epoch-making flight. And as at the be-
ginnin.f of the flight, so now at the end, it is the picture
of man*s Indomltability 1^: the persons of Smith, Nelson,
Arnold, Harding-, ^^ade and Ogden that stands out against the
background of that epic flight.
This same feeling was echoed seventeen years later in
(poll5.er^
s
. The writer of their "Wins Talk" section said of the
final len; of the round-the-world flight:
...It is doubtful if any airiman today, ir.cluding. the orig-
inal Army pilots, would attempt to fly from Reykjavik to the
United States in an exact duplicate of those ships. Yet our
boys did it. 25
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TRANSCONTINENTAL PLIGHTS
As was irentloned at the beginning of this chapter^ the
transcontinental fever began to mount in 1919 and to this day
it has never lost its appeal to the American public* Over the
years, records have been slashed again and again * but the csrosa-
ing of the country in a few hours by rocket ship will probably
not evoke mere glowing tribute than did the flight by Lieuten-
ant Eelvin V;, :^'aynard in 1919:
Well may the American people be proLid of lieutenant
Belvin Ys# Vaynard, winner of the coast- to- coast army com-
petition or> elapsed tirne, Aviat-^on records wj.11 be search-
ed in vain for such a performance as his: 5,400 miles of
flying at more than 100 rriles an hour, in spite of as chudL*
ish a reception as the eleT.ents have ever given an adven-
turer in the air. • • .Snowsto3nns, gales, fo^:, all were in the
day's work.,,.
...He had set a hirh nark for aviation and the echoes
of -^Is achievement will be some time dying down.^^
It is not often that one will find as many elements in
a story that combine for excellent human Interest and public
relations as was true in the case of Lieutenant Maynard's
flight:
...In San Francisco he answered the call to his cloth-
still a minister of the gospel, although wearing the wings
of the aviator— and spoke in two churches..,.
...Trixie, the Belgian war dog-, she whose coat kept the
tired mechanic, Hline, warrr; in frosty altitudes. •• , At the
end there was a picture to warm the heart, the reunion of
the Vaynard farr.iiy: the T/ife and the two siriall girls and
the husband and father who had come do'<m from the sky, all
the 7/ay frorr. the Pacific Coast,,. •^'y
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By 1923 the time required to fly across the United States
i«d been reduced considerably, V^hen Lieutenants f-acready and
Kelly flew non-stop from Long Island, Kew York to San Diego in
twenty- seven hours, The New York Herald termed it, "The most
thrilling accomplishment by men in the air since Alcock and
Brown hopped the Atlantic four summers ago,"^^ However, a writ-
er in The New York Vtorld found most significant the fact that
lesser achievements in aviation had aroused far greater interest
and enthusiasm* He stated:
The romance in aviation has dulled in the minds of the
public since Curtiss flew down from Albany {l9103.«».So many
times has the continent been spanned by airplane that, with
the exception of non-stop attempts, the feat has become com-
monplace
One valuable public relations lesson can be learned from
the Macready-Kelly flight* ¥i;hen the two aviators were being in-
terviewed in San Diego after the long flight. Lieutenant Mac-
ready said:
...The Rio Grande River was crossed near Socorro. From
that moment until we were near Phoenix we didn't sight a
human being. Kelly said he never saw such a waste in all
his life and remarked that Uncle Sam ought to give it back
to the Mexicans.
It is advisable to brief individuals before they take
off concerning statements to the press and/or radio at the end
of the flight. Since members of the crew are usually fatigued
from the flight, it is well to have a public relations officer
on hand to answer as many questions as possible and to assist
the flying personnel in avoiding statements which might later
prove embarraasingf even though they were uttered casually, as
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was done by Lieutenant Macready,
A proper concept of public relations was evidenced by
the following statement Made In 1919 ^7 Lieutenant Colonel H*M, :
Hickam, speaking for the Air Service:
The principle on which we are working Is that, as a re- '
suit of the wfiLT, the Air Service has now centered in it mostji
of the material, experience and personnel in aeronautics,
||
and we feel that the people of the United States are enti- '
tied, as a salvage from their Investment in the Air Service,
to all the benefits of our knowledge and experience that canll
be turned to coiimiercial advantage* Naturally, ono of the j
most important thing s in developing com:nercial aviation is
to have a well-recognized and well-organized transcontinen-
tal route from New York to San Francisco.
The unsuccessful attempts in 1923 of Lieutenauit Maughan
to fly across the continent between dawn and dusk were of great
'
alae to the manufacturers of aircraft as well as to the Air
Service, in the opinion of The Aeronautical Diprest
.
which com-
mented, "The wisdom of the air service in carrying on these
•xceedlngly heroic tests is certainly Justified by the experi-
ence and knowledge gained, "32
The following year Lieutenant Maughan successfully com-
pleted the flight from Long Island to San Francisco between
dawn and dusk at an average speed of 156.2 miles an hour. In
congratulating hira. General Patrick said, "Not only from a mili-
tary, but from a commercial standpoint, this flight is epoch-
al. "33 The New York Times also praised the feat:
It was a great achievement, and there is heroic stuff in
Maughan, His chief was right when he said in the telegram of|
jubilation, "You have brought prestige to yourself, the Army '
Air Service and to America," It was a flight which must
jhave been heard around the world,,,, 34
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The value of record-breaking flights was questioned again
I
In 1931, after Major Jimmy Doolittle had made the Ottawa-Washing-i
ton-Mexico City trip in 12 hours, 36 minutes, -.stimates of his
Average speed ranged from 20l|. to 235 miles per hour. Anticipat-
ing that some might term the flight, which had started with lit-
tle or no advance publicity, merely a stijnt, without permanent j
alue to aviation. The New York Times said:
j
Speed flights have more than a spectacular meaning. The
lessons of design both for plane and en^^ine are quickly ap-
plied in military and commercial types. On the human side,
speed-pilots such as Major Doolittle, Captain Hawks and Lie*|
tenant iVilllams.
.
.have learned that skill can avoid the
"blacking out" of vision which comes from the effect of cen-
trifugal force on the blood. 35
|
The morning of February 11, 1939 news wires hiommed with
reports that an Army mystery plane was out for a transcontinen-
tal record. By the time Lieutenant B^jn S, Kelsey breezed his
Ship into Amarillo, Texas from March Field, California for re-
fueling, the reports had been confirmed} newspapermen discovere4
that the ship was the new Lockheed substratosphere pursuit job
that had been undergoing quiet tests for the previous month-- !'
and that it approached 1^00 miles an hour. As Kelsey roared on
to Dayton, Ohio interest in his flight moimted. He refueled
again, then whipped toward Mitchel Field, Long Island. But as
he glided in to land, the light plane lost speed too rapidly.
Kelsey gunned his motors. Only one responded, the tricycle undei>
carriage grazed a tree and the ship fell into a golf course sand-
trap, almost a total wreck. Passers-by removed the flier,
-alightly^ln Jur«d,-^frQm i^e^aingle-seat coGi^ityJa^ut^aooa^^aa. IbayL
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cordon shoved them all away-«"to keep the Air Force's secret a
•ecret," 36 This incident has been discussed in the previous
|
chapter. However, another lesson to be learned from Lieutenant
Kelsey' s flight is tiiat it is practically iiapossible to keep a
|
record-breaking transcontinental flight a secret, so it is bet-
[1
ter to advise the press what is going to be attempted, instead '!
I
of having them print conjectures which might prove embarrassing !
at a later date. Most newspapermen have a sense of ethics which
|
will prompt them to maintain secrecy where it is reasonable and
logical.
ENDURANCE FLIGHTS
In August, 1923 Captain Lowell Smith and Lieutenant John
Richter flew for more than thirty-seven hours over Rockv/ell
Field, California, thereby breaking six aviation records. To
complete the flight, they made fifteen contacts with another
plane to take on gasoline, food, water and oil. The most nota-
ble thing about this flight from a public relations viewpoint
|
was the lack of recognition v/hich it received. The news story I
concerning it was buried on page 19 of the .august 29,1923 edi-
[
tion of The New York Times and no editorial comment was ever
made by the Times . This was unusual, because the Time
s
had
been consistently air-conscious since the earliest days of avia-
tion. Neither could any comment be found in the magazines of
, that period.
I
qnnh wfla nnf. t.ha ftase ffix yeAT-a-JLaJ^eg- when The^^jggtioa^
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Mark stayed aloft for 150 hours, l\.0 minutes and l5 seconds,
breaking the previous record by 35 hours. The .^a3hinp;ton Post
aid that the flight marked the beginning of a new era in com-
mercial and railitary aviation because it proved conclusively
||
that it was practicable and co-mparatlvely easy to refuel planes
in flight .^"^ "Nothing is any longer incredible to the people
of this incredible age," remarked The Richmond 'Jimes-Dispatch
which rated the flight of The Question Mark as the most signifi-
cant of any achievement in aviation since Lindbergh spanned the
Atlantic, 38 The New York Times was no less enthusiastic in its
comments on the flight!
The new year has begun with an achievement in aviation
that tempts one to predict a year of prodigies in 1929 • The
question Mark has been answered v/ith a chorus of plaudits
and forecasts by experts, ,, .The United States lias once more
shown the way. Our array men have often made records in the
air for skill and endurance, .Vhat does not aviation ov/e to
them? • ,
•
,,,What about the results, military and civil? It has been
demonstrated that planes can be refueled day and night in 1!
the air and that supplies and rations can be brought to themj(!
that the air can easily be taken with a ligi;t load of gaso-
line in an emergency, and that air scouting can be kept up
j
for days with reserves of fuel at iiand. Larger civilian 1
I
cargoes can be carried, with refueling plans made in ad- !
Vance, Repairs can bo made with planes in flight. The navy
as well as the army will H2:'0-fi't by v/hat v/aa accomplished
with The -question Fiark » 3V
SOUTH AI.?ERICAN PLIGHTS I
l|
The United States Air Force has contributed more toward
the establishment of good Pan-American relations than most peo-
ple realize. The first flight of Air Service planes to tour

South America departed from Kelly Field, Texas on December 21,
|
1926. At that time, Secretary of State Kellogg was quoted in
The New York Times as having said that "the primary and fund a-
'mental object of the flight would be the taking, of a cordial
message of friendship and good-will from the goveminent and peo-
p3.6 of the United States to the government and peoples of all
the American nations*" The New York Times went on to say:
That would be the oolitical aspect. It was hoped tliat
coramercial aviation would bo proxnoted in tne other Americas
j
by the visits to principal seaports of our Army pilots....
Major Dargue's command is properly the pick of the Army Air
Service* 4-1
^
Mishaps befell the flight all along the route; the hulls '
of two of the planes were damaged in Panama and the ships had to
be left behind for repairs. After rejoining the fli£iht a few
days later, the San Antonio again suffered damage and was left
behind. Then, over Buenos Aires the New York and the Detroit
bad a mid-air collision and crashed. Major Dargue and his co-
pilot. Lieutenant E. C. vlOiitehead, escaped by parachute, but both
fliers in the Detroit
,
Captain nVoolsey and Lieutenant Benton,
were killed. The New York Times commented:
Good-will hath her casualties as appalling as those of
war. The fatal accident w-aich befell our Pan-American fli-
i ers in Argentina appears to have been one of those calamltiei
! which no human prevision or skill can prevent. But it was
none the less tragic and mournful. Two of our experienced
aviators were lost, but the Secretary of »Var announces that
this sad fact will not cause the expedition to be given up.
It will be completed by the survivors. This shows how the
entire flight was conceived to be "in line of duty." The men
assigned to make it were under orders, and those orders re-
main to be carried out in spite of the disaster....
'6cepti<MV In the cm«ifcp4 «& tmd citl^a y«t to b»

visited will be even more significant and touching in conse-
quence of the tragedy at the extreme southern r»olnt of the
flight. 4^
The next notable flight to South America was made in
February, 1938 when six 3-17 Flying Fortresses, led by Colonel
Robert Olds, flew to Buenos Aires in thirty-four hours. Accord- i
Ing to The Kew York Times , the fliers received a tremendous ova-j
tion!
From the tenor of our dispatches from the Argentine, it
is clear that the good-will flight of the six huge B-17 I
planes of the Army -^ir Corps to Buenos Aires in honor of thej
inauguration of President Roberto M. Ortiz was a happy in-
spiration. The Gritica suiximed up the spirit of the flight
very appropriately in an eight-column, headline reading i
"A'elcome to the vi/ings of Democracy." 4-3
In November, 1939 another flight of B-17's, led by Major
General ii.ramons, visited South America. Sent to Brazil by Presi-j
dent Koosevelt as a gesture of good-will on the occasion of the
,
$Oth Anniversary of the founding of that republic, the four-
|
engine bombers covered 12,500 miles, involving all sorts of ter-j;
rain and altitudes from sea level to 25,000 feet. The last leg
of the homeward journey saw five of them fly non-stop the 2,100
|
miles from Maracaibo, Venezuela to Vi/ashington, D.C. at an aver- i
age speed of I96 miles an hour. Tiie I'tew York Tiues had tnis to i
•ay of the flight:
I
...Although the giant bombers flew southward only on an
errand of peace and good-will, their potentialities for hem-i
ispherical defense must be obvious after such a flight. And
!j
their trip clearly points to a still more important air
road, that of comiaerce, along which larger planes and more
frequent schedules wilJL knit more closely the ties of Pan-
American solidarity. 44
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A good-neighborly gesture in which the Air Corps played !
an important rolo occurred in December^ 19^0 when Senora Carlos
Davlla was flown in an Army bomber back to her home in Santiago,
j
Chile after a serious Illness here in the United States. Physi-
cians told her that her best hope for recovery was to return to
|
CKhile, but she could not stand a long sea voyage or the compara-
tively slow flit.;ht by Clipper* ^Vhen President Roosevelt, an old
friend of Carlos Davila, heard how things stood, he set aside, !
by executive decree^ the rule that women could not fly in Ariny I
planes and put a fo\ir-engine Flying Fortress at Senora Davila's
]i
I
disposal, Three days later the big bird of good-will deposited ij
grateful Senora Davila on her own soil again. According to Time !
magazine, "this good-neighborly gest^jre of Franklin -^^oosevelt
was not so princely as economical. Its direct cost to the
United States was about i3,B80 but the gesture was sure to be
P©paid--in good-will and good business—a thousandfold," 4-> i
New York Times approved heartily:
j
This fine gesture in behalf of a suffering lady has been
everywhere appla^ided in this country. .»'e can all think with,i
pleasure of this incident, k-^ \
ALASKAN FLIGHTS
|
In July, 1920, The Hew York Times lamented the fact that ,
"the breath cannot be kept in the body of aviation in this coun-^
I
try without ventures, novel and daring, that attract notice and
make people talk," was concerned with the lack of intereat
,
j
In thffl aright- £^ ^:ourL APffly IteHftvi
l
and plane H to Nome , Alaska^
1
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When the flight returned to Mitchel Field on October 20,
1920, The New York Times again admonished its public for an apa*
tJhetic attitude toward aviation:
Only the most daring and perilous, or novel, adventures
of the aviators attract notice nowadays* Interest in the
practice of flying is at a low ebb in England, and in this
country it is the same, which is to be regretted, because
the niost progressive nation in the development of transpor-
tation, not to speak of preparedness for war, v/ill be the
nation that takes aviation seriously and promotes it system-l
p.tlcally* Is the Onibed Estates to be such a nation? Not
unloss such achievenaentB ae the flight of the army men to I
Alaska and back aiakes a deeper impression. It was a most I
remarkable demonstration of the skill of our pilots, the
efficiency of our iUGChpiics, and the ingenuity of our de-
signers and builders, M-Q
The Army tested ten of its new Martin B-10 bombers on an
Alaskan trip to Fairbanks in July, 193k-» This flight was gener-^i
«lly agreed to be the most gruelling test that the Air Corps
had given the B-lO's, However, a public relations problem de-
veloped in connection with the flight, according to the account
The meaning of the massing of aerial strength in Alaska
pur-zled .dany last week. Admitting; the trcinndous strategic
importance of Alaska in a Pacific war, SLrm:y men insisted
their flight was merely a long-range bombing test and navy
men claimed their trip was only a routine maneuver.
Me€uiwhile, observers dug deeper for reasons. The army
flight they explained as an Air Corps effort to regain pres-i
tige lost in the air mail upset and subsequent Congressional'
investigations. A fast, headline-grabbing flight would put
to rest public fears about the nation's flying soldiers, ,
Whatever the causes and whatever the results, the two
7,000-odd mile mass flights should give the flphtini; forces
[
valuable publicity, which, in turn, should help them get .
bigger and better appropriations for their air services. . ,^9
in ^ewsweek:

This ia a good exeuaple of what can happen when vague and
flimsy answers are given to the press and then they start gaess-'
Ing about underlying motives, which are often non-existant » Of
eourse, on occasion the limitations of security make it impossi-
ble to divulge complete Information to the press. In such casei^
it is recommended that the members of the press be apprised of i
•xistlng conditions, instead of trying to appease them with a
decoy story*
FLIGHi' TO HAWAII
"The nation* 3 imagination was captured," said The New
York Heraid-Tribune , "by the daring of Lieutenants Maitland find
Hegenberger in firing themselves off on a tremendous range where]
A miss means extinction in the vast wastes of a trackless
|
ocean,** ^0 The Army fliers took off from Oakland, California on ii
June 23, 1927 and reached Hawaii the next morning, after flying '
twenty-six hours at an average speed of 92 miles an hoi^r.
The .Var Department gave evidence of having become anti-
stunt conscious, because from the beginning it insisted on the
•cientific value of the flight. The most notable new instrumGnt
I
tested by the flight was the new radio beacon, which guided th©
plane,^^ The New York Times editorialized:
Too much praise cannot be given Lieutenants Maitland and '
Hegenberger for their fine flight to Honolulu, .The hazard
was great, but in v/ar even greater hazards have to be faced,
,,,It is now known that in the emergency of war, a squadron
or several squadrons of planes could fly in formation the
2,1^.00 miles over the Pacific to the relief of Honolulu.,,,
II
19C
•••The Army Air Corps seems to b© capable of any venture,
however audacious, however difficult. It had to its credit
the wonderful cruise around the world and the Pan-ilmerican i
flignt, How it has made a record for distance flown at sea—
t
and by land planes tool There can be no doubt that in wau? 1
the army aviators would attempt anything and always distin- i
guish themselves. Reinforced by the navy and the daring i
spirit of the Marine Corps, they could go anyrrhere. ^2
PIXJDINGS
1. The value of r»peed and endurance tests has always
been questioned by elements which do not support military avia-
tion. Tiie purpose of record flights should be cited in advance,
thereby precluding misinterpretation and the ascribing of under-
lying motives, when security makes it impossible to announce
all details concerning flights, this fact should be stated, with]
the qualification that complete information will be released at
the earliest practicable date,
2* Flight personnel should be briefed in advance con-
cerning statements to be made to the press and/or radio when
i
they are interviewed at the completion of notable aerial achieve^'
ments. Careless remarks can create difficult public relations
problems,
j
3. In the past, the Air Force has been an important fac-,
tor in the development of rood Pan-American relations, Vith the
increased range of modern aircraft, flights will be made to all
I
parts of the £.lobe in the future and personnel perticipating Ij
therein should be Inculcated v/ith the importance of their fimc-
-a^l^nmbiaaaadr>T*i!i - l l
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1. Speed and endurance tests have two principal values:
(a) they develop essential information for the designers and
manufacturers of aircraft; (b) they serve to stimulate the inters
•at of the public in the progress of aviation, Fli^^hts should
never be staged merely for their "stunt" value. Aviation, mili-
tary and/or civilian, should be advanced by the project, and the
public interest should be served in all instances, e,£. , in the
form of more adequate national security, faster mail and freight
service by air, better cof.imerclal air lines, etc,
2. It is important that the Air Force bring home to the
American public the might of United States air strength by peri-
odically sending large formations of planes over the cities and
towns of the nation. Particulars concerning the aircraft should
be announced beforehand so that the viewing public may fully
comprehend the significance of the air potential being displayed]
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CHAPTER XIII
AIR PUBLICITY
Publicity Is the voice of Air Force public relations.
It is essential to the furtherance of the Air Force pub-
|
jlic relations program that Information concerning development '
j
Of policies, missions of good will, outstanding aerial achieve-
ments, and the Air Force story in general, be disclosed to the
public through media in the form of publicity. The absence of
the publicity endeavor may, in some cases, frustrate the goal to;
be achieved.
I
Publicity is a powerful tool of public relations which
Bust be used with careful thought and consideration to foster
the growth of favorable public opinion. It must be employed
»ith discretion. It must never be employed to whitevtrash a
bad situation. The power of publicity and its misuse is cited
In the following statement by Major Alexander P. deSeversky in I
19il.l!
...French officials and publicists deceived the country
and each other by sneering at Germany's vaunted air might...
Deception of the people of the United States during iiVorld
War I in connection with airplane production resulted from the I
use of misjudged, ill-timed publicity which did not portray the i
true facts, as is pointed out in Chapter IV. The Air Service
iBertainly did not benefit public relations-wise for its part in
bhis incident.
Therefore « Itjbecomes evident that the^^ublleitY pyQF.rflTn
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1
of the Air Force shoiild be designed to fulfill the mission of ln«fj
forming the public of the correct aspects of the aerial situation^
THE PORIIATIOIT OP PUBLIC OPINION
The molding of public opinion is a necessary objective of
the Air Force public relations program in seeking the successful
accomplishment of its missions. The interest of the ilmerican
people can be aroused by vigorous discussion of issues confront-
Ing the service. The use of publicity in this connection, in
j
keeping the public and media informed, serves a valuable purpose
>»ut must be discreetly employed. More than thirty years ago, in
the search for preparedness before the first world War, The New
I
j
j
York . Time
s
said:
]
•••Only tlirough vigorous public discussion have we reach-
ed the point of prospective preparedness, , .Iteration daily
in all but a few of the newspapers has served to keep the
subject alive. Plain and accurate stateiaents of our mili-
tary and naval deficiencies were necessary, and our require-
i
ments in the way of guns and animunition and ships and oizr
need of more men were inevitably dwelt upon until the knowl-
edge became common property. Only public opinion has com- t
pelled,A»the development of military and naval aerial serv-
ice,, • ,^
Lack of publicity concerning an important event may often
lull the public mind into a false sense of judgment, lliis prove
to be the case when the bombing tests conducted against the
battleships Virginia and New Jersey in 1925 received little
!
attention in the public press because the press relations sec-
jtion of the General Staff of the Army minimized the importance
of the tests in its advance publicity,^

11
1
i
i
1
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The publicity error became even more apparent v;hen on the
day of the battleship sinkings, the Navy scheduled a trial run
for the first rigid airship to be built in the United States,
the Shenandoah, It was said:
..News reports of the bombing v/ould revive editorial
comment and public discussion of the relative merits of
aerial bombs and naval guns. What happened? The barometer
was falling, but that did not matter. Favored news position
went to the airship experiment. Battleships had been sunk
from the air before. .. .Iwh-at if two ba&tleships had been
sunk? Was not the navy recognizing the diminishing power
of naval ships by devoting its greatest energies to the
air?4-
In 193^4. the need for an agency which would aid in the
ahaping of the publicfe opinion concerning America's aerial po-
iition v»as pointed out in The New York Times. It stated that
there xms a definite need for a fact-finding agency to provide
the public ¥;ith a starting point for intelligent thinking about
war in the air.^
In order to foster the growth of favorable public opinion
the Air Force must first get across to the Araerican people an
imderstanding of Its aims. VVhile secrecy may be involved in
many of its imdertakings, it must nevertheless keep the public
informed as the first step toward winning the good will of the
[people. The roaring of formations through the air, the staging
'of maneuvers, record flights and other shows of aerial strength
^are meaningless \mless the public understands what the Air Force
1
Is trying to accomplish. Grood will usually evolves from public
awareness of an organization's policies and goals. Criticism '
was voiced on this point in 191^0}
1
!

198
I
•,«It is not surprislriiT^ to find our government embarked
i! on a huge expansion of our air defense, for vv'hich the sum of I
" about 3500,000,000 has recently been appropriated. Tlie
'
puzzling feature about this procram is not its size, but
the lack of public understanding concerning it—the fact
||
that the -^iian in the street is disr>layin,;; such slight com- ji
prehension of a measure that is vitally related to the safe-i
ty of himself and of his fa:nily,^
|j
The above quotation also illustrates that extremely fa-
|
i
jTorable public opinion may be elicited if the Air Force can in-
^
jdlcate to the Individual taxpayer the way In which the develop-
I
i
ment of air pov/er can benefit the taxpayer himself • i
IVhen publicity is lacking or unobtainable, undesirable
j
public opinion may result when the media, sensing or knowing of
Ian important issue, will take upon itself the task of inform-
ing the public with what facts are available at the time* Not
I always will these facts portray the Air Forceps side of tlie |i
l|
story and some of them nay be the result of fiction combined
j|
with meager facts. Tlie issuance of correct inforrn.ation concern-:
ing the Air Force in these cases not only serves to engender the
I
I
igood will of newspapermen and coluimists but also gets the prop-j
,er information before the public and aids in winning many new i
'!
"
I
friends for the Air Force. The lack of information concerning
the building of America's air arm and its importance in the
I
!
formation of public opinion was pointed out during preparations
||for World '.Var III
The public should be taken into the Government's confi- J
ij dence to a greater extent in regard to military planning, '|
and particularly in the air phase ... .Not legitimate secrets,
of course.. .But neither should the broad outlines of plan-
i
ning be left entirely to the conjectures of columnists and >
ccaamentators#7 |

m
At the same time, The New York Times editorial opinion
criticized the Air Corps for not making public as much inTorma-
I
tion as the Navy had concerning our preparations for war in a
I
way which would create a state of understanding for the t)ublic: i
i ••The public is entitled to the broad basic facta re- I
ii garding the state and progress of our defences. This means '
that it ought to obtain at regular intervals comprehensive
I
reports with at least enough analysis to be meaningful.^
,
1
Later in that month, the same newspaper said;
J
•••The American public is entitled to know as much about
our present air forces as can safely be made public^^«»9
I
PRESS RELATIONS
The hostility or cooperation of media is an important
I element in the function of public relations • Considering the
immense size of the journalistic endeavor in the United States
!
and the huge audience it reaches, a project can practically be
j doomed in advance if the cooperation of media is unobtainable
•
I
On the other hand, good press relations will assure, at least,
j
;a major channel to the public. It is evident that it would be
very difficult to reach the mass audience of the United States
j! without media assistance.
j
In Chapter IV it was pointed out that the cooperation of
^
the press was sought in arousing public opinion in favor of a
I
large appropriation for the building of airplanes in World War
I
i I. This cooperation was obtained but was nurtured with bad
|
!
I
;' publicity which, in the last analysis, created poor public
|j
li
inion of the Alr_3ervlee^ Media dosA-j^t^-Ilke to be put Into li
ji
i
i
I 200
|ja position of a middle man in the deception of the public. Upon
ii
I
finding out the true situation, it will seek to rectify its mis-
takes by condemnation.
And—undreamed-of paradise for the press ngents--not only
did the papers publish what they said, but people believed
lt»#.«If you expect to iiave 12,000 airplanes by July l.,,and
then you find that you are only goinc to have 2,000, or per-
haps only thirty- seven. the effect has not been achieved.
You have failed to put it over; and whatever the defects of
present standards in the art of publicity, they have the
great merit of providing a sure and speedy consequence for
such a failure .•'•^
Media is interested only in publicity releases dealing
with newaworthy events which do not fall into the routine cate-
gory. Flooding media offices with irrelevant material is not
only a v<aste of the publicist's time, but results in the lack
of receptive attention when newsworthy material is submitted.
jCoercion of the press in this connection is usually worthless
for editors will print only articles which have real news value.
...Papers do and always did pay attention to the triumphs
I
as well as the failures of the airplane, but ihey cannot go
|
on forever telling of routine achievements. •
The preparation of articles in good journalistic style
is an absolute requirement for acceptability by the press. An
article not prepared in conformance with media standards, re-
j
gardless of its merits, may well fall into the waste basket! I
It is unfortunate that a moderate statement of truth doeoj
not compel attention. The annual reports of the chiefs of
Air Services recite pitiful inadequacies and major obstacles^
but they lack those dramatic touches that make them news...^*
!i
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i
!• Well-prepared publicity releases are essential to
j
the task of telling the Air Force story. The seeds of i^-ood
I
public relations are the honesty and integrity of an organiza-
' tion; the bursting forth of the blossom is the revelation to
the public of the facts by means of publicity. In this inanner,
I
favorable public opinion is formed and support is obtained for
Air Force goals,
2. Quality of Air Force publicity releases Is more es-
eential to the furtherance of the public relations program than
mere quantity of "bliirbs." It is of primary importance that all'
Air Force public information officers, regardless of the level
[
I at which they operate, enjoy the confidence and respect of media
editors.
'
I
^1
CONCLUSIONS
I
i
I 1« It is believed to be in the best interest of the
I
national militairy establishment for the various services to
\
avoid competition in their publicity efforts. V'^lien one service i
jjetages an event in an effort to overshadow a publicity effort
!
I
of anobher service, in most cases public opinion will not favor
;
the sei^lce which has attempted to dominate the news scene at
|
t
i
the expense of the other service.
I
j|
2. Publicity should always be directed toward the fur-
j
I
therauce of Air Force goals and not be made subservient to the
i
II
•eir-glorlfication of Individuals. In this connection, ezces-
•ive publicity about a few individuals within an organization,
I which results in forcing into obscurity equally qualified per-
i
•onnel, can create poor Internal relations.
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CHAPTER XIV
PUBLIC RELATIONS PAYS OFF
From the foregoing chapters, it appears that the Air
,
IjForce v/^s fortunate to have developed during the period in
American history v/hich saw the birth and growth of public re-
lations and the fostering of the doctrine which advocated "the
j
(good life."
Prior to .Vorld War I, America went through the "Big Buai-i
Bess" era during which the dignity of the individual was sub-
merged by the pressures attendant on the development of finan-
cial empires by powerful, impersonal corporations. The majority!
of the American populace was so vitally concerned with the task
jof earning its daily bread that national security was an ab-
j
jistractlon of little consequence to the man in the street. In
j
jjadditlon, there was no major threat to the peace v/hich would I
:l serve to focus the attention of the public on military prepar-
I i]j«dness. This would have been an inopportune period in which to ij
foster the growth of a new military weapon.
j
As was pointed out in Chapter IV, the period of World Warl
I was characterized by patriotic fervor and a chauvinistic at- ,
jtitude on the part of most Americans. This proved to be a
deterrent in the aviation field, because Britain and France had
jimade considerable strides in the development of their aircraft
||
•
ilindustry and United States production could have profited by the!
II !
Adoption of some of their de signs and processes* Unfortunately»
|
II
I
[the science of aviation and the airplane industry in the United i
ii i
States had not reached a point in its development at the time '
|0f America's entry into the war whereby it could profit to the
|
jnnximum extent from the opportunities which are always presented
i
to the advancement of the technical sciences during a state of
war. About the time tliat World War I drew to an end, the Ameri-j
i
1
'can aircraft industry had reached the stag© in its growth where
|
II
It could have anticipated a climbing rate of progress in the
|
months ahead,
|
During the twenties, practically no progress was made by
j
military aviation insofar as the development of its equipment !
I i|
jwas concerned because of a drastic curtailment of appropriations
ij
i brought about by two principal factors: (1) the national psy-
[ohological letdown and economic cutbacks which inevitably follow
postwar booms; (2) the severe depression in the latter part of
}
jithe decade.
|
j
These economic factors were a deterrent in themselves to
|
I
the progress of military aviation in addition to the opposition '
of the Army and Navy already mentioned in previous chapters.
The American public could have been aroused from its apathy only*
jiby controversies such as those in which Billy Mitchell engaged. 1
!i
I
IjTherefore, he xmquestionably served an important function in
|
keeping the issue of the development of air power alive during
the period of the t?/enties when so many other factors were com-
1
I
'binlng to stunt its natural growth. However, from a public re-
'
latlona standpoint it la felt that» by his vitxq)eratlona< Billy i

20^1
jMitchell did not actually abet the cause of a separate air force*
I
There was a striking resemblance between the attitude andi
i conduct of some of the more zealous advocates of military avia-
tion during the twenties and those individuals who contributed
itoward the inflation of the economic balloon which finally burst
in 1929. Both possessed a sense of daredeviltry, recklessness,
and abandon, .without these characteristics, it is doubtful if
|the Army aviators, with their obsolescent equipment, would have
'performed such outstanding feats as the round-the-world flight,
the endurance flight of The Question Mark, the Maitland-Hegen-
berger Hawaii flight and the other notable aerial achievements
of the tvj^enties.
This same reckless abandon was evident in the public re-
lations field, because during the twenties emphasis was placed
|on obtaining favorable publicity regardless of the basis in facfei
[Public relations counselors were frequently called upon to whit*
jiwash incidents which would have reflected unfavorably had the
'truth been published. There was little regard for the public
interest during this period*
At the outset of the thirties a combination of factors
forced American business to adopt a nev; concept of public re-
lations. This was the forerunner of the present day doctrine
jWhich places primary importance on the public interest and on
ithe dignity of the individual. It was only natural that this
concept would filter into the armed services, and it developed
that officers of t3aa oomparatlvely new_alrj8grvice werg mory
(
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!i temperamentally and psychologically capable of adapting them- '|
;
selves to this unprecedented doctrine.
! One factor which contributed tov/ard the adoption of this
I
i new regard for the dignity of the individual was the absence of
|
rigid discipline among members of airplane crews, dating back
jjto 1910 when General Poulols (then a lieutenant) assisted his
1
mechanics in airplane maintenance. Another factor was thRt
jmany of the Air Service officers who were commissioned after
World y«ar I had entered military service directly from civilian
jllfe and found that in the embryonic air arm they were not clo
I
ly bound by the customs of a service steeped in tradition.
This regard for the dignity of the individual is con-
'iflidered to have been a major factor toward the establishment of
j
ji excellent public relations by the Air Service during the thirtieal»
The favorable public opinion thus created paid off in 193lj- when
j
'the Air Service suffered an unfortunate experience as it attempt^
,ed to operate the air mail routes despite bad weather and obso-
j
jlescent equipment. As the result of a series of fatal crashes
the Air Service received much sympathy but little condemnation
j
from its various publics.
I
One of the questions most frequently asked of public re-
j
! lations counselors by business men is, "How will public relational
pay off?** Herein is found an excellent example of the way in
Iwhich a sound public relations program can benefit an organiza-
jjtion, even though several years may pass before such benefits ij
|are realized^__In^jhe^ajj._of_lj^ and throi;^^^_jjlijJ.j^ ttie Air L
1!
II
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Force reaped the benefits of the public relations seeds it had
11
I
sown during the thirties* l^Vhen the need for vast expansion of
Air Force personnel, planes, facilities and equip-.ient became
||
li
apparent in 19^0 # the support of the American people ¥/as as sure
fhis support manifested itself in successful recruiting drives,
industrial mobilization efforts and the passage by Congress of
|
huge appropriations bills without the myriad difficulties that
|
had been experienced by the Aviation Section prior to America's
•ntry into World War !•
.
|j
The Air Force enjoyed favorable public relations, for the
most part, during and subsequent to World War II. It Is en-
couraging to know that there is an awarenecs on the part of
high officers in the Air Force of the value of good relations
I
with its various publics because such relations will see the
Air Force throiigh the problems that will crop up during the
forthcoming atomic era. As long as the public interest is kept
in the foregroitid, the American people can rest assured that
I
I
they will be protected by an Air P'orce second to none.
I
'I
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